Paper #1

1 October 2002

IPS 691-FA02: Democracy, Governance and Development

Prof. Nüket Kardam

Saudi Arabia is a most fascinating place. Almost completely different from the USA in every way, and yet has a vitality, an essence of its own. Its government is different: there are no elections, and little if any public disclosure information. Its culture is different: Islam is the law of the land, and other religions are restricted or forbidden. Women and men are highly segregated from childhood, and have little interaction or even coexistence, except in the home. The economy is different: rather than being a land of opportunity as America prides itself, Saudi Arabia makes efforts to share its innate wealth from natural resources—fossil fuel. And yet, as different from the American way as it is, there are still many great aspects to this society. Healthcare for all is about as good as anywhere on Earth. Education is rapidly rising, including for women. Though segregated from men, at least large numbers of women are now filling classrooms and graduating with advanced degrees. Crime is extremely low, and a devoutness to religion is pervasive. Dangers lurk too, however. Extremes of religion, limited real economic opportunity, overbearing elements of social structure, and lack of free information all conspire, and terrorism such as at the military training center in Riyadh 1995, the Khobar Towers in 1996, and even 15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11^th, 2001. Understanding Saudi society, thus, has become an imperative of our globalizing world. Oil interests, regional stability in the Middle East, and progress in human rights are all further incentives in this pursuit. Yet one more such interest is that of culture itself. Saudi Arabia, for better or for worse, has a culture that is perhaps the most true to its history and heritage as is anywhere on Earth. Even for this reason alone, Saudi Arabia makes a fascinating study.

Saudi Arabia is making tremendous progress. It has modernized its industries in last twenty years, advanced health care, and bloomed in education. Yet in other ways it is still the same: a closed society, with at times inhumanly rigid rules, as witnessed by the fatal fire incident in the girls’ dormitory, where the girls were prevented from fleeing due to attire being deemed "inappropriate". What to do from here is a tremendous question, and I would doubt anyone anywhere has clear answer. To some extent, cultures must be respected and preserved, just in their own rights. At the same time, individuals within that culture must have certain inalienable rights, which must be protected. Whether actual "democratization" is an option, or even desirable, is unknown; but at least as higher education becomes more and more common—especially among women—Saudi societal fabric is bound to change. The world should pay attention, assist as much as possible, and simultaneously respect the heritage to the greatest extent possible as well. How to do both is a yet-unanswered question.

Per capita GDP: $10,500

Inflation rate: 0.5%

GDP: $232 Billion (2000 estimate)

Exports: $48 Billion (21% of GDP)

Imports: $28 Billion (12% of GDP)

Current Account: ($48 Bil) – ($28 Bil) = $20 Bil surplus, or

Exports ($48 Bil) (17% Japan, 15% USA, 11% South Korea)

1970: 11.8%

2000: 2.4%

1975: 53.9 years

2000: 70.9 years

UNDP says 23.7% (in 2000)

McGraw-Hill Global Studies says 37.2% (unspecified year)

Out of 173 countries surveyed by the UNDP, in terms of Polity (institutional factors necessary for democracy, i.e. laws and institutions allowing democratic participation), Civil Liberties, Political Rights, and Press Freedoms, Saudi Arabia scores rock bottom, 173^rd out of 173. Perfect scores on the first three (perfectly bad), and a score of 92% out of 100% in terms of lack of press freedom. The only countries surveyed performing worse than this score of 92% in lack of press freedom in Myanmar, with a perfect 100% and Cuba with 94%; both these countries, however, scored "only" a -7 in Polity (on a scale of

–10 to +10), while Saudi attained "perfect" rock-bottom scores in all three of the first categories, Polity, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights. Thus Saudi eclipses even Myanmar in lack of basic freedoms.

Other runners up and honorable mentions in the competition for world’s most and least free nations are:

11 November 2002

IPS 691-FA02: Democracy, Governance and Development

Prof. Nüket Kardam

In their book Achieving Broad-Based Sustainable Development: Governance, Environment, and Growth with Equity, Weaver, Rock, and Kusterer define Broad-Based Sustainable Development (BBSD) as "equitable, participatory, and environmentally sustainable" socio-economic and political development, which "must replace the narrower goal of economic growth". (Weaver, et. al., p. I.) Weaver et. al. further identify four components of BBSD:

(Weaver, et. al., p. 13.)

We can briefly evaluate the progress of Saudi Arabia according to these criteria.

Very briefly, Saudi Arabia has had five kings:

In 1970, King Faisal instituted a policy of 5-year economic plans. The first plan, 1970-1975, began with $80 million for the development of infrastructure such as transportation and communication, as well as social services.

The second plan, 1975-1980, utilized skyrocketing oil revenue ($1.2 billion in 1970, $22.6 billion in 1974) to industrialize and modernize investment, defense, education, urban development, and industrial and mineral production. After 1981, though, oil revenues greatly decreased, forcing a cut-back in these expenditures.

The third plan, 1980-1985, involving budgetary cut-backs, shifted focus from infrastructure on production. Agriculture was supported, as was job-training for Saudi nationals, and domestic investment was encouraged. The non-oil sectors of the economy grew substantially.

The fourth plan, 1985-1990, strove to increase efficiencies in manufacturing, agriculture, financial services, and education. Though oil revenues continued at lower rates, the economy overall grew 3.2% in 1988, clearly indicating recovery and success from these economic plans.

The fifth plan, 1990-1995, was reflective of the overshadowing Gulf War, an event which redefined Saudi Arabia’s entire foreign policy stance. Naturally, the fifth plan called heavily for increased spendings on defense, given these environmental conditions. Saudi Arabia not only spent heavily for its own defense, it also provided strong financial support for its allies in the war. Transportation, communication, and social welfare spending were all cut by large percentages.

Recently, Saudi Arabia has moved towards privatizing telecommunications, electrical power, and its Ministry of Posts. Telegraph, and Telephone. It has invited internet service providers and satellite link and fiber optic communications as well. The IMF has been highly supportive of Saudi Arabia’s continuing progress and development.

The contrast within Saudi Arabia’s governing system is evident: while among the least democratic in the world (scoring around 5% by Freedom House), the orderliness and rule of law functions at least relatively well (scoring around 60% in the Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness measurements). The UNDP Objective Measures reinforce the Subjective measures, showing clearly that Saudi Arabia has no democracy, in the sense that there are no elections at all, let alone affording women the right to vote. Even trade unions are rare, with most "civil society" at all forming around the national religion, Sunni / Wahhabi Islam, one of the strictest forms.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia does have social systems that support its citizens. While far from what we in the West think of in terms of a representative, "free" society where congregations of all sorts, speech of all sorts, and views of all sorts are presented freely and in plentiful opportunity, Saudi Arabia is apparently equally distant from a completely repressive, totalitarian regime that absorbs wealth at the expense of and with complete disregard to its populace. Saudi Arabia would be either a mid-point on this spectrum, or perhaps a third point in a diagrammed equilateral triangle. A better diagram yet might be a four-sided quadrilateral, with the fourth point being the "null hypothesis" of anarchy, or lack of an government at all.

The UNDP Report describes overall living conditions in Saudi Arabia to be reasonable, with healthcare and education available for a very high proportion of the populations.

Women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, as one example however, are severely restricted. Exact conditions vary, with dress sometimes heavily determined by ritual, and at other times Western-style blue jeans and T-shirts seem acceptable, at least in certain reported circumstances. Sometimes women are restricted and forbidden from driving a motor vehicle; at other times, such as those dictated by "economic necessity" (the definition of which, of course, is questionable) it is permitted.

Civil society— i.e. non-governmental organizations— hardly exist at all. Even an equivalent of the Parent-Teachers Association (PTA) was prohibited. Political protest is also severely restricted. Journalist and author Milton Viorst quotes Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Alshaikh, current Minister of Justice, as saying: "It is forbidden in Islam to raise a hand against the ruler. If he makes a mistake—even a big one like corruption, and that includes adultery or stealing or drinking—it is prohibited to overthrow him. If he forces others to violate Islam, you may refuse to follow him but you can go no further. You can advise him to change his ways, but you cannot publicize his faults. The one exception is heresy; if the ruler does not believe in God or the Prophet, then action is required. Otherwise, to overthrow a ruler is not permitted. When a people is without a ruler, what results is fitna—public disorder—and that is worse than corrupt rule. Obedience to rulers is part of Muslim practice." (Viorst, p. 218.)

Elsewhere, Viorst points out that "Western-style protests are of little interest to Saudi Arabians. Saudis, a professor reminded me, respond not to Rousseau or Jefferson but to the Prophet and his companions. Any serious reformer, Saudis agree, understand that his cause must be carried aboard an Islamic vehicle." (Viorst, p. 211.)

Conditions in Saudi Arabia, according to research I have seen, certainly meets the initial criteria of "national unity". While not completely unified—there are border disputes, internal disputes, etc.—no state can claim perfect unity. The orderliness indicated in the Subjective Indicators of Governance / Rule of Law data, as well as the strict Saudi adherence to the Koran and Islamic law does show a clear degree of national unity, and thus this criteria is met.

The next two conditions, "breakdown of non-democratic regime" and "beginning establishment of a democratic order" are present to some extent, but not overwhelmingly so. There is turmoil, and many voices can be heard (if one can find where to listen...), from both fundamentalists and reformers, as well as challengers within the system. Successors to the throne from among the many princes in one example of such internal challenge. "External" challenge—external to the royal family and current government, but internal to Saudi Arabia—includes radical anti-Western Islamists, as well as Western-educated "liberal" (relatively speaking) modernists. Thus breakdown of the non-democratic monarchy has not occurred, but there are certainly signs of strain and forces at play. Indications of Sørensen’s Preparatory Phase are thus visible.

As for Sørensen’s Decision Phase, "beginning establishment of a democratic order", there are some signs here as well. These tend to be more remote however. One influence is the presence of Westerners at all, whether off-duty US military personnel, including women in T-shirts and jeans, or whether Western business personnel, or whether via modern communications technology, such as cable television and internet connectivity. These Western technologies are still very rare in Saudi Arabia, with extremely low penetration rates, but they do exist, and more people in Saudi Arabia are beginning to become familiar with them, or to observe them at all, first hand. Another source is from within the Islamic religious order itself, where modern interpretations or re-interpretations shed new light on possibilities for reform. While far from any type of firm "beginning establishment", just the presence of these elements at all is an indication, a guiding light for possible further development or "enlightenment".

Sørensen’s final phase, the Consolidation Phase, "further development of democracy; democracy ingrained in the political culture", is clearly a long way off in Saudi Arabia. This stage has not yet occurred, and would be in the more distant future, if at all.

So again, in summary, Sørensen’s Background Conditions are met in Saudi Arabia; both the Preparatory Phase and the Decision Phase show some indications of beginning to occur or to become feasible; while the Consolidation Phase has yet to occur at all.

In Sørensen’s discussions of "transitions toward democracy", Saudi Arabia is clearly very low on the scale, but again some signs do exist.

First and forebodingly, Saudi Arabia bears much resemblance to Sørensen’s description of Max Weber’s "patrimonialism", which is "any government that originated from a royal household and that has a ruler who treats matters of state as his or her personal affair.... Personal rule is based on personal loyalty, especially toward the leading figure of the regime, the strongman. All the important positions in the state, whether bureaucratic, political, military, or police, are filled with the loyal followers of the strongman, his relatives, friends, kinsmen, and tribesmen. Their loyalty to the strongman is reinforced by their sharing the spoils of office. The strongman commands a web of informal networks, or patron-client relationships, within which two main forms of spoils are distributed. Both emanate from the strongman and his followers’ control of the state." (Sørensen, p. 50.) Again, this description sounds very much like the case in Saudi Arabia, and thus overly encouraging for prospects of democracy, but fortunately there is more—at least a little more— to the story.

Sørensen also cites the work of Robert A. Dahl, listing five conditions that favor the development of a democratic state:

Among these five conditions, only the last is present: the possibility of positively favorable foreign influence, either from the West, or from Western-influenced or more modernist or moderate Islamic scholars and reformers. The first four, unfortunately, very much point away from democracy in Saudi Arabia. But one factor in favor is better than no factors, so there is certainly a possibility and the glimmer of an opportunity, even if remote. Further, Sørensen adds, "it is important to note that these conditions, although the most favorable ones for the development of a consolidated democracy, are not prerequisites for its development." (Sørensen, p. 52.)

Other factors supporting the possibility of democracy, however distant, exist in Saudi Arabia as well. Sørensen also discusses the role of "human rights groups, amnesty committees, and other civil associations... the Catholic church.... trade union associations, professional groups (lawyers, engineers, social workers, journalists, and so forth), and university associations. The emergence of a stronger civil society in... diverse associations constitute the plural society that is an important precondition to democracy... Moreover, their internal organizations create forums for the education of citizens in democratic decision-making. In this sense, the associations can act as ‘seedbeds of democracy’." (Sørensen, p. 57.)

While we have already discussed the nearly non-existent level of civil society in Saudi Arabia, there are trends toward it possibly arising. Most specifically, a larger number of its citizens are gaining training outside of Saudi Arabia, and getting exposure to the West both in their specific fields of study and at the general levels of participation and pluralism. This increasing awareness, if not direct involvement, by a growing percentage of the Saudi population will help creep toward the ideas of participative civil society, and enlightened views of previous affairs.

Another case study described in Sørensen’s book, that very interestingly bears similarity with Saudi Arabia is the case of the fall and gradual trend toward democratization in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. If the idealism of Communism could be related to the idealism if Islamism (very different ideologies, doubtlessly, but the fact that entire nations were formulated around single ideologies such as these provides the basis for a model and a comparison), and the degree of control utilized by the Soviets (and particularly the Stalinist) regime is compared to the level of control exacted by the Saudi government, then perhaps the same paths could be followed (intentionally or not) in Saudi Arabia as ultimately occurred in the former Soviet Union. Perhaps a collapse under its own weight and economic inefficiency, when in ever-closer relation with the West, will prove to be the result in both cases. Granted, the Soviet Union had a much greater degree of civil society than does Saudi Arabia, but perhaps this only means that the USSR in the mid- to late-20th century was further along in the transition process toward democracy than is Saudi Arabia currently. Saudi Arabia’s similar transition— and perhaps just as similarly unexpectedly when it does— is likewise possible in the early 21^st century. Similarities may be well worth exploring, though there are undeniable differences and uniqueness as well.

The UNDP report depicts the following diagram on page 58:

2. Open and informed social dialogue (to be knowledgeable, educated and free to

3. Public pressure and responsive actions (to be able to survive and enjoy good

4. Public pressure and responsive actions (to enjoy a decent standard of living)

Democracy: Democratic institutions and practice characterized by

The Freedom Scores cited above on page 1 have shown Saudi Arabia to have practically zero civil liberties and political freedoms, so Item #1 on this chart does not apply; the other 3 items, however do apply (regardless of how grim the condition of total absence of civil liberty and political freedom may be). Specifically, Item #2, Open and informed social dialogue does not yet fully take place in Saudi Arabia, more of its citizens are becoming educated and informed, and are beginning to express themselves, at least via the channel of their religion if not in other ways. Items #3 and #4, public health and standard of living, are presently supplied willingly by the Saudi government. Thus out of these four items, Saudi Arabia scores somewhere around two and a half; certainly enough to be considered to be "in the game", or within the realm of possibility.

As for the three characteristics of democratic institutions listed above, the only one existent to any extent in Saudi Arabia is the last one—accountability of the powerful—where there is at least a hint of questioning the status quo. The other two, contestation of power, and participation of the people, are as of yet practically nonexistent in Saudi Arabia.

As for a trade-off between democracy and economic and social development, Sørensen speaks of "frozen democracies" such as those of Latin America, which have progressed some of the way from dictatorship to democracy, but appear to be stuck mid-way in transition, due to inefficiencies, economic difficulties, and unique factors. This case does not appear to hold for Saudi Arabia, however there are other concerns. Since the primary export product is oil, accounting for 90% of Saudi export value, further economic growth is in fact dependent on social development. In order for Saudi Arabia to develop new sources of wealth beyond the fixed-source commodity of fossil fuels, to expand its export capacity and diversify into other industries, education and social development is the only way. Further considering Saudi Arabia’s very limited natural resources (other than fuel), it would seem that greater economic development could come only from intellectual pursuits— research, design, software, etc. These greater educational levels and greater individual empowerment through improved technology and increased individual responsibility, will necessarily foster some of the conditions for maneuvering closer to democracy, as has been outlined in the models above. Thus in Saudi Arabia’s case, it seems, further economic development and greater democratic trends seem to be almost one and the same. The alternative, it seems, would be for the strict hierarchy to remain, limiting Saudi national income to its oil wealth alone. While not bad for a king (and the royalty, of course, do exceedingly well), but not enough for the population. Despite encompassing 25% of the world’s oil reserves, Saudi Arabia, with only one-third of one percent of the world’s population, has a GDP per capita of only $10,500. While not particularly poor by world standards, it must be noted that the Saudi population is growing by 3% per year— doubling the population in just 24 years— while its source of income remains relatively fixed. This trend, if unchecked, would put Saudi Arabia among the poorer nations of the world within about one generation.

Thus again, the trend among democratic and economic development in Saudi Arabia’s case seems not so much of a trade-off as a synergy.

Saudi Arabia has a rather unique situation in terms of security management. While experiencing both internal and external strife, Saudi Arabia has been able to lean on protective support from the United States since US President Franklin D. Roosevelt entered into a deal with the Saudi King during World War II, exchanging access to Saudi oil in return for protection by the US.

Saudi Arabia faces, or has faced in recent decades, threats from Egypt to the west, Iran from the north across the Persian Gulf, and from Iraq to the northwest. The United States defense of Saudi Arabia against further aggression by Saddam Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is familiar.

Saudi Arabia also faces on-going border disputes with the United Arab Emirates to the northeast, and with Yemen in the south. Thus, Saudi Arabia is virtually ringed with active or potential conflicts. This, plus its sitting on the "prize" of 25% of the world’s oil supply makes it a rich target for any or all of these surrounding adversaries. Saudi Arabian desire for American superpower protection is therefore highly understandable.

Would any of these conflicts or potential conflicts be less dangerous were Saudi Arabia more democratic? Probably not. The oil (target) would still be there, the historical rivalries would still be there. Only, perhaps, if all of the surrounding states were likewise to become democracies, would perhaps Saudi Arabia become more secure, according to the theorem that democracies don’t (at least not up until this point) go to war against other democracies.

As for Saudi Arabian internal strife, this is due to a variety of reasons. In addition to threats directly against the royal family (always present), there are also religious extremists, and xenophobic isolationists who target any external forces. Osama bin Laden and the bombings of the Khobar towers and the car-bombing in Riyadh are examples of these internal threats. Democracy itself may do little to ease these conflicts, but indirectly perhaps other channels could be created whereby tensions could at least be reduced. Other than democratic reform, there may be very little way of accessing these trouble points. Violence such as the war on terrorism may work in the short run, but ultimately there needs to be an alternative to the oppression that only creates this violent resistance in the first place.

Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have some involvement with Saudi Arabia.

The IMF says: "Executive Directors commended the Saudi authorities for their skillful and consistent pursuit over the past several years of a comprehensive policy strategy encompassing structural reforms and sound macroeconomic policies. This strategy aims at accelerating the growth of non-oil sectors, which will be key to generating employment opportunities for the rapidly growing Saudi labor force and reducing the economy's vulnerability to oil price fluctuations. The strategy has appropriately focused on the development of legal and institutional foundations for market-based resource allocation by aiming to promote the role of the private sector, encourage foreign direct investment, privatize state enterprises, introduce labor market reforms, and widen and deepen the financial sector. Directors considered that the slowdown in economic growth and swings in the fiscal balance in recent years-against the backdrop of volatility in global oil markets and increased regional security concerns-further underscore the importance of determined pursuit of the Saudi policy strategy in order to encourage investment, promote economic diversification, and accelerate job creation. They therefore welcomed the authorities' plans to tighten demand management and expedite structural reforms in the period ahead, notwithstanding the recent increase in oil prices." (Website: International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/121, October 25, 2002.)

The World Bank reports: "Over the past 25 years the World Bank has forged a strong partnership with countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab states of the Gulf, diversifying its services as needed to keep pace with changes in the region. The Technical Cooperation Program (TCP) initially responded to the needs of governments as they developed their infrastructure, industrial base, and economic planning capacity. Today the Arab States of the Gulf are interested in cooperation in macroeconomics and sectoral policies-such as those that help diversify labor markets, protect the environment, develop human resources, and promote the private sector. And the program has quickly responded by sharing best professional practices gained by the Bank’s extensive global network." (Website: The World Bank Group, Middle East and North Africa, Saudi Arabia.)

Among the most interesting influences on development in Saudi Arabia, however, is that from Sheikh Hasan al-Saffar, Saudi Arabia’s own spiritual leader of its Shi’a Reform Movement.

Sheikh Hasan al-Saffar writes, "It is best whenever the people assume a role in managing their affairs and solving their problems. This is the way a people may learn and grow. Of course, private/civil performance is much better and of higher quality than government. Whatever is done by private hands is the result of self-motivation and drive, whether this stems from personal interest or from noble, voluntary feelings. The government’s work, on the other hand, is bureaucratic and follows a pattern of routine.... Thus in developed and advanced societies there is an abundance of civil organizations, institutions; they are the ones which solve societal problems and ills." (Fandy, p. 195.)

Sheikh Hasan al-Saffar further references the U.S. Constitution, the French Constitution, the International Declaration of Human Rights, and international NGOs such as Amnesty International, as well as the Islamic declaration of rights presented by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1989. Al-Saffar praises all these works "in order to exemplify heightened awareness of human rights and consequent efforts to safeguard them. Al-Saffar praises widespread acceptance of human rights on the level of theory and recognized ‘the great powers’ [the Western world] as ‘forerunners when it comes to public promotion, discussion, and production of slogans on the issue of human rights and their protection.’.... Rather than condoning the politicization of human rights, al-Saffar embraces a nondiscriminatory, more inclusive understanding of the issue, which he grounds in the Quran... Despite his position as a religious opposition leader, the sheikh does not dwell on the Saudi regime’s human rights abuses. On the contrary, he cautions against narrowly defining human rights as ‘the rights of citizens vis-à-vis the state’ and argues instead that they ‘are in the first place about the interaction of humans with each other.’ He identifies religion, rather than the state, as the ultimate guarantor or human rights." (Fandy, p. 219-220.)

And as for the role of any specific religion—or any other differentiating characteristic among people-- Sheikh Hasan al-Saffar writes, "Allah granted humans this dignity. He gave them this status and value—to humans, all of them, based on their being human, without any discrimination based on color, race, language, religion, sect, class, or affiliation. Humans, given that they are humans, have dignity and value, which are not granted by other human beings. There is no one who grants others their value and dignity. These are granted by Allah." (Fandy, p. 219.)

What better way to express the ideals and foundations of democracy?

Western understanding of the Arab / Muslim world, and of Saudi society in particular, is very much a work in progress. Perhaps understanding its mysteries is even a work in progress for many of its own constituents! Statistical data is rare, and in its absence, most of the information available is anecdotal—reports from travelers who have attempted to explain their interactions. As such, I find it most compelling to share these writers’ experiences directly, rather than to attempt to describe, summarize, or otherwise dilute the authenticity of their remarks. Descriptions span the realms of sex, religion, and politics; and ventures into any of these subjects, we are forewarned, surely brings a plunge to murky depths. Therefore, to preserve as much as possible of the genuine and concrete elements of these reports, I have elected to cite them directly, as many of them may be fairly difficult for Westerners to believe already. Below are some 50 direct quotes, grouped by topic, to show the nature and structure of Saudi / Arab / Muslim society, and in particular, the roles there maintained for that 50% of the population known as the female gender.

"The Arab countries devote the highest percentage of gross domestic product in the world to arms. Saudi Arabia, for example, commits nearly one-quarter (21.8 percent) of its GDP for military expenses. Jordan and the Democratic Republic of Yemen spend 16 percent, Syria 17 percent. By contrast, France spends 4 percent of its GDP, the former West Germany 3.1 percent, Italy 3.2 percent, Sweden 1.7 percent, Spain 3 percent, Canada 3.2 percent, and Japan 1 percent on weapons.

How can Arab women hope to overcome opposition in their societies and go out in search of paid work if the economies of their countries are devoting a large part of their wealth to unproductive expenditures like the importation of weapons that don’t even serve any useful purpose, as the Gulf War amply demonstrates? [Saddam’s weapons were destroyed, and Saudi Arabia’s were insufficient, despite all the expenditures.]....

One of the reasons for mounting unemployment in the Arab countries is the debt, a problem inextricably tied to military expenditures. The editors of the Mémento Défense-Désarmement 1989 contend that ‘the net sum of the debt before 1979 could have been 20 to 30 percent lower if the borrowing Third World countries had not bought arms’... Fundamentalism spread and flourished in the shadow of this famous debt."

The military option is contrary to the interests of Arab citizens in general, and to those of women in particular... Arab women too must mobilize around the issue of demilitarization... The only way for the Arab nations is that of Japan, which allocates just 1 percent of its budget for defense." – Mernissi, p. 169-170

"The hijab [veil] is manna from heaven for politicians facing crises. It is not just a scrap of cloth; it is a division of labor. It sends women back to the kitchen. Any Muslim state can reduce its level of unemployment by half just by appealing to the shari’a." – Mernissi, p. 165

"[P]opular democracy, free expression, or women’s equality [are] all foreign values." – Viorst, p. 213

"Women in Saudi Arabia are totally excluded from public life." – Viorst, p. 211

"Women never let themselves by tamed. Men believed that a person could become accustomed to confinement. But women were waiting for the right moment, the moment of difference with dignity, of participation and dialogue, and that moment has arrived." – Mernissi, p. 151

"Astonishingly, the land of my ancestors is little changed from that of a thousand years ago. Yes, modern buildings spring up, the latest health care is available to all, but consideration for women and for the quality of their lives still receives a shrug of indifference." – Sasson, p. 21

"[H]istory suggests that the [Saudi] regime has survived this long precisely because it has never, in its basic structure, give serious thought to reform at all." – Viorst, p. 217

"A Western-educated intellectual had a slightly different reading of the clergy’s power.

‘In recent years,’ he said, ‘this country has exploded with new experiences in technology and in such areas as banking and management. These changes have been absorbed with no conflict.

But the old social issues remain untouched. Islamic society has not resolved three questions: where women fit in, what the goal of education is, and how much freedom of dissent to grant the people and the media. Everyone is concerned about these questions. But no one talks of them in public, not in the universities or the chambers of commerce, and certainly not in the press. We can’t even buy books unless they are approved by the Ministry of Information, and then we know they say nothing.’" – Viorst, p. 224

"Arab youths know that the hand cut off in Saudi Arabia can no longer be blamed solely on the Saudi regime, which revealed its weakness during the [1991 Gulf War] conflict. Above all, they know that it is not Islam that demands such horrors, but an anachronistic regime that can hide its archaisms only by veiling them with the sacred."

– Mernissi, p. 166

"Whatever its flaws, Saudi Arabia has risen from the desert in a few generations to have prospering cities, efficient communication and transportation systems, state-of-the-art factories and seaports, well-run universities and hospitals. Its oil industry, where Saudis are increasingly replacing foreign managers, is competently run and dominates world markets.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has spread its oil wealth widely, if not equitably. Though more than half its citizens are under twenty-one—the birth rate, about 3.8 percent, is among the world’s highest—it has, without a pervasive police presence, maintained a remarkable level of public order. Indisputably, the culture is stifling to individual expression; but it is also undeniably infused with a pride of collective achievement.

The House of Saud is troubled, however, that so many of its citizens do not regard these accomplishments as enough.... The problem is that they regard all their critics as ingrates, misguided at best, and probably outright sinful." – Viorst, p. 233

"Saudis, a [Saudi] professor reminded me, respond not to [Jean Jacques] Rousseau or [Thomas] Jefferson but to the Prophet and his companions. Any serious reformer, Saudis agree, understands that his cause must be carried aboard an Islamic vehicle." – Viorst, p. 211

"It is wrong, however, to blame our Muslim faith for the lowly position of women in our society. Although the Koran does state that women are secondary to men, much in the same way the Bible authorizes men to rule over women, our Prophet Mohammed taught only kindness and fairness toward those of my sex. The men who came behind Prophet Mohammed have chosen to follow Mohammed’s words and example. Our Prophet scorned the practice of infanticide, a common custom in his day of ridding the family of unwanted females. Prophet Mohammed’s very words ring with his concern at the possibility of abuse and indifference toward females: ‘Whoever hath a daughter, and doth not bury her alive, or scold her, or prefer his male children to her, may G_d bring him into Paradise.’" – Sasson, p. 21

"The Qur’an recognizes the highly vulnerable position that women occupy and stresses over and over the need for equity, honorable treatment, and full recognition of their needs and rights. In the Qur’anic paradigm, the powers that men have over women are a burden, not a license for abuse and tyranny." – Humphreys, p. 213

"Ancient pre-Islamic custom dictates group practices like polygamy, male and female circumcision, the arrangement of marriages by parents for their children, with the payment of a bride-price, and much attendant ritual concerning virginity and the circumstances proper to its loss. Post-Islamic custom dictates the wearing of the veil and probably the seclusion of women as well. In broad terms, Koranic sanction is absent for these practices, although certain passages can be interpreted to suit and substantiate custom, as in a verse stating that a man may have four wives if he can be sure of treating them all fairly, or another verse to the effect that a man’s mere verbal repudiation of his wife is enough to constitute divorce, without right of appeal. Down the centuries, custom and religion have interacted in mutual reinforcement." – Pryce-Jones, p. 123

"It is hard to make any useful generalizations, since there are by now very wide differences in family law between one country and another, and these codes are subject to constant change. At one extreme lies Saudi Arabia, which adheres rigorously to traditional Shari’a principles and procedures. At the other there is Turkey, which simply tossed out its Shari’a-based legislation in 1927 and substitute the Swiss Civil Code for it." – Humphreys, p. 214-215

"The Gaza Strip’s oldest resident, Haj Abdulah Kadurah, died last week at the age of 128. For the last 70 years he had served as muezzin (caller to prayer) of the Tufah neighbourhood mosque, located next to his home. Kadurah is survived by more than 240 [two hundred forty] children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and great-great-grandchildren.

Forty-year-old Salem Jemaa Mabruk [of Abu Dhabi] has 27 children, and aims to have 100. He said in an interview in the daily newspaper Al-Ittihad that he might have to divorce some of his four present wives and seek more energetic ones." – Pryce-Jones, p. 126-127

"The clash of values can be observed starkly in Israel, where Muslim practices often defy the state’s legal codes. To give a recent example, Salman Abu Jildan agreed with another man that each would marry the other’s teenage daughter. Abu Jildan was forty-two. His own daughter, one of eight children by his first wife, accepted the agreement, but his sixteen-year-old designated bride did not. She fought for her rights and was advised to complain to the police. When the case reached court, the defense lawyer pleaded, no doubt truthfully, that his client ‘had no idea he was doing anything wrong.’ Nonetheless, Abu Jildan was sentenced to prison for bigamy and for the rape of the sixteen-year-old girl." – Pryce-Jones, p. 136

"[T]he Egyptian Qasim Amin, whose books were The Emancipation of Women, published in 1899, and The New Woman two years later... advocated reform on Western lines. Polygamy, he thought, was ‘nothing but a legal fiction designed to satisfy animal desires, an indication of corrupted morals.’ What he was saying had profound social and political implications.

‘Look at the eastern countries; you will find woman enslaved to man and man to the ruler. Man is an oppressor in his home, oppressed as soon as he leaves it. Then look at the European countries; the governments are based on freedom and respect for personal rights, and the status of women has been raised to a high degree of respect and freedom of thought and action.’" – Pryce-Jones, p. 134

"[W]omen cannot be emancipated unless and until men are. A fulfilled marriage will be only a miniaturized version of a society with equal rights. Women’s liberation among Arabs is not a separate issue amenable to piece-meal reform but an aspect of the far more intractable question of how a modern Muslim society ought to be ordered."

– Pryce-Jones, p. 133

"Custom varies according to time and place. Harems with hundreds of women may be found, as in the royal households of Saudi Arabia today, and so may monogamous faithfulness, concubines, slave girls, the Shia practice of ‘temporary marriage’ whereby a man takes on a wife for a period of time fixed by contract, and outright prostitution, which has been practiced everywhere and at all periods. Bedouin or desert women are more likely than urban women to escape the veil and seclusion. It is hardly possible to wear a full veil while doing agricultural work. Female circumcision is not practiced in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, or among Palestinians, Turks, Iranians, and North Africans. Whether or not Islamic sanction exists in the popular mind, the purpose of custom is the maintenance of the family group, its honor and its values. Immemorially, the consequence has been the devaluation of women as individuals in their own right. Boys are regarded from birth as capital investment, in the phrase of the Egyptian sociologist Hamad Ammar, while girls are the fountainhead of shame, valued only because in due course they will develop into the producers of boys or of more capital. There can be no approximation here of a relationship freely and privately agreed between a man and a woman, which is the basis of Western romantic love and marriage, and therefore a prime determinant of Western values." – Pryce-Jones, p. 124

"‘A few decades ago,’ [an anonymous Western-educated Saudi intellectual] said, ‘our country was almost illiterate. Now thousands of young people graduate from our schools every year. They used to go to universities abroad, and many came back with modern ideas. Now we have seven universities of our own, and our students stay home and become ingrown. Many graduate as teachers—especially the women, since no other work is available to them—and go on to reinforce religious thinking in the schools.

‘It is ironic that when the schools were established they were regarded as liberalizing instruments. But under the rule of the clergy, they are making the society even more conservative.

‘The situation has developed this way because the royal family’s policy has been to respond to every crisis by granting a few more concessions to the clerics. It thinks it is co-opting them, but they keep demanding more. As they grow stronger, they bring us not higher spiritual values but more ritual, which translates into greater social and doctrinal conformity.’

The man pointed out that, as a sign of religiosity, Saudi men increasingly wear beards, while more and more women wear the full veil and the black abaya. The mutaween patrol the streets and the markets with greater dedication, making sure that women’s arms are covered. Men want to be seen reciting prayers. Yet, he said, Saudis are not better Muslims. On the contrary, the more they ritualize religion, the more they marginalize belief.’" – Viorst, p. 224-5

"During the Gulf War, when Western servicewomen were appearing publicly in uniform on city streets, forty-seven Saudi women organized a demonstration to win the right to drive. Notwithstanding international publicity, the King seized their passports, fired all of them from their jobs and made the driving ban on women ever more stringent than before. A fatwa justified the action as observance of the Islamic injunction to preserve women’s dignity.

‘The King, deep down, is less rigid than the clergy,’ an editor of an Islamic paper said to me. ‘By Saudi standards, he is probably very enlightened. But the people are Wahhabi, and I’m not sure how much social change the people want.

‘We have an enlightened, Western-oriented middle class, which favors reform. Its members behave differently when they go to London or Cairo, and even behind the doors of their own homes. They’re tired of the gap between ideology and practice, and they’d like to end the hypocrisy. But the national consensus remains Wahhabi, and no one successfully challenges it.

‘The women who demonstrated for the right to drive did not get public support, and the King was applauded for punishing them. The clergy may be an obstacle to modernization but they are not alone. Fahd can’t be more liberal than the people.’"

– Viorst, p. 223-4

Prince Nayef, Minister of Interior and Saudi Arabia’s chief law enforcement officer "spoke of the ban on driving by women, which he said—to my surprise—was not an Islamic issue at all.

‘The applicable rule,’ he said, ‘is that anything which does not contradict Islam is permissible. But any rule must be acceptable to society, which decides whether it is good or bad. Driving by women is obviously not forbidden by the shari’a, but a social consensus holds that it will lead to bad deeds.

‘In a case like this, the King makes the decision, but he considers the consensus that the ulama express, and none of them favors women driving. Ijtihad is important here. On Islamic principles, the doors to ijtihad are closed. But on matters not covered by the shari’a, the scholars apply ijtihad, as they have throughout history. The scholars now think that driving by women is dangerous, and the King agrees. But that can change.’"

– Viorst, p. 234

"Dr. Abdullah al-Naseef, who is deputy chairman to Sheikh Jubair, told me he regrets that the shura does not play a more prominent role in Saudi affairs.

Naseef studied in the 1960s at Berkeley, where he said he learned to cherish American democracy, though he was appalled at its absence of spiritual content. By profession a geologist, he has also served as executive directly of the World Muslim League, where he said he has worked to promote an Islam that is gentler than what the world generally perceives.

‘We Arabs are now emerging from the Dark Ages,’ Naseef said. ‘We turned away from Greek thought under the Abbasids; we suffered from intellectual aggression during colonialism; we gave up ijtihad during the Ottoman years. We largely lost our ability to think and criticize. Now we are frustrated and have a deep inferiority complex. Coming out is very hard.’

Naseef said he saw the shura as the beginning of a social transformation. He wants its sessions covered by the press, even televised, but the government refuses. The Saud family fails to understand, he said, that the people now want to participate in the life of the country. The shura has been conducting itself responsibly. Opening it up, he said, would give Saudis a greater sense of themselves, and even enhance social stability.

Naseef contended that Saudis are ready to build on the experience they already have had with elections in universities, chambers of commerce and professional associations. Nothing in Islam bars elections, he argued, or even women’s suffrage. Sheikh Jubair is mistaken, he declared, in asserting that elections will bring in unsuitable people. Vigorous debate may not be part of the Quran, he said, but it is part of bedouin tradition, and Saudis are ready for it.

‘Sheikh Jubair is right, however, in saying there are limits to speech in Islam,’ Naseef continued. ‘Indeed, I was shocked by the speech and the disorder I found in Berkeley in 1964. They were not good for America. Those young people, in their absence of values, were failed by their families. Such an experience would not be good for us. Totally free speech can lead to free sex [and harems? – ed .], illegitimate children [from concubines? – ed.], wild behavior [like terrorism? For all the wild, crazy, things for which "berserkly" justly gets its nickname, when was the last time it hosted a terrorist organization? Possibly other than a few Al-Quaida members on student visas... – ed.]. Fortunately, Islam provides signposts ["I say, you must be this tall to enter this harem": Paraphrased sign at roller-coasters in American amusement parks. – ed.]. Our moral precepts, based on our faith, are our strength.

‘Nonetheless, we have to have dialogue in Islam. One man can’t issue fatwas, not even Sheikh bin Baz, on what the Quran or the sunna says. Egypt is having so much trouble with its young people because they have never been introduced to the gentle side of Islam. A G_dless society has made heroes of the radicals, who want to kill for Islam. When the young are not taught that Islam is tolerant and loving, how can they grow up to be reasonable?

‘We Muslims are the greatest enemies of Islam. We blame Western conspiracies for our problems rather than look into ourselves. We applaud Khomeinie’s foolish fatwa against Rushdie. We are still fighting Mu’tazilites and ijtihad, when we should be reaching out for fresh ideas within our own culture.

‘That’s why the shura is important. Islamic doctrine does not limit it in any way. The government says that opening up the debate will confuse the people. I think it is just the opposite. I believe television will be covering our meetings before very long. I’m among the Saudis who think this is the beginning of something very good.’" – Viorst, p. 229-231

"The principle political change after the Gulf War has been the King’s establishment of a Majlis al-Shura, a national consultative council, as well as thirteen provincial councils responsible to local governors. Shura—conventionally interpreted as consultation between the ruler and the ruled—is enjoined in the Quran. As we noted before, it is one of Islam’s few political commandments and was applied for the election of the first four caliphs. Shura was among the demands contained in the clerics’ letter to the King in May 1991. Though some Islamic thinkers take it as a call for a democratic state, the House of Saud interprets it more modestly.

Shura, emerging out of bedouin practices, became part of the Saudi state machinery under King Abdulaziz, who founded the present kingdom at the turn of the century. It fell into disuse in the 1950s, when the Sauds, bowing to pressures to modernize government, adopted a cabinet system around the King.

King Fahd, on assuming the throne in 1982, promised to restore shura to the political system, and in 1985 actually built a sumptuous palace in which the Majlis—the word means ‘discussion group’—was to sit. But no shura was established and, in the void, Saudis became skeptical that one would ever be. The King finally issued a shura decree in 1992, a year after the Gulf War, and in 1993 the body met for the first time. The provincial bodies began meeting a year later.

The Majlis al-Shura has sixty-one members, including its chairman, Muhammad bin Jubair, who is an old tribal leader and a former Justice Minister. The entire membership was appointed by the king, who, to the surprise of most Saudis, named no princes to seats. Rather, he tipped the body toward academics, then added some engineers, businessmen, doctors and lawyers, religious scholars and retired civil servants.

The selections, to be sure, contained no hint of representativity, whether geographical, class or tribal. Predictably, the King named no dissidents; the shura has no formal opposition within it. But the appointments were not frivolous. They were weighted heavily toward nonclerics with practical experience and intellectual attainment. More than half the members named were Ph.D.s, and two thirds had studied in the West.

‘When King Abdulaziz established the shura, there were very few educated people in the kingdom,’ said Sheikh Jubair, its elderly chairman. Jubair, circled by aides, received me in a richly carpeted, vanilla and gold sitting room of the Majlis building. ‘The educated people were all clergy. The luminaries were tribal chieftains. Nonetheless, the King relied on it for acvice on legal, financial and management problems. By the 1950s, however, the King had more qualified people available, and the world was more complicated, and so the shura lost its role.

‘But it never really disappeared. It is required in Islam. G_d in the Quran instructs the ruler to ask advice of the people who know before reaching a decision.* (*In fact, the Quran’s requirement of a shura does not specify ‘people who know’, though the Prophet is quoted on such a principle in the sunna.) The laws of Islam were written fourteen hundred years ago in the Quran and the sunna, and they do not require a legislature. To make the shura into a representative body would not be Islamic.

‘Of course, times change. Not everything is in the shari’a. The King cannot change the laws against drinking, for example, but when we need traffic regulations, he issues a decree and everyone is required by the Quran to obey it. But the shura is not a step toward democracy. It is our own system, coming from our religion and habits and tradition.

‘Furthermore, if we had an election, we wouldn’t get such educated men to serve. The voters would not choose members qualified to offer the King advice. They would elect tribal chiefs, unable to read or write. Our shura, composed of experts, fulfills its Islamic mandate of advising the King, who has the responsibility to rule.’

Under the royal decree, the shura’s mandate is to consider drafts of laws and international agreements which are submitted to it. Consideration of the national budget, which the royal family treats as a private matter, is not included among its responsibilities.

Organized much like a parliament, the Majlis al-Shura has committees which hear testimony and, after discussion, propose action to the plenary body. The shura can summon officials and request state documents, but it has no watchdog functions. The shura debates and votes, then sends its recommendations to the King. All of its proceedings are recorded. What most distinguishes it from parliaments is that its actions have no binding force.

Abdulaziz al-Fayez, a respected political scientist on leave from Riyadh University, told me he had no indication in advance that he was a candidate, and was stunned by his nomination to the shura. All members agree to serve full time for four years, for which they are paid a small stipend. They are very conscientious about their work, he said, and debate the issues thoughtfully and respectfully. All accept the limitations on their power.

‘We have no illusions,’ Fayez said. ‘We’re Saudis, and we’re used to paternalism. Our job is to give our honest judgments on public issues, and we do. We are a source of information and analysis that is outside the ministerial circle. In short, we are a body of advisers to the King, and nothing more.’

Fayez said the King has shown respect for the shura and seems to take its recommendations seriously. The rules of procedure, however, not only make its deliberations secret but bar its members from discussing any items on its agenda with the press.

Since citizens have little idea what the Majlis al-Shura does, and even less what the provincial shuras do, the entire process becomes an easy target of mockery, which Fayez says it does not deserve. Critics regard the Majlis al-Shura as a political lapdog, designed to give the King cover against charges of despotism. In fact, the shura process is shrouded in so much secrecy that most Saudis, having been introduced to it as a step toward accountability, have now all but forgotten that it exists." – Viorst, p. 227-229

"Prince Salman... one of King Fahd’s close advisers…. contended that all of the princes meet with Saudi citizens personally, and so get direct exposure to what is on their minds.

He himself conducts a majlis—a consultation with the people—twice daily, he said, in which his doors are open to all Saudis who wish to bring him their problems.

At Prince Salman’s invitation, I witnessed his own majlis, held after the noon prayer in a huge and opulent receiving room in the palace. Dozens of robed men, most with the sun-dried faces of bedouins, sat waiting in chairs around the periphery, then rose deferentially when Salman entered. Forming a line, each in turn approached the throne, shook the prince’s hand, presented him a petition, and for a few seconds delivered a personal plea. The issues were private, I was told, like getting an elderly mother admitted to a hospital or releasing a miscreant son from jail. The prince, after listening to the petitioner, handed the petition to an aide, to whom he whispered instructions.

The majlis struck me as a fascinating adaptation of ancient customs to the present day, if not to present values.. It was a scene of desert governance, a display of comradeship between the ruler and the ruled. What I witnessed, however, was not a hearing on public policy but a system for dealing with intimate personal needs. Certainly, none of the petitioners proffered a comment that the prince did not want to hear. I left the majlis dubious about whether these encounters conveyed to the prince anything at all of the People’s attitude toward his family, current political problems or the nature of the Saudi state." – Viorst, p. 231-232

"When I asked Alshaikh [Saudi Minister of Justice] how Islam responds to the corruption of which I had heard so much in Saudi Arabia, he did not dismiss the question. On the contrary, he had a ready answer.

‘It is forbidden in Islam to raise a hand against the ruler. If he makes a mistake—even a big one like corruption, and that includes adultery or stealing or drinking—it is prohibited to overthrow him. If he forces others to violate Islam, you may refuse to follow him but you can go no further. You can advise him to change his ways, but you cannot publicize his faults.

‘The one exception is heresy; if the ruler does not believe in G_d or the Prophet, then action is required.

‘Otherwise, to overthrow a ruler is not permitted. When a people is without a ruler, what results is fitna—public disorder—and that is worse than corrupt rule. Obedience to rulers is part of Muslim practice.’

Obedience, enforced under the shari’a, is the linchpin of the jointly exercised rule of the Sauds and the Wahhabs." – Viorst, p. 218

"[R]arely do we view confrontation in our society. It is our nature to speak softly and agree with those before us and then to handle difficulties in a secret manner."

– Sasson, p. 33

"My own sense is that the Sauds have sheltered themselves from any real grasp of the breadth of the popular discontent. But only at their peril can they ignore it much longer.

Admittedly, in a society as closed as Saudi Arabia’s, it is hard to gauge the depth and intensity of discontent. Similarly, in a government as secretive as Saudi Arabia’s, it is impossible to measure official receptivity to the popular grumbling. Since the end of the Gulf War, however, there is enough evidence to conclude that the discontent will not go away of its own accord. Nor are invocations to Islamic duty by princes and clerics likely to extinguish the fire that lies underneath it.

Justifiably or not, the Gulf War provoked a sharp turn in the public mind. Whether Saudis prefer lives with more Wahhabism or less, it seems very apparent that most want greater accountability from their government. It will not suffice much longer for the family to hid its refection of reform behind Islam. Saudis are beginning to see through this device. As long as the House of Saud refuses to acknowledge the yearning for a more accountable state, I believe, the feeling of dissatisfaction in the culture will continue to grow." – Viorst, p. 235-236

"Margaret Luce, traveling in the 1960s in Arabia with her husband, an experienced British diplomat, and observing how soon after birth the segregation of small boys and girls began, had what may be called she standard Eurocentric response. Nothing could be done about this process of unequal socialization between the sexes except to regret it.

‘Two little girls watched us, too young to wear a batula (a black cloak-cum-veil), very pretty, rather shy, about a year or two of freedom still to go. The women were in their distant black herd. I think what one really longs for is just a single spirited one who would throw off her batula, jump on it, put out her tongue, and buy a dress in scarlet with yellow spots. One doesn’t exactly feel sorry for them because they are unhappy. I don’t think they are. The sadness is that they don’t mind. And a certain sadness for the thought of hundreds of years of this black static unflowering unfeminine waste of spirit.’" – Pryce-Jones, p. 123

"Although all Arab or Iranian women would accept that their status is different from that of men, only a Western-educated handful would then proceed to the Eurocentric judgment that it is ‘inferior.’ Mai Yamani is an adult daughter of Sheikh Yamani who for many years played his part in fixing the world’s oil price. She was educated in Europe and nonetheless in an interview in 1986 she explained how she continued to value Saudi custom. Wearing the veil was a matter of belonging to her group, identifying herself with the domain of women. ‘I think it is a form of social distance,’ she told her interviewer., ‘like a barrier I have between me and men. I like my veil. I like to be a Saudi Arabian woman.’ Even in the case of someone educated to make objective choices, the demands of group identity overrode those of personal freedom and rights." – Pryce-Jones, p. 122-123

"A few years ago they [Saudi women] tended to imitate Western dress as well as they could, and many were strikingly fashionable. Nowadays they are increasingly adopting some form of "Islamic dress," which can be anything from a loose dress, blouse, and jacket with an attractive headscarf to a bulky, fairly shapeless sack and a jilbab—a wimple pulled tightly around the head, leaving only the front of the face exposed. There is absolutely nothing "traditional" about the latter; it is a form of attire that looks nothing like what women were wearing in 1900. But it does meet the Islamic demand for modesty, for a form of dress that shelters women from the male gaze and in some sense segregates them from men. In this way, it also allows women to occupy the same public space as men without incurring censure for immodesty." – Humphreys, p. 212

Mecca: Monday, March 11, 2002: 15 girls died, 50 others injured in a fire at a boarding school. Authorities would not let the girls out of the building, nor allow rescue workers to reach them, because the girls were still in their sleeping attire, rather than wearing the customary abaya (black cloak) and headscarf. – BBC News, March 15, 2002

"Unfortunately, the incidents [Princess] Sultana and I tell about in this book are not isolated outrages, but regular events in a society that views women as the bearer of sons or as sex objects." – Sasson, in Author’s Notes, p. 7

"[I]n Arab countries an average 45 percent of girls aged fifteen to nineteen are already married, and again on average there will be seven live births per married woman." – Pryce-Jones, p. 128-129

"During the past twenty years, the Western or colonial influence underlying all legislation to emancipate women has been ebbing and draining away fast, to be replaced by the former Islamic or precolonial order. Underage marriage, divorce by simple repudiation, appropriation and abuse of a woman’s property by males in her family, even polygamy, are increasingly practiced and increasingly disregarded by the authorities, in the correct belief that it is futile and unjust to pick on some man here or there who is only doing what he believes is customary and sanctioned by Islam." – Pryce-Jones, p. 136

"Marriage in the Arab world is by the arrangement and consent of the parents of the prospective bride and bridegroom. The heads of the families concerned are seeking mutual advantage by means of bringing together their children. Both parties aim to acquire honor and standing; neither will accept the shame of any liaison that might be deemed inappropriate or humiliating. Commonplace and anxiety-ridden themes in everyday life as well as in literature concern the girl who brings shame by losing her virginity inappropriately, and the young man who brings shame by refusing the bride selected for him by his family." – Pryce-Jones, p. 124

"In their introduction to Women in the Muslim World, Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie give a general sketch of what is to be anticipated from an upbringing and way of life designed to preserve honor and other group values:

‘In most cases, a girl’s parents decide whether and for how long she goes to school; the parents of both parties decide on the marriage partner (this limits the boy too, but he can often turn to other sexual partners or repudiate his spouse, which she cannot easily do); the mother-in-law and husband rule over much of the young wife’s life, and the husband can, de jure or de facto, decide if the wife can work for wages, at what kind of job, and whether she can use any of her wages if she works. The husband, according to religious law, receives custody of children (after a certain age) after divorce; women are thereby suddenly cut off from those by whom their whole role as females is defined, and are denied the continuing satisfactions of the maternal role. Most women are not allowed to remain unmarried, even after an early divorce, or to live alone. Women are threatened with repudiation or with a second wife being brought into the house if they do not bear sons. Many women find considerable satisfactions in traditional family life, but their legal and customary status is often precarious.’

Every one of these particulars conditions the assumption that women are to have their relationships dictated for them by men." – Pryce-Jones, p. 129

"When a man becomes formally betrothed, he is required to pay a certain sum to his fiancée’s male guardian (usually her father, but sometimes a paternal uncle or older brother). This sum is called mahr, usually translated in English—quite misleadingly—as "dowry" or "bride-price." The mahr is no nominal matter; the amount of money in question can be quite daunting. It is in any case determined by mutual agreement between the prospective groom and the woman’s family, and the amount is stipulated in the marriage contract. Both the Qur’an and the Shari’a state explicitly that the mahr belongs to the woman; it is her property to dispose of as she will, and she retains it on widowhood or divorce. It is in a sense her insurance policy. In spite of the plain words of scripture and law, however, it is common in smaller cities and villages for the bride’s guardian to retain the bride-price. Few spend the money on themselves, to be sure; they use it to purchase a trousseau and household goods for their daughter. But if a girl has the misfortune to belong to a dysfunctional family, she has no effective way to compel her guardian to turn the money over to her. Going to court (where she would probably prevail) will only worsen her situation." – Humphreys, p. 215

"On her wedding night, a girl who was still very young (14-16 years) would seldom know her husband; she would be deflowered literally by a stranger. Hardly less humiliating (though as much to her bridegroom as to her), first intercourse would take place on a white cloth. This cloth, stained by the blood of her lost virginity, was immediately passed to the women of her groom’s family waiting outside the bridal chamber. Tenderness and courting, which might have eased the transition to a married state, were no part of the wedding night. To modern Westerners it may seem a kind of legalized rape. But in fact it is very hard for an outsider to "read" all this accurately, even if the outsider is a female anthropologist who is well known and trusted by her subjects. A bride’s experience must be disorienting and alienating on a personal psychic level—or so we suppose—but it is one that is demanded, validated, and supported by her culture, including the female members of it. It is just how things are.

It is a difficult system for men as well, though they obviously have the better part of it. A man’s bride is after all a stranger to him; he has to make love to a woman whom he has not seen before, who may not strike him as attractive in any way, toward whom he has had no opportunity to build up a fund of affection of focused desire. In that event he has some options, of course, whereas his bride does not; he can turn his back on her, divorce her, try to marry another wife. Even the institution of concubinage has serious emotional shortcomings. He may well have seen his new serving girl nude or nearly so, so he knows that she is physically appealing to him. But any emotional bonds, rooted in personality, character, and intelligence, will have to come later if at all. In spite of the difficult relations between the sexes in contemporary America, and in spite of the apparent tenuousness of the marriage bond, it remains very common for a man to say that his wife is his best friend. In the traditional Middle East that would have been an odd, almost incomprehensible statement." – Humphreys, p. 220-221

If a man were wealthy and "with more than one wife, each [wife] would have an apartment of her own, quite separate from that of her co-wives. A concubine would also have her own space, though she might share it with other slave women (but not any of the wives). The master of the household could enter the harem at will, of course, but for him it represented a retreat from the public world to spend time with his family. As to other men, the close blood relatives of a woman (essentially anyone she could not marry) could visit her, with appropriate permission, in her own chambers. And women were usually free to accept visits from other women. Except in the wealthiest households, the women of a harem had little time for the idle languor of our fantasies; they had to devote most of their waking hours to the hard work of running a home." – Humphreys, p. 222

"José Arnold was a Swiss steward in the household of King Saud of Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, and he described how one day the King fell ill and had to be flown for treatment to the Aramco hospital in Dhahran.

Before he would consent to leave Riyadh, however, he insisted on having his favourite wife, Umm Mansur, brought to his bed. With the assistance of four slaves, the sick King had intercourse with the woman. The next day, after the King’s departure for Dhahran had been publicly announced, word of his "strength" of the night before was discreetly passed around Riyadh, and his people were thus assured that he was not too weak to rule." – Pryce-Jones, p. 128

"Perhaps the largest role available to women in Islamic religious life was that of patronage. A great many of the most important mosques, colleges, and funerary complexes were built with their money and at their behest." – Humphreys, p. 209

"Court documents, which we have in abundance from the mid-sixteenth century on, reveal the economic roles of a far broader cross-section of women. In Shari’a law, women have the full right to own and dispose of property, whether they are married or single. Moreover, the property and incomes of a married woman may not be used to support the household; that burden is borne entirely by her husband. Hence the court registers reflect quite fully property and contract transactions involving women. As to property transactions, some 25 to 40 percent of these involve women, usually in modest ways but sometimes on a very large scale." – Humphreys, p. 209-210

"Women are still hewers of wood and carriers of water, as anyone can tell by going out to the villages, but the educated elites enjoy a significant role in the patronage of education and the arts. The latter would include such disparate figures as Shaykha Hussa of the Kuwaiti ruling house, who is the founder and principal donor of the Kuwait National Museum, and the wife of the late King Saud (reigned 1953-1964), who clandestinely began public education for girls in Saudi Arabia around 1960, at a time when to the country’s religious traditionalists such a thing was unthinkable. As in medieval times, we encounter the gap between the narrow roles open to poor village women and the wide possibilities for action enjoyed by influential members of royal households.

"But there are also women who have no real medieval counterparts. These are highly visible secular professionals, often with advanced degrees from major European and North American universities.... Most women in this class would regard themselves as feminists (a word that covers many things, obviously), but not all; among them are those who speak very eloquently for Islamic tradition." – Humphreys, p. 210

"In our land, brilliance in a woman assures her future misery, for there is nowhere to focus her genius." – Sasson, p. 44

"Saudi ideology and policy demand a strict segregation between the sexes... except within the sanctity of the family at home, adult men and women do not occupy the same space at the same time. So the Saudi universities have separate women’s colleges, often on separate campuses. Male professors may lecture to women students, but only through the intermediary of closed-circuit television; the professor never sees his students. The women’s colleges include faculties of arts, medicine, pharmacology, education, and so on, but also the traditional female faculties of nursing and home economics. They tend to receive secondhand equipment and less desirable facilities all around, but they are part of the public university system and they have a lot of students. At least one-third of the university students in this sternly conservative country are women. Obviously this fact will have a huge impact on Saudi social and political life in the long run, though it would be reckless to predict the exact nature of that impact. What is intriguing is the policy decision to admit women to the universities and to train them for at least limited professional roles. One suspects that a decision has been made, perhaps half-consciously, to prepare a way for a different future, without knowing what that future might be and while deferring it as long as possible.

Far more important in terms of numbers and everyday social impact are working women of the middle and lower-middle classes. They have a high school education at least—many in fact are university graduates—and hold clerical and low-level professional jobs as nurses or schoolteachers." – Humphreys, p. 211

"The great surprise of the 1980, however, comes from Saudi women. Despite the strengthening of surveillance and the almost prisonlike atmosphere in which they live, many have succeeded just since the 1970s in getting university degrees. In Saudi Arabia, 32 percent of university professors in 1986 were women. The universities, of course, are segregated, but that hasn’t stopped Saudi women from hiding beneath their veils doctoral degrees from great academic institutions, often British or American. A woman with a doctorate, even though she is still condemned in Saudi Arabia to the veil and seclusion, is not like an illiterate woman relegated to the kitchen. Modern education introduces a new dimension and changes the authority relationship between a woman and her group. This is the only explanation for the outcry of the imams against the handful of Saudi women who broke the ban on driving and drove around the streets of Riyadh at the wheel of their cars during the Gulf War." – Mernissi, p. 162

"Feminism in the Middle East has been pursued chiefly by a small minority of highly educated, Western-oriented, upper-middle-class women—in short, by those who had enough economic security to violate widely held social taboos... Even in relatively favorable climates, such as Republican Turkey (which supplanted Shari’a with European civil and criminal codes in the late 1920s) [but still has some difficulties with human rights violations – ed.], the Tunisia of Bourguiba, the Egypt of Nasser [bleeding-heart liberal there] and Sadat, and Iran during the Shah’s last fifteen years in power, progress toward a degree even of legal equality was slow and fitful.... [H]ow can there be such a thing as Islamic feminism? The search for it is no doubt rooted in the deeply felt need of educated Muslim women to address two dimensions of their personal and social identities. On the one hand, they want to assert their standing as women free and able to act independently in the modern world. On the other hand, they want to reaffirm their roots in the fourteen centuries of Islam, their continuing acceptance of the unique covenant that G_d offered to humanity through Muhammad....

[A]s literate and engaged women confront the sacred texts, especially the Qur’an and Prophetic tradition, they will inevitably make something different of it than men have. They may put aside the many misogynist statements (which are found in many sayings attributed to the Prophet but almost never in the Qur’an, by the way) and retain those that confer some honor and status on women. They will certainly perceive the Qur’an’s humane and flexible tone as oppressed to the rigidities of the jurists, and in light of this perception they will demand that Islamic legislation become more authentically Qur’anic. Of course, none of this will come out in the way we now predict or imagine. But even in this most bitterly contested realm of life, we must never underestimate the capacity of Muslims to find original and effective solutions to the problems that beset them. Nor should we forget the infinite variety of resources that Islamic tradition will provide them for this search, if they will only allow themselves to use these freely." – Humphreys, p. 226

"In Third World societies millions of people like me, who belong to groups that only recently were excluded from knowledge, have had access to that manna from heaven since the Second World War. We must not fall into the victim mentality and moan about what a miserable century this is. It is a fabulous century, at least for the countries of the Third World, which used to stagnate in material, political, and cultural deprivation. In countries like mine, many of our doctors and brilliant professors began life as shepherds, and they often recall this fact with a certain pride, especially to communicate to their students a sense of the wonder felt by all those in the Third World, who have had access to an unhoped0for education. Let us have fewer weapons and more learning. Then we will have a word that I would love to travel around, a world in whose creation I would be proud to participate. I know there are untold millions of others who want such a world." – Mernissi, p. 170

"We can bring a new world into being through all the scientific advances that allow us to communicate, to engage in unlimited dialogue, to create that global mirror in which all cultures can shine in their uniqueness. Nothing makes me more exuberant than the vision of this new world, and the fact that we must go forward toward it without any barriers no longer frightens me." – Mernissi, p. 174

At times it can be difficult to know what to believe. Surely, if one probes into any society, one finds stories amazing enough to show that truth is stranger then fiction. Stories of the Western world, from Rome to Paris to London are sure to have their idiosyncrasies. Wall Street, Madison Avenue, Hollywood, even the White House, all have their tales to tell. What is remarkable about these tales of the Middle East, though, is their consistency, from author to author, report to report, and throughout the levels and reaches of the societies they explore. Perhaps most compelling is the biography of an anonymous Saudi princess—known only as "Sultana"—who told her story to author Jean Sasson. In their book Princess: A True Story of Life Behind the Veil in Saudi Arabia, they describe some events that are barbaric, yet they also show how in other ways Saudi society is highly structured and formalized. Relationships, respect, politenesses, and customs follow well-established patterns, priorities, and almost rituals. Saudi Arabia is an advanced society, even if very different from the West. The trouble comes in when members of that society—Sultana herself, for example— frequently despises her lot in life, and how few options she has to do anything about it. Writing her book with author Jean Sasson, an extraordinary measure in her culture, was ultimately what she chose. Further questions and complications come in, though, when other women appear to appreciate those same conditions. Some Saudi women say they like their veil. Some women (outside Saudi Arabia) even say they like "circumcision", a euphemism for amputation, or cliterodectomy. (Female "circumcision" is not practiced in Saudi Arabia, but it is in nearby parts of the Muslim world.) How does one deal with an act, so heinous to even consider in Western culture, yet normal, expected, in some ways even desirable in another culture?

Perhaps the best guideline is right to choose. If adults make informed choices of their own free will, then culture is as they wish. And perhaps like Fatema Mernissi’s most uplifting calls, and her Sufi imagery, advancing education is what will enable and empower individuals to choose their practices wisely. When this occurs, we can all be sure of living in a truly advanced society.

BBC News. Friday, March 15, 2002, 12:19 GMT. "Saudi Police ‘Stopped’ Fire Rescue." http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1874471.stm

Humphreys, R. Stephen. 2001. "Chapter 9 – Women in Public Life: Islamic Perspectives, Middle Eastern Realities" in Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Mernissi, Fatema, Mary Jo Lakeland (translator). 2002. "Chapter 10 – Women’s Song: Destination Freedom" in Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing.

Pryce-Jones, David. 2002. "Chapter 5 – Men and Women" in The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.

Sasson, Jean. 2001. Princess: A True Story of Life Behind the Veil in Saudi Arabia. Van Nuys, CA: Windsor-Brooke Books.

Viorst, Milton. 2001. "Chapter 7 – The Saudi Dilemma" in In The Shadow of the Prophet: The Struggle for the Soul of Islam. Boulder, CO: Westview Press