Katherine Collin

Romania is one of Europe’s oldest nations and one of its earliest adopters of democracy. Romania was formed from the melding of a Thracian tribe, the Dacs, with the Romans. The Dacs were conquered in the second century and Romania remained under the Roman or Byzantine Empire for several hundred years. However, for the years between the seventh and the eleventh centuries, historical references to the Latin speaking eastern nation are few. Romania is traditionally divided into three regions: Wallachia in the southeast, Moldova in the northeast, and Transylvania in the west behind the Carpathian Mountains. Romania was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century, but regained suzerainty under that empire in the early nineteenth century. During this century, Romania was at the intersection of three empires: the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Russian. The Russians occupied parts of Wallachia and Moldova in the early 1830s. The Russians traded northern areas of Moldova with Romania until the end of the Second World War, when part of the region was annexed into the Soviet Union. Transylvania was a province in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and was annexed into Hungary proper in 1849 after a series of ethnic Romanian nationalist uprisings. Despite being at the crossroads of these empires and while adopting cultural influences from each, Romania has maintained linguistic, ethnic, and historic continuity since the first century.

In 1859, Wallachia and Moldova, enjoying self-rule under Ottoman suzerainty, wished to unify into a single political unit. While the Ottomans denied their request, the two provinces elected a colonel, Ion Cuza, to lead both provinces in de facto unity. Cuza initiated a series of social reforms. However, in 1862, Romania formally unified and imported a Hohenzollern to serve as king. Carol I was confirmed as Romania’s king in 1866 by plebiscite. Carol’s family ruled Romania until the child king Michael was forced to abdicate during World War II. Romania was a constitutional monarchy: the monarchy ruled under a constitution drafted in 1866. Transylvania was incorporated into Romania following World War I. Culturally and intellectually Romania became a leading light of Eastern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bucharest was a cultural capital in the east.

In World War I, Romania was part of the "Little Entente," part of the Allied countries in the East. In the interwar period, despite some instability in the monarchy, Romania was a bastion of constitutionality in the East and resisted regional tendencies towards both communism and fascism. However, at onset of World War II, Romania was ruled by a child king, Michael. A general, Antonescu, led the country through the war. Antonescu sided with the Germans initially and used the alliance to regain territories in Moldova from the Soviets. In 1944, Romania turned its guns on the Germans and began fighting with the Allies. Romania, after the Soviet Union, experienced the second largest loss of life in the war. Soviet troops occupied the territory at the close of the war. Areas of Moldova were incorporated into the USSR and in 1946 a communist regime was installed in Bucharest.

While the "Eastern Bloc" is generally analyzed as a unit, Romanian exceptionalism to Eastern bloc trends profoundly affected political culture and the transitional period. The exception is due to the leadership of Nicolae Ceauşescu, from 1967 through 1989. Ceauşescu melded Romanian nationalism with socialism and attempted to navigate an increasingly independent foreign policy. Ceauşescu supported the Prague Spring in 1968 and spoke out against the Soviet military interference there. He also participated in the non-aligned movement of the 1970s. He was rewarded for these actions by the United States. Romania was granted most-favored-nation status in 1976.

Ceauşescu’s rule was also extremely personalized and is described as “sultanistic.” Personal control became more important than ideology, socialist development, or international contacts. Romania was never de-Stalinized as other countries in the Eastern bloc were beginning in the 1950s and ‘60s. Close state control was maintained over the economy. In 1984, Ceauşescu decided to pay off all of Romania’s international debt, which he succeeded at accomplishing by 1989 at the expense of massive food and consumer goods shortages during the 1980s. Agricultural exports during this period were increased to bring in foreign exchange while farmers went hungry. Romania also never embraced the liberalizations of the Gorbachev era and was therefore increasingly isolated for mainstream developments in both the Eastern bloc and the Western world. In 1986, the US withdrew MFN status. Romania began its economic collapse during this time in the mid 1980s when other countries in Central and Eastern Europe were slowly liberalizing their economies and providing space for dissident movements to grow. Romania was increasing control over the economy and over the thought and expression of its citizens.

Human rights in Romania were probably the worst of socialist Europe. The Securitate, the Romanian secret police, was powerful and pervasive. The exaggerations of the Securitate monitoring every element of private life probably extended beyond their actual reach. The belief in their power speaks to the extent to which ordinary citizens were oppressed by the regime.

Give this experience of authoritarian socialism, it is not surprising that Romania’s transitional period has also been exceptionally difficult in comparison to other post-socialist European countries. Elements of authoritarianism remain entrenched in the system, and it was at least eighteen months after the revolution that the democratic nature of the emergent regime became clear. It is also not surprising given Ceauşescu’s declared opposition to reform much less regime change that Romania’s transition began with violence. Over 1,100 people were killed during the week of the “revolution.”

Ceauşescu was summarily executed on Christmas day, 1989 by a military tribunal. The National Salvation Front, a collection of communist politicians, secret police, and military official, later joined by intellectuals, took power ostensibly for the period until elections could be held in the spring of 1990. The constitution was adopted in December 1991. During 1990-91, the National Salvation Front’s party won the first elections and ruled until the 1992 elections. Since adopting the constitution there have been three elections. The first returned the National Salvation Front leader, former communist functionary Ion Iliescu, to the presidency. Iliescu led the Romanian Party of Social Democracy. The 1996 elections turned the presidential mandate over to Emil Constantinescu, the leader of a coalition of opposition parties. This coalition was not sturdy enough either to carry out its entire reform program or to maintain the loyalty of the electorate. The 2000 elections returned Iliescu to the presidency in a run off with a far-right, non-democratic party.

Economic reforms have been tentative and remain incomplete. However, the human rights situation has been completely turned around. Although Romanian people still live in poverty, they are now guaranteed freedoms. This has been the greatest success of the transitional period.

Romania is a medium level income country with high human development. Romania is currently undergoing a transition from state controlled socialism to democracy and capitalism. Romania was most profoundly affected between 1945 and 1989 by the Soviet, Stalinist model of development. The economic strategy between 1945 and 1989 relied on state intervention and planning, investment in heavy industry, agricultural collectivization, and incorporation into the regional, COMECON, economy. In development theory, this model resembles import substitution industrialization with an emphasis on developing industry in a protective environment. It also resembles ISI in the extent of central state control over the economy and the tendency towards authoritarian government experienced in socialist and non-socialist countries during the Cold War. Where the socialist experience of Romania differs is in the regional development plan that was applied in Eastern Europe. The region underwent a balanced development model directed from Moscow. Not every country had every industry but each worked together to provide for consumer needs.

One effect of this model on the transitional period is that a close relationship between the economy and the state has not yet broken down. The political elites of the communist era have become the capitalist class of the transition. Latin American, "third wave" democratization generally emerged from a negotiation between the political class and the capitalist class. In Romania, there is no separation between these power bases. Democratization emerged because of the collapse of the previous system and the lack of viable alternatives. Democratization is more a result of negotiation between a monolithic Romanian elite and the international community.

The development agenda since 1990 has been set by the international consensus that free markets and laissez-faire economics are the only path to broad based, sustainable development. The prescription from all significant players, both political and economic, has been to liberalize prices, privatize the economy, and stabilize the economy within the international system. These economic reforms must accompany a political system that combines competition, participation, and human rights. The reforms that Romania has undertaken to these ends have been with the goal of incorporating Romania into Western structures, especially the European Union and NATO. The Washington consensus is that democracy and capitalism bring wealth and well being, but the Romanian perspective is that Western integration would provide economic and military stability, growth, and status.

The European Union is a force for democratization in countries negotiating to join the Union. Human rights laws, minority rights, and other human development policies have been shaped by EU standards. Romania began negotiating for EU entry early in its transition. It entered official negotiations in 1993 and is expected to join in the second round of expansion in 2007. It was the first country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1993. Romania also joined the Council of Europe early on, but waited until 1997 to join the Central and Eastern European Free Trade Area. Last year Romania held the presidency of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe for six months and was extended an offer to join NATO last month. Romania has also been a leader in multilateral efforts in former Yugoslavia, backing the NATO campaign, participating in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and sending police to join the international police force in Kosovo.

International laissez-faire consensus has been tempered by internal reluctance to reform. Romanian policy has been more concerned with integrating the economy into the world free market system than with dismantling the internal controls of the state. The state maintains control of 40% of the economy. While export share and import share of the economy have increased in the past twelve years, so has dependence on international lending. The slow pace of reform has stunted the country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment and detracted from macro-economic stability.

Democratization has taken hold and there has been a transfer of power, but political reforms have deepened an existing power base without an equivalent level of concurrent widening. Corruption is widespread. The rent seeking behavior of politicians has not destabilized the country politically, but it has undermined the economic equity of growth.

Theories of development have not yet broadened to encompass the transition from socialism. Most theorists regard the transition type as an extension of the Latin American third wave of democratization. During these transitions, the collapse of authoritarianism necessitated compromise among several elites. Democratization was born out of compromise because other forms of governance could no longer bear one elite in power without the consent of another. The flaw of the transition type is that it does not broaden power to the non-elites. Its strength is the choice of negotiation over conflict. Some theorists do not regard this model as applicable to post communist states. Post Soviet democratizations of the 1990s make up a "fourth wave" of democratization. (McFaul, 2002) Communism and colonialism destroyed the traditional elites of societies. Some post-communist transitions have resulted from conflict between the masses and the communist elites. Others have grown out of the internal collapse of the socialist system while the state personnel remain in power. In the fourth wave of democratization, there has been no internal negotiation, only conflict. The conflictual cases have been more successful in democratization because elites have been forced to compete for power in more genuinely contestable circumstances. In cases where the communist elite remains, there are many opportunities to embrace authoritarianism. Such authoritarian transitions have been seen in Soviet and Yugoslav successor states. Romania’s communist elite has reinvented itself, and while it remains entrenched in democratization, authoritarian dangers still exist.

The structural transformation of the Romanian economy began in land reforms in the post World War I period which gave over 85% of farmland to the peasantry. Agriculture was largely for subsistence production. Agricultural methods were not modernized until after World War II and land holdings tended to be small and scattered around a densely populated village.

Industrially, Romania’s main development was in oil. Romania has substantial oil reserves, and in the interwar period these were developed into one of the leading European oil industries. This industry was heavily damaged during WWII and has never recovered its prominence in the Romanian economy.

The economy that faced the newly imposed regime following WWII was highly agrarian and economically isolated. In 1950, 75% of the population was rural. The socialist structural transformation developed heavy industry and collectivized agriculture. By 1989, industry amounted to just over half of the economic output of the country. Industrial output was concentrated in machines, textiles, food processing, chemical production, and oil extraction and processing, and light industries of textiles and food processing. The agricultural sector had been modernized and mechanized since 1945 through collectivization: 91% of agricultural land was collectivized. The sector produced both livestock and staples such a wheat, corn, and potatoes. The Romanian economy was integrated into the Soviet satellite system, and by the 1970s and ‘80s this accounted for an inflated return to the industrial sector.

The Ceauşescu regime was able to negotiate a fairly independent foreign policy beginning in the 1970s and participated in the international non-aliened movement. The United States government supported this independence as a point of leverage against the Soviet Union, and therefore Romania enjoyed a considerable amount of trade outside of the communist bloc. By the 1980s, exports were split equally between communist and capitalist countries.

Since the winter of 1989, the Romanian economy has felt the impact of internal reform as well as international events. Iliescu’s approach to economic reform was slower than Central Europe’s. Romania was hard hit by the regional recession of 1997 – 99 relating to the Russian currency crisis and the sanctions imposed on its neighbor Yugoslavia. However, the openness of the economy has increased, reflected in growing export share, and privatization efforts continue. The local currency, the leu, was consolidated and liberalized in 1997. Rampant inflation, both before and after the currency liberalization, is now dramatically improved. Foreign direct investment has increased, although it is still small compared to what Central European neighbors attract. Romania had no international debt in 1989, but it now owes over 10 billion USD to the IMF, used largely to make up for chronic current account deficits.

Romania experienced two transitional recessions. Between 1990 and 1993, 21% of GDP was lost. Between 1997 and 1999 GDP lost a cumulative 14.7% of its value. This recession was a result of both external factors and the new government’s increased reform efforts. Despite the heavy losses of 1997-99, the Romanian economy has grown an average of .47% per year since 1993. By 2000, Romania’s GDP was 144% of its 1990 levels, the largest gain of GDP on 1990 levels in post-socialist Europe. (World Bank, 2001, B)

Industrial output slowed in the 1990s. The age and condition of the industrial stock render this sector of the economy uncompetitive in the world economy. Surviving heavy industry has contracted or has been taken over by foreign corporations. Romania now exports machines, shoes, textiles, and agricultural products. This sector is mostly generated from new, green-field industries rather than reinvented communist era firms. Lower levels of foreign investment stifle the growth potential of this sector. The uncertain pace of reform, the complicated state requirements for business, and the continued state dominance of the economy discourage FDI. The services sector of the economy has also grown.

Unemployment has stabilized at around 10%. The informal economy has blossomed and accounted for at least 40% of GDP in 2000. Roughly half of Romanian workers are formally employed in the private sector of the economy. With accession pressures from the European Union, efforts to curb the "shadow economy" have increased since 1999. However, the de-monetization of the Romanian economy continues to be a problem. After the loss of over 1.5 billion USD in savings in the 2000 banking scandal, over 10% of the population now has no banking account at all.

Privatization was a very slow process until the 1996 election of the center-right government. Until 1994, only 35% of the economy was privatized. By 1997 privatization increased to 55% and it currently stands at 60%. In 1991, the economy was split into the State Ownership Fund and five Private Ownership Funds that respectively received 70% and 30% of the 6,400 enterprises. The POFs distributed vouchers to employees and managers of firms. Firms could not be sold without the consent of voucher holders. Many people quickly sold their vouchers. Managers were able to buy them at low prices and install themselves as capitalist owners. By 1996, only 45% of the SOF enterprises scheduled to be sold had actually been privatized, and of these the majority were small and medium sized firms. Only 13% of large-scale enterprises had been privatized by the election of 1996. Constantinescu increased the speed of privatization but maintained the proportion favoring state ownership of large enterprise. In contrast to this slow progress, the privatization of farmland was quick. As of 1998 83% of farmland and 87% of agricultural production was in private hands.

Agriculture has lessened its share of GDP output by 10%. Keeping in mind GDP growth, this represents a large drop in productivity. If 1990 levels are set to 100 for the Food Production Index, 1979-81 levels were at 112.8%. 1996 levels were at 95.9%. (World Bank, 2002) Romania faces a difficult agricultural export market with the heavily protected European Union. In addition, subsistence agriculture has become very important. Rural residents produce for family and or local consumption to an increased degree. In a 1996 poll, 15% of farmers reported participation in the barter economy, and 64% replied that they did not intend to sell their produce to the state. Only 1 – 8% replied that they were satisfied with the state’s acquisition prices. (Mihailescu, 1996) The increasing poverty of the transitional period has reinforced the socialist era survival strategy of relying on familial networks and bartering for food security.

The nature of land holdings does not support export or market oriented agricultural production. Rural residents regained control of their pre-communist land holdings in 1991, one of the earliest reforms. These land holdings are small (ranging from hundreds of hectares to a fraction of a hectare) and un-consolidated. Average holdings of a middle class farmer are four hectares. (Mihailescu, 1996) Ownership patterns resemble those of the initial land reform following World War I. Technical expertise of collective farms has been lost as infrastructure has been appropriated by large landholders or has been left to waste. Tractors and other farm machinery, facilities for upkeep, and access to resources for any maintenance of farm machinery have become scare.

Human capital is deep in Romania, the population is highly educated, access to university education has increased, medical care is available and affordable, illiteracy is at 1% for men, 3% for women and falling, life expectancy is near western levels. Some of these trends (access to education) have improved since 1990, but some (quality of medical care) have been negatively impacted by transition. The state, acknowledging inevitable shortfalls in income during transition, adopted a strategy to compensate for lost earnings with increased social expenditures. This led to spike in spending in 1990 and gradual spending decreases after that. Subsidies to families with children were cut, and spending on education increased as a proportion of the budget. (Zamfir, 1995)

While human development indicators have remained constant since 1989, GDP per capita has fallen off and then come back to 1990 levels by 2001. The year of greatest purchasing power was 1986 at $8,800 per capita. Post communist per capita levels have not yet matched this level. Romania was very economically equal in 1989, but since the revolution the elite classes have enriched themselves. In 1994, the poorest 20% of Romanians received 8.9% of the income whereas the richest 20% received 7.3% and the richest 10% received 22.7%. Although these are the most currently available statistics, these trends have accelerated since 1994. This inequality has evolved in a relatively short amount of time. An increasing number of Romanians live in poverty. Between 1993 and 1995, 59% of Romanians lived on less than $4 per day (PPP). Poverty is concentrated in rural areas and in families with children.

The inequality of income distribution has evolved because of the liberalization and privatization process. Privatization was the method by which the wealth of the state was transferred to the former communist political elites because the process was highly skewed to insider dealings. Management and employees bought out roughly 80% of privatized companies, and in the process political knowledge was translated into the power to get into privatization deals.

Romania has undergone two structural transformations since the Second World War. The first is now undone by the second. The second economic transformation is yet to take shape fully, but it is most profoundly influenced internally by a growing economic inequity that is routed in state politics. The state and the economy are not independent in this sense, and the economic elite wields state power in what is sometimes clearly private interest.

from the quality of representative government.

The election system is a list system that tends to reinforce the strength of party politics. The only directly elected positions are for president and local mayors. The central government is a presidential-parliamentary fusion. The parliament is bicameral, split between the Camera Deputatilor (Chamber of Deputies) and the Senat. The Supreme Court consists of nine justices, one third of which is appointed by each house and the remaining third appointed by the government. Local government in Romania is directly elected with the exception of the head at county level, which is appointed. Generally local governance is weak and most decision-making is run through the central government.

The parliament has been somewhat inactive, and the prime minister has the right to pass legislation through a special decree. More laws have been passed through these decrees and later accepted by the parliament than passed normally through the parliament. This system decreases the transparency of the law-making process and removes legislative power one step from elected representatives.

Since 1989, Romania has had some trouble with the police, and with the independence of the judiciary, accused several times of being influenced by the ruling party. While the judiciary is now more independent, police problems persist. In 2001, several people complained of inappropriate treatment while under arrest. In addition, the police disciplinary system falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. Police officers are deployed centrally and do not necessarily police their home areas. Some policing policy remains at issue between Romania and the European Union, and reforms will have to be enacted before accession is granted.

Romania has what is considered by most measures a consolidated democracy. Romania has free, contested elections with high levels of political participation and mechanisms for institutional accountability. Romania has had two peaceful transfers of power and has fair and clean elections. The levels of official participation are strong: 65% of eligible voters turned out to the last presidential elections, and the number of non-governmental organizations and labor union participation are high.

The UNDP figures indicate a strong, liberal structure with high scores for both the polity and for individual political rights and civil liberties. While the free press score ranks Romania in the partially free category, the Romanian press is quite strong and the number of news outlets in print, radio, and television has blossomed since 1990.

While these scores indicate strides in building democratic forms and guaranteeing individual liberties since the transition to democracy began twelve years ago, the UNDP report also shows some weak areas. Accountability does not match the level of stability reached.

The political stability and lack of violence, rule of law, and government effectiveness scores are slightly below the middle of the scale, while the law and order score is a very strong four of six. The discrepancy of these scores may reflect the legacy of the strong state prior to 1990 with its emphasis on controlling the population. This is a pattern shared by other formerly communist countries making similar transitions. The lower voice and accountability government score makes more sense in the context of these scores and the post-communist pattern.

Romania has a high corruption score in absolute terms as well as in comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries. In a survey of Romanian citizens in January 2002, the most important issues facing the country was corruption, followed by poverty, unemployment, and inflation. (Gligorov, 2002) However, the pattern for formerly communist European countries demonstrates that corruption increases as the human development index score decreases. Romania fits in with this pattern, which suggests that corruption is improvable with the economy and quality of governance.

Corruption is a large problem in Romania and is spread throughout the system. Although bribery is common, high-level corruption is more problematic. The PSDR has had two officials indicted over allegations that a party member, a former government member and businessman, illegally donated money to the party for the 1996 elections in return for favors. The PSD (formerly PSDR) was returned to power while still under a French run investigation over the 1996 election scandal. In a separate case, in the summer of 2000, a large investment fund collapsed after executives embezzled funds. Investors, suspecting a collapse was immanent, were prevented from making withdrawals from the fund to prevent a run on the fund. When the fund collapsed, many people lost their savings. Two of Romania’s largest banks (state owned) were so invested in the fund that the National Bank of Romania had to bail them out. Transparency International ranked Romania 68 out of 90 countries surveyed in 2000. This is an increase in corruption from 1999 (63) and from 1998 (61). An anti-corruption office established by the opposition government in 2000 has made several high level arrests in the last several months for bribery (in amounts of several hundred thousand USD to hundreds of millions).

Gender participation in parliament is low compared to other formerly communist European countries. However, women in Romania benefit from formal workplace equality. Women received the vote in Romania in 1929. Internationally, Romania is an active participant in expanding international law and has ratified the human rights treaties mentioned in the United Nations Development Program objective indicators of democratization as well as several other important international treaties (e.g. the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, etc.).

These numbers demonstrate that Romania has a strong democratic state and is entrenched in the process of transition, and that there is significant improvement to be made in the rule of law, democratic effectiveness and accountability.

In light of three necessary elements of health democracy: contestation, participation, and accountability, Romania has made significant progress in all three elements, but improvements are needed. These three ingredients emphasize the competitive and inclusive characteristics of democratic culture. This is another way in which the transition of the twenty-first century will undo the Soviet styled projects of the twentieth century. The imposed socialist political culture emphasized cooperation and accord. Superimposed on these official political traits were the corrosive elements of corruption and control. Therefore the democratic transition must reverse the official political culture of the previous era and the mistrust of the state and all forms of public participation that the regime engendered.

Romania has had a rougher transitional period than some other European Warsaw Pact countries, and has continuing challenges to its democratic consolidation. These challenges are deeply affected by the legacy of the Ceauşescu regime and its peculiarities within the Eastern bloc. Ceauşescu’s rule was much more autocratic, irrational, and restrictive than other European communist regimes. Freedom of thought and expression were more closely controlled, and the small underground resistance movements developed in other countries were absent in Romania. The Ceauşescus’ had strict, personal and arbitrary control over the careers of other communist leaders. There was no formal arena for discussion or dissention even among party elite. This has affected both the former communist and other leaders of the transitional period. The project of creating a healthy opposition has been more difficult in post-Ceauşescu Romania. Parties still gravitate towards charismatic and powerful leaders. The after effects of Ceauşescu’s sultanistic regime enhance detract from efforts towards an open inclusive and accountable government. Politics maintains a bias toward a strong leading party whose interests are closely identified with state interests.

Romania has had two transfers of power from incumbents to opposition. Superficially, this indicates healthy democratic function. However, there has been only one successful opposition movement. The most powerful contestation of Iliescu’s run for president in the 2000 elections came from the ultra-nationalist party, far right PRM. Support for the PSD is growing. Many mayors switched party allegiance to the PSD after the 2000 elections. The party runs the central government and has a strong majority in local governments. The lack of coherent or strong democratic opposition strengthens the impression that the system centers on the strong party of the former communists.

The electoral system strengthens the force of an overpowering party. All elections, except for president and mayors, use the party list system. Voters vote for a party and the party names candidates to fill the seats it wins. This increases party control over its own members as well as dominance of established, large parties. In addition to reinforcing the distribution of power among parties, it strengthens the hierarchical organization within parties. Carothers writes of the possible future of Romania as a Mexican style democracy: dominated by one party with economic self-interest. (Carothers, p. 16, 1996)

Political participation in Romania remains on par with standards in the West when measured in voter turnout, but has decreased steadily since 1990. These decreasing numbers indicate growing alienation from the democratic process.

As the UNDP indicators show, civil society has gained much strength during the past twelve years of democratic rule. Non-governmental organizations have been organized, and labor union participation remains strong in the industrial sector. Many international NGOs are active within Romania, but these have tended, especially in the early years after 1990, to focus on issues which generated international attention but do not touch the heart of the Romanian polity: abandoned children and Roma rights. Most civil society organizing is urban based, and the agricultural population remains much less organized. (Freedom House, 2002)

Citizens’ trust is largely placed in non-governmental institutions. The church, the military, mass media, and universities attract the greatest levels of public trust in Romania, a pattern that generally holds for most of South-Eastern Europe. (Gligorov, 2002) Part of the explanation for this level of public faith is that these institutions have escaped association with both the communist past and the difficulties and failures of the transitional period.

Mass media is one of the most trusted institutions in Romania. The press has experienced a rebirth since 1990 and is visibly robust and active on the ground in radio, television, and newspaper. Press freedom is greater than reflected in the UNDP numbers, which are probably taken from an older report. Freedom House press freedom rating improved from 4 to 3.5 in 1999 and remains at 3.5 through 2002. (Freedom House, 2002) Accusations have been made that libel laws, including increased penalties for libel of public officials, inhibit press freedom. Libel suits have been brought against journalists, but this does not seem to impede journalistic diligence. Press independence has also come into question after the government called in the extensive debts of the two major independent television stations in 2000. Since that time, these stations have muted their criticisms of the government. A last concern is the licensing of television and radio stations that was removed from an independent board in 2001. This authority was given to a politically appointed minister. (Freedom House, 2002) These developments call into question the extent of democratic intentions of the PSD government.

Newspaper readership in 2001 was at 25% of the population (5.51 million). It has experienced some decrease due to the economic crisis and the increases in other forms of media. Internet cafes have increasing presence in Bucharest.

Certain basic elements of the democratic social contract are still being contested in transitional Romania. However, democracy is the one acceptable form of government and in this sense Romania’s democracy is most profoundly consolidated. Given the economic status of a middle-income country with a purchasing power parity of around $6,000 USD, Romania is within a worldwide trend in its transition to democracy and away from authoritarianism. (UNDP, figure 2.4 – p. 58, 2002) However, in two key areas, conceptions of the nation and of legitimacy are still under national consideration.

The first issue area is the role of the state in the economy. In comparison with other formerly communist European countries, Romania has been slow to privatize the state sector. The ruling PSD party may be ambivalent to the reform process in general. Romanian public opinion reflects a belief that the government has a role in maintaining economic equality among citizens and providing for the basic needs of its citizens. (Gligorov, 2002) These ideas do not correspond with the conception of limited liberal democracy of the Washington consensus.

However, even stronger in Romanian public opinion is the idea that the government’s role is to provide for general economic prosperity. A majority believes that the pace of economic reform is too slow. It seems inevitable that reforms will be completed under international pressure as well as overwhelming national will to join the European Union. However, the more fundamental questions of economic equality and the state as a guarantor of certain economic rights may remain unsettled even as reforms are pushed through.

The second element of the democratic contract still being negotiated is the character of the nation state project: to what extent Romanian ethnicity will be important in the Romanian state. This question is contested by a much smaller group of people, but the recent presidential election demonstrated that this group might not belong on the political fringe. Vadim Tudor, a former communist and the founder of the Romania Mare party (Greater Romania, PRM), reached the presidential run-offs with Iliescu in the 2000 elections. PRM is an extreme right wing party with a xenophobic agenda. This strikes at the heart of the Romanian polity with large ethnic minorities. In 2002, PRM remains the most popular opposition party.

In the meantime, the government has continued to support laws and policies designed to increase minority access to government. These policies are in response to the successful organization of the Hungarian minority. The ethnic Hungarian party, while small, has been the most consistent and well organized opposition party. Some of the most democratic changes in Romania have been in response to minority organization or in response to minority needs.

Preconditions for democracy are measured in two groups: structural elements conducive to democracy and choice elements that push political elites to choose and continue to choose democracy. Structural elements refer to the cultural, economical, and international context. Choice elements influence a politically dominant minority and relate to the individual choices of the significant players. Among these politically significant players, individual choices for or against democracy can influence the course of the country’s politics.

Romania has structural forces contributing to democracy and undermining democracy. Deep human capital provides a base for democracy. Romania has high levels of literacy and education and is an urbanized society. Although the rural population is 44% of the total, cultural and political life is still based around the cities. Structurally, the population is capable of educated participation in democracy.

External factors shepherd Romania’s transition to democracy. Romania sees itself as belonging to the cultural family of Western Europe and sees its proper place as integrated into the European Union. Romania has a democratic past and was a bastion of democracy in Eastern Europe in the inter-war years. Romania has pursued a course of integration since the beginning of its transition. Externally, the strategic importance of democratic stability in the former Eastern bloc and especially in Europe to the Western establishment has brought funding and technical aid. This increased during and after the wars of the former Yugoslavia. Romania is seen as a key to Balkan stability as the largest and most populous country in South Eastern Europe. Regional stability is one of the stated priorities of the American diplomatic mission in Romania. These international ties have increased foreign involvement with the democratic transition and decreased any chances of rejecting democracy.

Although participation levels in Romania have been high since 1990, political culture may be a structural problem for Romania. The legacy of Ceauşescu is strong. Romanian society was left profoundly atomized and distrustful by the dictatorship. The sense of political powerlessness has unfortunately been reinforced by the lack of meaningful political contestation, the failure of the opposition, and declining standards of living.

If the middle class is the bulwark of democracy, Romania is structurally lacking in its class structure. The transition to a market economy has transformed the political elite into the core of the economic elite and the result is to increase the tendency towards centralization of power and the alienation of the general population from the democratic process. The Romanian economy has not recovered to its richest level, although it has reached parity with the so-called zero year of 1990. It cannot currently provide the growth necessary for the development of bourgeois class independent of the state. Therefore the elites of the state and the economy are not independent and the majority of the population lacks the leverage and base for political power that a middle class would provide. In combination with alienated political culture, chances for mass mobilization behind a democratic cause are lessened. The effects of these structural trends might be demonstrated in the rise of the PRM.

Potential members of the middle class are also lost through emigration. Romania’s population has shrunk by over 1.5 million people since 1990. Many of these are ethnic Germans who were eligible for German citizenship and others are guest workers, but the majority of this population loss is most likely due to brain drain.

One of the great questions of Romanian democracy is the conception of legitimacy. There are several forms of democratic legitimacy that share space in the government and which balance each other in policy making. Many Romanians looked to their southern neighbor, Yugoslavia, as the most desirable model of governance in 1990. During socialist times, Yugoslavia was more Western looking, had greater freedom of travel and expression, and greater economic freedom. The destruction of the Yugoslav model has left a void in the Romanian path, with no middle ground example to follow. The Romanian government must therefore balance the people’s conception of legitimate governance and the Western liberal definitions.

Western, especially American definitions of democracy may indicate a more limited, hands-off government that’s role is to guarantee individual rights but not to moderate the social system. The Romanian people’s conception seems to be that a democratic government should guarantee civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights. In addition, the Romanian public trusts Western powers more than their own government. The Romanian government’s perspective has been that the state is empowered democratically but will determine the uses of state power internally. This reflects the elite limited transition type. Initially, the government tried to maintain social and economic rights by increasing social spending. Currently, after being criticized for high wages and large fiscal and monetary problems throughout the 1990s, the government is backing away from these types of spending.

Finally, the evolution is guided in large part by the personalities and motivations of the leaders. Iliescu is constitutionally barred from the presidency for a third term. He was also constitutionally required to give up the leadership of the PSD to serve as president. That leadership passed to Adrain Nastase, the current prime minister. It appears that Iliescu wants to increase reform and transparency while Nastase is trying to maintain or even increase certain non-transparent government practices. For instance, the government has proposed changing some elected positions to appointments and does not support efforts to change the electoral list system. It appears that Iliescu has his place in history in mind, while Nastase will probably run for president in 2004.

Romania fits the model of limited elite style democracy, in which political classes lead a structural democracy without functional opportunities for those outside of power. The political elite makes deepening of the powerbase impossible. The idea of a false or stolen revolution is common in analyzing the Romanian democratic transition. Romania was the only eastern bloc country to begin the change from communism to democracy through violence. This reflects both the character of the communist regime and the democratic regime. The Ceauşescus were not ready to reform the government or step aside to make way for the changes sweeping the Eastern bloc. At the same time, the cadre that seized power after Christmas 1989 is suspected of orchestrating some of the violence of the revolution in order to construct an opportunity to seize power.

The Romanian "revolution" began as a spontaneous demonstration against Ceauşescu in Timisoara became a much more orchestrated and violent event in Bucharest. The National Salvation Front stepped in to establish order and manage a governmental transition. Initially, the NSF was both opaque and a-political. The Front’s membership was to some extent unknown and their political stance unimportant because of its declaration that it would not stand for the political elections called for spring 1990. That spring there was a florescence of political groups led by artists and intellectuals in the urban centers. Parties from the inter-war years were re-founded. However, some groups were unorganized, unfunded, and unknown outside of the cities. The NSF reversed its position and stood for elections as the only group with coherent organization and immediate recognition across the country. The NSF controlled the election mechanisms and had a high degree of influence over the media. Iliescu won the presidency with 85% of the vote. The NSF also controlled both houses of the parliament.

University students in Bucharest occupied the piata in front of the university for two months protesting the results of the election. Eventually when these students began fighting with the police, groups of miners arrived in Bucharest to put down the demonstrations. Many students were killed. The question remains whether the NSF brought the miners to Bucharest or simply benefited from their actions. However, after this event, the results of the 1990 election were uncontested. The first constitutional elections were held in 1992. The PSDR (a party that came out of the NSF) and Iliescu maintained power.

The way in which the PSD has come to dominate Romanian political life demonstrates the limitations inherent in Romanian democracy. The use of violence, the continued, if diminished, use of the secret police in ’92 to infiltrate the opposition, the lack of credible opportunity for the opposition from outset of the transition shows the extent to which the elite restricts political opportunities.

Several other factors contribute to the limitations of democratic transition, most important of which is the economic depression. Romania fits the Central and Eastern European model of democracy undermined by economic hardship. Romanian citizens are less likely to challenge the slow pace of reform and the lack of political pluralism when affronted by poverty and unemployment. East-Central European citizens measure the success of transition to western style democracy in both the increase in civil liberties and in economic growth and increased well being. The economic and political transformations have been packed together for the Central and Eastern European transitions. The failure of the economic transition will undermine the belief in the political transition and strengthen local anti-democratic tendencies. What has been delivered in Romania is a huge improvement in human rights accompanied by economic insecurity. This undermines the legitimacy of the democratic option in Romania.

Furthermore, the extent of Western engagement as a guarantor of both democratic and economic transitions became more important as a hope for the future and less credible as the west divided the former communist countries into fast and slow tracks. The longer some countries wait for meaningful engagement, the more alienating the process is likely to become. The choice between Iliescu and Tudor on the heels of the failure of the Constantinescu opposition reflects these processes.

Romania has been in recession since the mid 1980s. The economic decline was a result of growing distortions throughout the communist bloc. There was no way to integrate the Romanian economy into the Western system without an adjustment, and the adjustment has been harsh. Romania, with Poland and Bulgaria, has had additional problems due to the extent of the agricultural sector in the economy. The sector reverted to almost feudal land holding patterns with land reform and has had to compete with highly subsidized European Union exports.

The assumption that economic development is best directed in a balanced approach from a strong central state has been discredited since the debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and so giving up democratic development for the sake of better directing economic development is a model currently out of fashion. Romania bears some cosmetic resemblance to this pattern with its state sector still at 40% of the economy and the strong one party dominance from the old left. However, the nature of the democracy is not maintained for economic development but in order to either preserve some of the old order or a conservative approach to reform. Romania is left with both an economic deficit and a democratic deficit.

The three biggest international donors to Romania are the World Bank, the European Union’s European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the United States Agency for International Development. The goals of each donor are similar in their vision of Romania integrated into first capitalist, global economic structures and then to Western and European political and security structures. Toward these goals, each agency emphasizes economic restructuring and privatization, support of the small and medium enterprise sector, and fulfilling the European Union accession requirements.

Because all of the major donor agencies are guided by European Union accession demands, the democratic emphasis of international aid has become more or less uniform in Romania. Out of these three major donors, it is USAID that has the most developed and evolved democratic aid packages. Democratic assistance is one of the major components of US foreign aid to Romania. Since 1990, the project types have varied, but the emphasis on democratic assistance has remained and is a major component of the current Country Assistance Plan from 2002 through 2006.

Democratic assistance has been a component of USAID programs since the 1960s in Latin America and has backed up the core of US foreign policy in post communist Europe. With the fall of communism it was the assumption of the US as well as Central and Eastern European countries that democracy was the logical next step and that the United States and Europe were the models and aids of transformation. Successful transformation in Eastern Europe was seen as part of the natural close of the Cold War. In 1989 the US Congress passed the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act allocating $1.69 billion to assistance programs in Eastern Europe. Most of this aid went to economic restructuring and humanitarian aid programs, but roughly $130 million was spent on democratization programs. (Carothers, 1996) The Clinton administration continued the support for democracy assistance and made democratization one of the cornerstones of US foreign policy.

Initially, US aid focused on large projects, parliamentary assistances, and elections. In Eastern bloc countries that had experienced some liberalization, the US usually had a pre-existing relationship with local dissident groups. In countries such as Romania where no such relationship existed, emphasis in the beginning was also given to identifying actors and establishing ties. More recently, US programs have emphasized local government quality and civil society development, reflecting the global trends toward a more grassroots approach to democratization. Although some programs have made positive contributions to the Romanian polity, the small size of funding for these projects limits their scope and impact.

Current democratic assistance focuses on building central government technical capacity. The majority of projects focus on technical aid and exchange programs for major parties and government agencies. Other programs include broad technical assistance to local level government and press development. Also unique about USAID projects in Romania, civil society building has been incorporated into other program areas and therefore bolster the democratic assistance program area. In part because of budget cuts and in part because of the natural progression of the program, focus has been given to local partnerships in implementation as much as possible.

Politics has had a part in shaping development and democracy assistance to Romania from USAID. After Christmas 1989, the election of 1990, and its aftermath, USAID’s democratic assistance was shaped by the US’s suspicion of the NSF and its successor party the PDSR. Between 1990 and 1992, the bulk of US assistance went towards free and fair election development, opposition party cultivation, and free and independent press cultivation.

In 1992, the US based NGO, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), established and advised the Romanian election commission, which was very successful. The 1992 elections were regarded as free and fair by international observers. The media support has also been successful and is an on-going element of USAID democratic assistance. Opposition party development is somewhat controversial and was an arguable failure.

Most opposition party assistance was carried out by the US based NGO the International Republican Institute (IRI), and included trainings for opposition leaders from US political experts. The weakness of the opposition in the 1992 elections led to a reduction in this approach. Many were critical of the form of assistance, and say that the experts were not well versed in Romanian politics. American consultants were oriented towards mass membership parties while the Romanian opposition parties did not fit this model. Romanian leaders at that time did not feel threatened by the opposition and so regarded US activities as an irrelevant and illegitimate interference in Romanian internal politics. (Carothers, p. 43, 1996) Due to the highly public nature of the US opposition assistance in the early years of transition (the symbol of the Democratic Convention in 1992 was the Statue of Liberty), there is a taint of partisanship on subsequent USAID democratization programs.

Rule of law assistance has been a constant element in USAID programs since 1990. Rule of law projects initially followed the Latin American model of holding trainings for judges through the Magistrates’ School. The school was established in 1991 by the Ministry of Justice and run through assistance from the US bar association Central and Eastern European Law project (with USAID funding). The school has a weak reputation and variable levels of support. Assistance in the most recent country assistance program switched to direct technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice itself. Programs for training visits for individuals to the US have also been a more successful part of rule of law assistance.

USAID has also supported institutional programs to the presidency, the parliament, and other government agencies. In these approaches, USAID has taken a very top down or centralized view of democratic development. Arguably, one of the main obstacles to deepening of democracy in Romania lies more in civil society and in political culture. As stated above, Romanian political culture suffers from something like post communist shock, and citizens are largely suspicious of all most types of organizations and associations. Political parties reflect this in their authoritarian, charismatic, and hierarchical approach to organization. Support for the center has often resulted in miscommunication and not addressed the disconnect between the government and society.

USAID assistance has made some attempts to develop a more grassroots approach to democratic assistance. This began with civil society assistance in 1992. This type of assistance was initially focused on NGOs addressing human rights, ethnic, and environmental groups, and has grown to include civic education groups, for instance the Pro Democracy Association. USAID’s approach has broadened even more to include NGO training and Romanian-American NGO partnerships. While these NGOs report a substantial impact on their development from US assistance, the affects on Romanian society of the groups has been more limited. These local NGOs operate mainly for specific groups of people: students, journalists, intellectuals, and in urban areas.

The lack of mass impact relates both to the size of the problem and to the disconnect between civil society development and the development of civic virtues. While support of civic education and other outreach organization has a desired if modest affect, the most far-reaching results in this area would come from a more responsive government and avenues for genuine political activism. The state has proven itself able to address social issues in some cases. For instance it has dramatically reformed its care for orphans and it has the most comprehensive and effective health programs for AIDS patients in Europe. However, the continued lack of voice in the government because of the one-party dominance reinforces the negative pattern of citizens distrusting the state and withdrawing from participation. The failure of the DCR should have changed this pattern but instead followed it.

This dilemma demonstrates the limits of democratic assistance and the evaluation of impact in the short term. Lessons from the USAID experience emphasize the importance of civil society and its connections to mass consciousness, on the ground knowledge and understanding, and a grassroots approach to complement more centralized technical assistance.

Participation is one of the structural preconditions of a healthy democracy. Healthy participation implies both structures that facilitate access to power and culture that reinforces democratic involvement. Structural participation is related to the UNDP’s discussion of competition as one of the elements of a democratic system. Competition among parties and candidates in an election and competition between the government and the opposition between elections form structural participation elements. Participation is also central to the political culture of democracy. The extent of voter participation in an election is an easy measure of this participation, but political culture is deeper. Participation in democracy is also implicit in the functioning of civil society. Aid agencies’ growing emphasis on fostering civil society actually fosters participation and stems from recognition that merely supporting a competitive political structure is not sufficient to instill democracy. The concept therefore works both top down and bottom up. Top down elements are whether the structure provides opportunity for citizen, NGOs, and opposition party participation. Bottom up elements are the extent to which the population accesses participatory structures. Whether these structures therefore are truly democratic (representing a broad sample of the population) or are elitist, providing formal access for those already empowered.

Romania’s participation in light of these definitions demonstrates several key facets of its transitional political life. One is the elitist nature of the structure. While democratic in all its forms, the government structures service the elites and provide access for the elites. Another facet is the depth of the impact of the Ceauşescu regime on Romanian political culture. The atomization and anomie of the society since the transition reflect the deep distrust of everything in the public sphere instilled by the Ceauşescus’ regime. The extent to which organizational life has grown since 1990 reflects resilience in society, but the gaps in its representation portent the divisions of the future within Romanian society. Finally, the extent to which the Romanian government has structurally incorporated minorities is perhaps the more democratic trend in post-socialist political life. This embrace of participatory principles provides a positive example for all democratic societies and is more meaningful after the manipulation of nationalism since the 1960s, the continued strength of far right nationalist parties, and the Balkan experience in the 1990s.

Citizen alienation from the democratic process is reflected in an opinion poll taken in January 2002 that reports that roughly half of the population trusts the presidency, and that percentage falls to 32% trusting the parliament. 64% reported that corruption was the greatest problem facing the country. This compares to over 90% who trust the church and over 60% who trust the media (Gligorov, 2002). Clearly, civil society is more trusted and well regarded than public officials.

Civil society, as composed of non-governmental organizations, is active if somewhat disorganized in Romania. USAID reports that over 40,000 registered NGOs in Romania. Of these an estimated half are active. Many NGOs were established in the early 1990s to take advantage of a legal loophole that allowed them to import cars tax-free. A 1996 Freedom House survey reports that only 6% of the adult population belongs to an association. 59% of workers belong to a labor union.

Multilateral and bilateral aid agencies are increasingly supporting local NGOs. Agencies work through local organizations, and several aid agencies (USAID, EBRD, and WB) have simply established grant-giving operations for local NGOs to carry out projects. However, this support is undermined by a diminishing total of funding from aid agencies and foundations. International funding sources are still the main source of money for the NGO sector, followed by government sources and then local private sources. In 2001 international funding fell and the local share of funding increased from 2% to 13%.

There are several important limitations to civil society in Romania. The first is lack of access to the political agenda. While it is not illegal to access and influence politicians, the political structures in place discourage public, organized participation. For instance, the preparation of legislation does not allow for public review. This lack of access is compounded by the weakness of the legislature. More legislation has been passed by governmental decree and is another degree removed from public scrutiny in its preparation. Unions have had much greater political access and influence, and several union heads currently serve in the parliament, elected under the PSD list.

NGOs are also limited in the population they address. The vast majority of NGOs are urban based. While the rural population has higher need of activity and assistance, rural communities are all but devoid of associational life. Development programs have been dropped in rural areas because local groups could not be organized to administer funds. This generally reflects a growing divide in the country between an organized, informed, and educated urban population and an unorganized, poor, and under-employed rural population. The rural population has experienced the worst of the transition. Local politicians are the same people as before the transition, living standards are poorer, and the market economy is generally inaccessible.

As stated above, the greatest threat to Romanian democracy is the possibility of a future of one party rule. This is due to the structuring of democratic tools on the part of the PSD, but it is also due to the weakness of opposition parties.

The first election after the regime change, in May 1990, earned parliamentary representation for nine parties with percentages of the total vote over 1%. Over sixty parties in all participated and over twenty were represented in the bicameral parliament. The only party with more than 10% of the vote was the National Salvation Front, and only two other parties gained more than 5%, the threshold for representation applied in the most recent elections. While these parties included resurrections of inter-war period parties, the only party with national coverage and exposure was the NSF.

The second election was held in September 1992, nearly a year after the constitution was put in place in December 1991. The NSF was still the strongest party, but it has lost much strength and was reduced from 66.3% of the vote to 27.7% in parliamentary elections. Other parties also increased their base of support, but the number of parties contesting elections increased to 72. A 3% threshold for parliamentary participation was put in place for the ’92 elections. Between May 1990 and September 1992, a coalition of 18 democratic, reform minded parties formed under the leadership of Emil Constantinescu, a university professor of geology.

This coalition, the Democratic Convention, gained power in the ’96 elections. Romania brought through the first democratic exchange of power since before World War II. However, the political landscape changed profoundly between 1996 and the 2000 elections. The failure of the Democratic Convention to maintain the trust of the voters led to a drop in voter participation, the return to power of the PSD in 2000, and the rise of a far right opposition instead of a democratic one.

Constantinescu did not run for office in the 2000 presidential election based on early polling information. Democratic Convention parties reduced their parliamentary representation to less than 10%, while the PRM leads parliamentary opposition with roughly 25% of the parliamentary seats. The PRM’s program is similar to other far right European parties: anti-minority, reversing concessions to minorities already in place, and authoritarian leadership style. While the PSD continues in policies ambivalent to democratization, the government’s democratic credentials are reinforced internationally in comparison with the PRM. The mandate of Constantinescu increased the legitimacy of Romanian democracy internationally. Freedom House ratings changed from partially free to free in 1996. The return of former communists hasn’t decreased this legitimacy. In November 2001 Romania was invited into NATO, and in 2007 Romania is expected to join the EU in its second round of expansion.

The lack of competition in the political system reflects the nature of the democratic transition. While most third wave transitions in Latin America were the result of negotiations between competing elites, in Romania there was no pluralism among the elites, and therefore no negotiation was required. The elite has not broadened its base since 1989, although economic liberalization has allowed it to deepen and diversify its hold on power. Party leadership is dominated by faction heads from the old NSF or led by other former communist nomenklatura.

Furthermore, party organization is hierarchical and organized around one strong leader. The failure of the Democratic Convention has partially been attributed to its loose power structures as a coalition of parties. Other parties are much more authoritarian, and party membership is not necessarily freely accessible for the public.

Citizen impact on political agendas is limited by party organization and lack of effective contestation by an opposition. These trends alienate the Romanian public from democracy. This alienation is reflected in falling voter participation in elections. (Freedom House, 2001)

Although participation is weak in other areas, structural accommodation of minority participation is quite strong. Romania is a very diverse country. Although ethnically it is reportedly 90% Romanian, in various localities ethnic minorities predominate. Romania is most mixed in the regions bordering Hungary and Yugoslavia in the west. Hungarians make up roughly 7% of the population, but dominate some areas of Transylvanian. Hungarians tend to be the most geographically coherent minority and the most organized. Germans also used to dominate certain Transylvanian towns, but most ethnic Germans have left the country since 1989. Jews also used to be a significant minority. Ceauşescu allowed Jews to emigrate to Israel. Ceauşescu once remarked that his greatest exports were Jews and Germans. Romania is also home to Europe’s largest population of Roma. The 2000 census counted the Roma at 1.5% of the population, but unofficial estimates put the numbers closer to 4.5%. Romania has eighteen recognized minorities including Russians, Ukrainians, Italians, Czechs, Turks, Greeks, Serbs, and others.

Ethnic politics were volatile in the early years of transition. The revolution itself was sparked by demonstrations for a Hungarian dissident in Timisoara. In June 1990 in Tirgu Mures, a Transylvanian city, ethnic Romanians and Hungarians clashed. Three civilians were killed before the army quelled the violence. Roma have been targeted with violence. Between 1991 and 1993 there was a series of violent attacks on Roma villages. Toward the end of this period, violence was sometimes carried out with the knowledge and participation of the police. The right wing Romanian nationalist movement has since gained momentum and is the strongest opposition now in parliament. A poll taken in 2002, half way through the current parliamentary mandate, reveals that the popularity of the PRM remains proportional to their seats in parliament. In 2000 it was believed that Tudor’s electoral success might be due to protest votes, but this poll belies that theory. In short, Romanian politics has a strong nationalist streak that was manipulated during Ceauşescu’s rule and has not yet died out. The consequences of this nationalism occasionally have violent potential.

It is against this background that minority participation takes place. The best example of minority participation comes from the Hungarian population. Hungarians are organized, involved, and have effected policy changes in their own interest. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) was organized in 1990 and has been the most consistent opposition party in Romania since. It has participated in the government since 1996. It consistently attracts over 70% of the eligible Hungarian vote and is the only minority party that wins representation over the 5% threshold. It has been described as the most internally democratic party in Romania. The UDMR has been instrumental in passing minority rights legislation, particularly affecting the Hungarian minority.

While the Hungarians have won a politically powerful position, other minorities, less well organized, are guaranteed representation in the parliament. Every recognized minority is reserved a seat in the lower house of parliament (seventeen seats, plus the UDMR). Local government also accommodates minorities. According to a law passed in 2000, government services must be offered in minority languages in any municipality where the minority is 20% or more of the population.

In 2000, the central government established a national office for minority rights that administers minority oriented projects. This office has a subsidiary for Roma and has developed a program to improve Roma conditions developed by the Open Society and paid for by the European Union. This program fields project proposals from Roma community organizations, meeting Roma needs while increasing the organizational infrastructure of the community. The model is being replicated in other EU accession countries.

Although minorities are sometimes economically and socially vulnerable, the government has attempted to address inequalities and bring minorities into the center of the political process. Treatment of minorities demonstrates the most democratic tendencies of the Romanian transition. Minority participation is guaranteed at the highest levels and is supported through community building exercises. This top down and bottom up approach might be a path towards democratization for the whole society.

Romania began its transition process without a true embrace of a democratic society. The revolution was probably more appropriately described as a coup d’etat, and the new leaders on several occasions used violence to cement their rule. The transition presented an illusion of broad based democratic opportunity that was erased by the violent response to the 1990 student protests. Given this history, Romania followed the transition style of Latin American elite limited democracy more closely than the rest of post-socialist Europe.

However, Romania could not escape the regional trends that did promote democracy. This includes international engagement and scrutiny of proportions probably not seen since post World War II rebuilding in Western Europe. This also includes the public opinion that democracy is the only way forward and integration into the West is the only way to secure democracy. The Romania transition shares elements of its authoritarian past, the elitist present, and democratic potential of the people.

The communist nomeklatura remain in power in the Romanian democracy, and the opposition parties have been weakened by their time in power. The political elite has reaped the fruits of economic liberalization and integration into capitalist global systems while the majority of the population has suffered through a prolonged economic recession. At the same time, Romanian citizens now enjoy the full complement of democratic rights: expression and press, thought, travel, and private enterprise. The lives of Romanian citizens, although less economically secure, have been revolutionized during the last ten years. The extent to which these citizens can make their newfound political and civil rights felt by the government remains a question for the future.

Romania is a confirmed democracy in form but a significant amount of political and societal reform must be put in place for future broad based sustainable development. The significance of the political rights won in the Romanian revolution remains unclear while the former communist elites gain in wealth and power. The growing alienation of the Romanian population from public participation seems inevitable given the legacy of the Ceauşescu era combined with the economic hardships and corruption of the transitional period. However, Romania is one of Europe’s first democracies and has a long history of cultural integration with the trends of Western Europe. Romania also has the human capital in place to quickly transform living conditions given appropriate political changes. The European Union and other international forces are now in the process of integrating Romania into political, economic, and military establishments of the West. Most profoundly in its treatment of minorities, Romania has demonstrated that while struggles with the authoritarian past are not yet finished, democratic traditions and innovations are flourishing.

The development of the economy and government has experience a virtuous circle with the international community. Although economically Western engagement has contributed to some problems, Western powers, especially the EU and the US have used both the carrot and the stick to encourage democratic development. There has also been a vicious circle of growing distrust and alienation between the state and those it governs. These two development directions must be reconciled in the next ten years as Romania enters the EU, but how this will happen and if it will result in democratic deepening remains to be seen.

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