In the last decade women’s organizing has increased dramatically in Morocco. The women’s movement, which was initially marginal, has progressed since the mid-1980s. Even though their initiatives have produced few changes in the national legislation, the women’s movement has managed to redefine gender identities and promote political debate. As a result of this effort, women’s issues have finally entered the sphere of politics in Morocco (Naciri, 1998;Brand, 1998).

This paper aims to explore the reasons for the above development through an examination of two cases: the 1992 million signatures campaign to change the Personal Status Code and the 1993 Thabit sex scandal. These cases help to examine more closely the nature of state policy towards women’s issues in Morocco. Both cases also represent a revealing testimony of the opportunities and constraints that women face in order to increase gender accountability in Morocco.

In Morocco, women are under the authority of two contradictory laws. The first is the public law, which does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of sex or religion, and gives women human and civil rights- hence the right to work, the right of freedom of movement and other human rights. The second one is the Moroccan Personal Status Code, which governs the status of women and family relations, and is based on traditional Islamic law (Lewis, 1993). Contrary to the other secularized legal provisions, this code places the woman under male tutelage throughout her life- celibacy, marriage, divorce, and widowhood. It also institutionalizes the strict division of gender roles: the man is the head of the family and is responsible for maintaining the women and children: the women have only duties toward her spouse (Ziai, 1997). The state, thus appear to adhere to different ideologies on gender relations simultaneously. By law, women are considered equal citizens in the public sphere and subordinated to the men’s will in the family.

In reality, however, this public/private duality is not so clear. Feminists scholars have attempted to oppose the public/private duality by demonstrating the degree of interdependence between the two spheres and the extent to which social justice for women depends upon equality within the private sphere as well as outside it (Naciri, 1998). In the case of Morocco, the constitutional rights of political and socio-economic equality established in 1992 are negated by the provisions embedded in the Personal Status Code. Stipulations, such as the duty of obedience to the husband or the need to for marital authorization in order to work, restrict the ability of women to exercise their rights as citizens in the political sphere (Naciri, 1998). In addition, traditional gender norms that are firmly reinforced in the private sphere are reproduced in the public sphere, including the labor market, leading to bias against women. Women end up occupying the low-wage positions in export industries, and in social and domestic services (Naciri, 1998). The promulgation of the Sharia renders the proclamation of secular and progressive laws meaningless.

According to Kandiyoti (1998), the progressive appearance of the Moroccan constitution is only an attempt to improve its public image in its dealing with the European Union, in its international trade relations, and with respect to international aid. The state accepts to make minimum modifications that allows the state to project a progressive image of Morocco and to obtain international aid, but refuses to make any changes in the institution of the family and the legal and social status of women. The international pressure forces the state to compromise while attempting to maintain the status quo regarding women. Along the same lines, the feminist scholar Naciri (1998) argues that this contradictory and Janus-faced legislation allows leaders to take pride in the attainments of women in the Arab-Muslim context when dealing with Western partners, and simultaneously pride themselves on the fact that the country has been able to retain its traditions.

The deliberate objective of the state to avoid politicizing women’s status became clear when it ratified Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1993. The reservations of Morocco to CEDAW were so extensive as to render its ratification meaningless. The articles on which these reservations have been entered are those that obligate Morocco to combat prevailing discrimination against women actively, that is, through establishing legal protection of equal rights of women, including enforcement mechanisms; abolishing existing discriminatory regulations, customs and practices in all matters relating to marriage and family relations. The basis for reservations to CEDAW lies in the judgment that the manner in which the principle of equality is interpreted in the Convention conflicts with the Sharia. According to the Collectif’95 Maghreb Egalite, Morocco made reservations " especially to those provisions related to equality between man and women as far as their rights and responsibilities are concerned, which derives from the fact that this is contrary to Islamic Sharia, which grants each of the spouses rights and responsibilities whose equilibrium and complementarity will preserve the sacred ties of marriage "(Collectif’95 Maghreb Egalite, 1995). On the basis of religion and tradition, Moroccan government derogates from the provisions of the Convention that grant equal rights to women in the family sphere.

The lack of gender accountability is also present in the way the state administers the development programs involving women. The women’s machinery in the state is divided among a division, a service and two bureaus within four of the least prestigious, least politically influential and poorest ministries (Barkallil, 1994). It is impossible to speak of a coherent WID strategy emerging from any of those units. Each responds to ministerial priorities, and usually each is focused around women-specific and foreign funded project activities, which make few encroachments into broader Ministerial activities.

The lack of national perspective on gender issues was sharply highlighted in the context of the 1985 Nairobi Conference. The Division of Aid and Social protection of the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs was charged in 1985 with producing a National Plan, the National Strategy for the promotion of Moroccan women to the year 2000. The document was not completed until 1989. Unfortunately it was a desultory effort, reflecting the limited perspective of its urban and formal employment-focused ministerial location. It does not even differentiate between the needs of urban and rural women, in spite of the availability of data. It clings to conventional assumptions about the labor market, disregarding non-waged forms of employment. (Marie Goetz, 1998) And as Barkallil points out, it is also absolutely inoperative, failing to detail action plans worked out over time, to quantify targets, or to specify budget implications.

Morocco has sought to justify these discriminatory laws and practices against women on the basis of Islam and traditions. The state avoids challenging the premise that Islam should govern the rights of women, even though it has abandoned the Islamic framework in other areas of the law. As Naciri, noted, " Everything is accepted from the West except the moral values touching on the Muslim and Arab identity- the family structure and the situation of women". There is a symbolic construction that links the identity and the traditions of Morocco with the status of women. The state therefore concentrates their efforts on the Personal Law and on the family, which become the epitome of Islamic politics, and a place of refuge (Anne Helie-Lucas, 1994). " Women have to assume the onerous burden of a largely male defined tradition and are cast as the custodians of cultural values "(Moghadam, 1994).

In recent years, feminist scholarship has demonstrated that women frequently become the sign or marker of political goals and of cultural identity during processes of revolution and state building, and when power is being contested. Representations of women assume political significance, and certain images of women define and demarcate political groups. Women’s behavior and appearance come to be defined by, and are frequently subject to the political objectives of the state and leadership (Papanek, 1994)

This manipulation of women’s image becomes very clear in Morocco where the Monarchy appropriates the gendered identities for political purposes. On the one hand, women’s issues provide a useful territory on which the state can give ground to placate Islamic interests (Naciri 1998; Goetz, 1998; Helie-Lucas 1994). Furthermore, the defense of an Islamic law concerning women helps to legitimize a state that historically has called upon religion to find support for the monarchy (Naciri, 1998, Ziai, 1997). It is important to contextualice the political discourse on women’s issues within the context of a state attempting to contest the politics of Islam.

In Morocco, throughout the 1980s, militant Islamic groups have been associated with efforts to overthrow the monarchy and have been target of official persecution. Since 1991, Islamic groups have raised their public profiles, and with a view to averting any kind of conflict, the monarchy has permitted a limited expression of Islamic political interests and the emergence of an Islamic movement. The Monarch tends to encourage the integration of Islamist groups into the system and not to radicalize them by an overly repressive attitude (Naciri, 1998;Ziai, 1997;Goetz, 1998). This is the case in particular for the members of the association Isalh wa tajdid, who have formed a political party (Goetz, 1998). Even though, the state has abandoned the Islamic framework in other areas of the law, an Islamic interpretation has often figured in legal and policy positions in relation to women. Thus, the recent amendments to the country’s personal law retain a conservative Islamic interpretation. Statements are made in the National Strategy for the Promotion of the Moroccan women to the year 2000, which implies that, a " liberated expression of female identity is anti-Islamic. One policy objective in the education sector, for instance, is " to challenge the foreign and imported image of women and treat this image according to a modernist Islamic version" and another is to.." reinforce awareness that it is not necessary to adopt ways of life and comportment known in other societies where the values and aspirations differ from those of an Arab-Muslim society like Morocco." (GOM, 1989)

Women’s status becomes a bargaining tool used by the state to placate Islamic interests. The Monarch makes concessions at the expense of women, acknowledging that the women’s constituency is not powerful enough to register an effective protest Naciri1998; Brand ,1998; Goetz 1998; Anne Helie-Lucas 1994).

The refusal to challenge the Islamic law concerning women is also noticeable among the opposition parties (Naciri1998; Brand1998). In 1994, the opposition parties formed a democratic block called Koutla. The political and ideological approaches of the Koutla coalition cover a wide spectrum from nationalist and pan-Arabic left to the socialist and communist left. They represent the only legally constituted and authorized political force in Morocco. According to Brand, the political opposition refuses to advance women’s political issues because that represents a threat to the already fragile political consensus. "Unwilling to sacrifice potential strength that the Koutla provided and unconvinced of a possible offsetting strength to be gained from women as a result of party support for these issues, the parties simply refuse to take an active role " (Brand, 1998). The scholar Naciri adds, the parties of the Koutla are not willing to advance issues concerning Islam and women because that would jeopardize their privileges in the political arena. In a country, where Islam is called upon as a means to exclude dissenting political voices, the acceptance of the dominant religious discourse is necessary to be able to occupy a privileged position on the political fringe. According to Naciri, all the opposition parties including the left-wing parties are not willing to assert women’s rights because that represents a challenge to the official religious discourse, and therefore defending them would represent a risk to lose power and legitimacy.

The refusal of the opposition parties to assert women’s rights became clear in a memorandum related to the revision of the constitution that they addressed to the King. In this memorandum, the opposition parties requested recognition of gender equality in civil rights; however, this demand was conditional on the fact that recognition should not counter national religious values. This condition allows the political parties- like the state- to appear to make concessions to the demands of the women’s movement, while at the same time disregarding them, since it is agreed that Islam cannot accepts equality in civil rights (Naciri, 1998).

Overall, the exclusion of women from the formal political sphere works through an elitist system, which, in order to persist, used a number of symbolic and practical mechanisms of exclusion. According to the official political forces, a change regarding the status of women is considered and error because is sensitive on the religious level and because it only represents the extravagant demands of the upper-middle class feminist of the urban areas. The official political forces attempt to marginalize the women’s movement by asserting that their demands are not among the preoccupations of the overwhelming majority of rural women (Naciri, 1998).

In the last decade, growing pressures for modification of a political system has led to a democratization of the government. Such demands for a more open political system have been strongly influenced by the negative impact of structural adjustment programs on broad sectors of the kingdoms population. At the same time, several factors have helped to encourage the development of greater freedom of expression and the expansion of the associative movement. One of the most important has been the existence of a broader international political climate with a hegemonic discourse of economic liberalization, human rights, and women’s rights which rewards those states that pursue projects supporting these norms and marginalizes those which do not. The liberalization process has allowed for the establishment and greater activity of women’s organizations (Brand, 1998)

For the purpose of this paper I will use the term women’s movement to refer to those women’s associations that aim to re-evaluate women’s identity and the status of women in society. These women’s associations have decided to dissociate to some extent from political parties and trade unions to work through independent structures outside the political establishment. This category of associations that emerged during the 80s is one of the most active in Morocco and has managed to redefine gender identities in the political sphere (Moghadan, 1994; Naciri1998; Brand 1998).

This movement is predominantly formed by women that decided to disengage themselves from the leftist political parties. Since the independence of Morocco, the leftist parties were putting off women’s equality claims by making them conditional to class liberalization. For the leftist parties, women inequalities linked to class were the priority and were perceived as more acceptable than those related to gender inequality. For this reason, women of the left were told that " emphasizing one’s woes as a woman is indecent" (Razabi, 1998). After years working for the party women became increasingly aware of the marginalization that they were facing. A new consciousness was emerging among some women who began to see their struggle as parallel, not subordinate or secondary to the class struggle (Brand, 1998). However, this new consciousness of some women did not lead to a re-considerations of the views and policies of the parties. Gender claims were considered a deviation from central political concerns and were excluded from the political agenda.

This frustration prompted a large number of these women to become members of separate associations. The independence from the leftist political parties, allowed women to voice their feminist demands and discuss women’s subordination in terms of gender relations. This disengagement from the political parties, however, is not absolute and the women’s movement is still ideologically tied to the leftist groups. " Women’s associations remain divided between their desire not to cut the umbilical cord from their leftist roots and their desire to affirm their own political identity and their independence from the same groups" (Naciri, 1998).

The feminist associations originating from political parties include the Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (Democratic Association of Moroccan Women), the Union pour l´ Action Féminine (Union for Women´s Actions), the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité (Association 95 Maghreb for Equality), and the Association Marocaine pour les Droits des Femmes (Maroccan Association for women’s rights) (Brand, 1998; Moghadan, 1994) These feminist associations give priority to actions relating gender discrimination, such as inequality with regard to civil rights, violence against women, and sexual harassment. In doing this, women are promoting political debate in issues that have been traditionally associated with the domestic sphere and private sphere- all subjects to be discussed exclusively among specialists in theology or Islamic law (Natchwey, 2001).

The women’s movement represents a significant break with the demands and discourses characterizing other women’s organization in Morocco. Instead of focusing exclusively on immediate and practical interests, and other policy initiatives relating to issues such as family and illiteracy, these organizations question the Personal Status code or the civil rights in the constitution. These problems had never been formulated by other women’s associations before. Indeed, women’s sections of the political parties have exclusively demanded the implementation of rights already established by legislation (Moghadam, 1994).

The opposition parties, the Monarch and the most conservative elements in society all have used Islam in order to deny women equality in the private sphere. Women’s rights are usually considered western imported values that threaten the identity of Islam, centered on women and the family (Anne Helie-Lucas, 1994). In the face of the instrumental use of religion, the women’s movement has adopted a dual strategy. One approach consists of advocating the emancipation of women by examining the Koran and other sacred texts from historical point of view, so as to be able to contradict the non-historical approach of the Islamist and traditionalist groups. The second strategy calls for a progressive approach, base on the universalists philosophy of the rights of the individual of either sex. According to Brand, women’s movement utilizes one of these two approaches or the two simultaneously, depending on opportunities and the interlocutors ( Anne Helie-Lucas, 1994)

The emergence of the women’s movement does not leave the institutionalized political elite indifferent; the elite try to take over this movement by appropriating their discourse, co-opting some of the best-known leaders. But the capacity of this new movement depends on the their ability to remain independent (Naciri, 1998).

In the next section I will discuss two cases that may be used to illustrate the nature of state policy toward women’s movement in Morocco. Both cases, the 1992 million signatures campaign to change the Personal Status Code and the 1993 Thabit sex scandal are also a perfect testimony of women’s political potential in Morocco.

On March 7 1992, the UAF (Union pour l´ Action Féminine) launched a petition campaign aimed at changing the Personal Status Code (Mudawwanah). The decision to launch this campaign has its roots in a UAF- workshop on women, democracy and civil society. A letter detailing the program’s results was sent on March 5 to the president of the Parliament and to parliamentary groups and political parties, none of which responded. On March 7, the UAF announced publicly its initiative in the UAF’s magazine Mars 8. This day marked the beginning of a long political campaign that aimed to challenge what was, at that time, considered an immutable and sacred law based on Islamic texts (Natchwey, 2001)

UAF’s campaign started two months after King Hassan announced constitutional reforms in the country. The king, pressured by international human rights monitors and domestic political forces accepted to revise the constitution and promised to hold a referendum and parliamentary elections at the end of 2002 (Natchwey, 2001). The king and political parties discussion of domestic political reform seemed to open the possibilities for dialogue on women’s rights. Thus, UAF’s campaign seemed to erupt at an opportune moment. Morocco’s regime was being discussed publicly and the international institutions, particularly EU, were closely surveying the liberalization process.

UAF aimed to collect a million signatures to change the entire Personal Status Code. The women’s petition called for the following changes: (1) instituting equality and complementarity between husband and wife in the family; (2) according women, as men, legal competency simply by reaching the legal age of maturity; (3) giving women the right to marry without the need for a guardian after the reaching the age of maturity; (4) placing divorce in the hands of a judge and granting women the same bases as a man for seeking divorce; (5) stipulating that both spouses have the same rights and obligations in marriage; (6) outlawing polygamy; (7) giving the wife the same right as the husband to guardianship over their children; and (8) establishing work outside the home and education as rights the husband cannot dispute (Natchiri, 2001)

All the political parties, without any exception, neglected UAF demands. The PI (Party Istiqlalien), USFP (Union Socialiste des Forces Popularies) and even the PPS (Parti du Progres et du Socialisme, formerly the Morocccan Communist Party) actively opposed the women on this issue. As UAF President Latifa Jbabdi stated, "we suffered, not only from the state or the Islamists, but also from the political parties. We suffered innumerable pressures to stop the campaign….I had contacts with parties, and was attacked more than I ever was by Islamists…by the USFP and the Istliqlal. For them to touch the Mudwwanah was to touch a taboo which would then create problems". (Latifa Jbabdi quoted in Brand, 1998)

Hence, even the non-islamist parties that were supposed to be their natural constituency, decided to oppose women. Political party considerations ultimately forced women linked to the political parties in the opposition to officially withdraw from coordination with the UAF, although the group was then joined by the Comité de la Femme Ouvriere (newly created in the Union Marocaine de Travail-UMT), women’s sections from the newly created Parti de la Renaissance et du Socialisme, as well as other women labor union activists, researchers, and lawyers. The campaign targeted all demographic forces- men and women- in an effort to collect a million signatures (Brand, 1998)

Women’s mobilization was also strongly condemned by Islamist organizations. In its issue of April 20,1992, an article by an Islamic scholar strongly condemned the UAF petition on an number of points and stated that questioning the Shari’a was a crime punishable by death. The article further stated that the use of the issue of the mudawwanah was not driven by patriotic motives: " today more than ever this issue aims at conspiring against Islam to eliminate it, to remove what is left of Islamic law in the Muslim world and to achieve a complete westernization of the world " (quoted in Brand, 1998). The Islamist groups were accusing women of basing their objections and demands on codes and principles outside the Islamists context. By importing western concepts, women were not only betraying the official religion but also were attacking the nation, the community and the culture of Morocco (Mayer, 1995)

Opposition also appeared from the figure of the Ulama (Islamic official scholar). In Morocco, it has long been state policy to leave matters related to women and the family to the realm of the Ulama, who have been traditionally very narrow in the interpretation of Islam. Ulma´s response did not differ from the Islamist groups’ reaction. Both answers were based on a total rejection of these women to interfere in matters of religion. According to Moghadan, the virulence of the Ulama´s response not only resulted from " a concern with maintaining the last bastion of Islamic Law, but also from a competition between the Islamists and the Ulama over the political and religious role.

Five months after the campaign started, the Monarch intervened. Women’s signature initiative posed both opportunities and challenges to the monarch. The opportunity lay in potentially pleasing a mobilized and politicized group prior to the referendum over constitutional reforms. A positive interaction with the women’s campaign also gave the Monarchy the option of showing a more democratic image in Europe, where women have successfully publicized their campaign. Nevertheless, the monarch did not want the debate over the muddawannah, to alienate his two bastions of state support; the old and elitist Koutla and the ulama, the traditional source of religious legitimacy. Finally, the acceptance of women’s demands could radicalize the Islamists who might confront secularists. A favorable response to women’s demands would also deviate from the state’s old strategy of making concessions at the expense of women in order to keep the most traditionalist and conservative elements in society placated (Slavin 1996; Naciri 1998; Brand 1998; Mayer 1994)

Hence, all these issues pointed to the likelihood of Hassan’s involvement. The king held a formal meeting with the women where he acknowledged women’s complaints about the Personal Civil Code, but he entreated women not to mix these problems with the constitutional referendum and the electoral campaign, urging them to keep them " outside politics". King Morocco asked the women’s associations to refer to him personally when proposing revisions to the Code, in exchange for which they agreed not to turn the question into an electoral issue (Naciri, 1998). Under the order of the King, a committee with mostly conservative representatives was assembled in order to deliberate and decide upon the recommendations (Brand, 1998)

The recommendations of the committee were finally announced on September, 1993. The changes suggested by the council of ulama and signed into law by the king were minimum. The law remained particularly the same. Some of the modifications are the following ones. In the section on marriage, a woman who had reached the age of maturity and who was an orphan was allowed to contract her marriage herself (without a guardian), or could choose her own guardian. All other women are required to choose a tutor. The husband was required to inform the first wife of his desire to take second wife, and was required to obtain the permission of a judge for such a marriage. In the section regarding dissolution of the marriage contract, a new provision required the presence of two parties to register the divorce as well as the permission of the judge to implement the divorce, thus putting some minor constraints on unilateral repudiation (Ziai, 1997; Mayer 1994).

According to Brand, women activists that worked on the signature campaign or in a parallel activity, felt the effort had been worthwhile, despite the minor changes secured, because it demonstrated that the Mudawwanah was not immutable, sacred text. Women also pointed out that according to his pronouncements, the king had left the door open to future amendments of changes.

In early February 1993, a police commissioner of Casablanca was arrested after two young women filed a complaint charging him with rape. The story that gradually emerges was of the commissar’s involvement in the rape of some 5 hundred women over the course of at least 13 years. The commissioner was ultimately sentenced to death (Slavin, 1996).

The story raised many questions about the abuse of power, political corruption and sexual violence against women. As a response to the Tabiat case, the women’s section of all the political parties, the women’s unions, women’s human rights groups, and women’s sections of labor unions developed a document. The authors of this document explicitly accused the state of doubly oppressing women, as citizens and as females, deprived from equal economic, social, and legal rights. In this document, women’s organizations demanded a comprehensive investigation into all cases of economic and political corruption, as well as crimes that touched human rights. As one analyst points out, the call, not for specific changes in laws, but for a broader examination of corruption, was a mayor departure from the strategy employed in the Personal Status Code campaign (Brand, 1998).

This time, contrary to the 1 million-signature campaign, the political parties decided to participate in the debate. Both political parties PPS and USFP focus on those aspects of the case dealing with political corruption. With parliamentary elections only a few months away, the opposition parties demanded legal and administrative measures to fight corruption. At base, many of the criticism leveled by the political parties called into question the whole political system. Indeed, the opposition parties sought to frame the case in such a way as to put the political system itself on trial. However, it is remarkable that none of the political parties’ criticisms made the connection between the muddawwanah and violence against women. None of them argue that the personal civil code in fact legitimates violence (Natchiri, 2001).

The Islamists also weighed in. Many of their points echoed those raised by the secular opposition, as they clearly called into question the legitimacy of an apparatus with wide responsibilities for community and national security. Contrary to the political parties, the Islamists did made a connection between state policy towards women and the Thabit case. According to the Islamists, these state policies that in the name of liberalization and equality had pushed women toward unveiling and mixing with men are also responsible for any case of sexual violence. Therefore, the implications are clear. The Shari’a need to be implemented and the Personal Status code should restrict women even further (Natchiri, 2001).

The response from the government arrived on March 11 in an article released in the official journal, Le Matin du Sahara. This article stressed out that Thabit’s case should not in any way represent the entire National Security service. Hassan sought to discourage the tendency to generalize from the corruption of the case to the entire state apparatus and regime. Not surprisingly, the monarchy refused to question the family laws that explicitly legitimize violence against women in Morocco. The Muddawanahh was again intentionally ignored and put outside the political debate (Brand, 1998).

Moreover, the Thabits case did not trigger the same mobilization as the mudawwanah campaign did. For Brand, the short period between arrest and execution of the police commissioner helped to keep opportunities to mobilize to a minimum. According to this author, the short duration of the trial may be explained by the regime’s desire to put an end to a political discussion that could be translated into lack of royal support in the coming parliamentary elections.

Thabit case highlighted the problem of violence against women, a subject that have been a taboo in Moroccan society. According to the testimonies, it also led to the opening of a number of centers to deal with violence against women. Subsequently an advice center and hotline was opened in Casablanca under the direction of lawyer and OMHD activists. There also been a number of conferences held on the question of violence against women and the legal protection offered to women, such as major conference held in Casablanca in mid-June 1995, organized by the Association Marocaine des Droits de la Femme (AMDF) and funded by an international donor (Natchiri, 2001).

It seems to be a consensus between the scholars that since 1985, and especially since 1990, the possibilities for women’s organizing have increased dramatically. Women have taken advantage of the political liberalization and successfully encourage public discussion and debate on issues traditionally associated with the domestic sphere. Issues like divorce, polygamy, matrimonial tutelage, and the political participation of women, which were discussed exclusively by specialists in Theology or Islamic Law have entered the terrain of politics.

The fact that their initiatives have produced few modifications in the national legislation is largely because the changes they sought to one degree or another struck at the very bases of the sociopolitical system. A change in the status of women threatened to dissolve the political coalition carefully crafted by male activists to try wrest a small share of power, but without questioning the broader official discourse. The monarch is also aware that making minor concessions to women plays well with its western supporters, but he also knows that any changes that would challenge societal practices or Islamic Law in Morocco would create resentment and opposition in the ulama and other conservatives. In addition, making concession to women would also alienate the Islamists and raise the spectrum of an Algeria or an Iran in the kingdom.

A greater success of the women’s movement lies in its capacity to build a powerful and influential political force. This would require a joint mobilization of middle class women in the urban areas and rural women that have traditionally remained marginalized and outside the political sphere. The ability of the women’s movement to change the current balance of forces in the country and gain influence at expense of the more conservative elements of society would decide the improvement of women’s status in Morocco.

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