While women have historically organized themselves for social change in Jordan, the 1992 implementation of the UN Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has enabled women’s groups to more substantively discuss and challenge sensitive legislation. Though CEDAW, as an international convention, does not have the same force as state law, it gives activists a common vocabulary and places the pressure of international observation on officials. At the same time, women’s rights activism has occasionally been the subject of scrutiny by the Jordanian government and social opponents, who alternately label CEDAW-related work as political opposition and the spread of foreign ideals. Nevertheless, a national women’s machinery is making comprehensive progress in the country.

Jordan is a country of four million people that is governed by a constitutional monarchy. Its parliament is composed of upper house senators appointed by the king, and lower house deputies elected for four year terms. Seats are allocated for Muslims, Christians, Bedouins, and the Circassian and Chechen minorities. Women comprise approximately 15% of the workforce, and are primarily employed as secretaries, teachers, and nurses. Unemployment is around 34% for women and 14% for men. The legal age of marriage for women is 15 years, and for men, 16 years.

The women’s movement in Jordan rose out of women’s charitable organizations founded in the 1940s and ’50s. These were typically composed of elites and could claim only nominal commitment to social work. Volunteerism still plays an important role in the society, and has grown increasingly substantive. There are up to 600 of these voluntary associations in the East Bank alone providing health and literacy services, and assistance to the poor.

That feminist activism often originates in the context of social assistance organizations is an historical pattern in global women’s movements. Social work for underprivileged sectors has usually been a sanctioned activity for women; perhaps because it is understood to be an extension of their routine domestic responsibilities of caring for others. As civil organization evolves and begins making demands for gender equality, this interest is initially put on the political backburner, either because it is not considered a political issue, or because the ‘wider’ context of nationalist struggle takes precedent. This holds true for Jordan’s economy and politics, which have been profoundly affected by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The country’s charitable societies of the mid-20^th century did not challenge socially acceptable feminine roles, but did plant the seeds of organizational skills and membership. Women’s participation in public organizations has been historically limited in the region, due to social restrictions on women’s activities outside the home. The government has kept independent organization in general on a tight reign, and women in leadership positions are often placed there by those at the top, often because of their distance from the political concerns of different classes. The general sense is that activist organization should be managed vertically from official levels, rather than horizontally across civilian sectors. This again is an example of the mild threat posed to the government by independent organization, which is easily construed as political opposition.

There are two "Royal NGOs" (RiNGOs) in Jordan, which are not bound by Law 33 for NGOs of 1966, which states that all NGOs must register themselves and report all planned actions to the Ministry for Social Development for approval. Princess Basma is the president of the Queen Alia Fund, and Queen Noor heads the Noor al-Hussain Foundation. Both RiNGOs were established by royal decree, and are not required to abide by Law 33. Whereas regular NGOs are prohibited from conducting fundraising at all, the RiNGOs maintain direct access to overseas donors. They are also exempt from reporting to the state, giving them much more freedom in choosing their activities. The ministry therefore views the RiNGOs as somewhat competitive agencies.

NGOs are naturally constrained by the reporting requirement and the time lag in being granted permission by the Ministry. The mandate of all NGOs is either charitable or development-oriented. They are discouraged from developing goals that deal with political change. Participatory approaches are also not encouraged at most stages of the project cycles, with the exception of implementation (Sigge 1998, Sections 2.1 – 2.3).
The first female cabinet minister, In’am al Mufti, was appointed to the Ministry of Social Development in 1979. Under her leadership, a Jordanian committee began preparations for the 1980 UN Women’s Decade meeting in Copenhagen. The government, under pressure to present a good international image, granted women voting rights and the right to run for elective office at this time. Currently, women make up 6% of top-level government positions; the average in the Middle East is 2%, and globally it is 7%. (UNICEF 1997).

After the Beijing Conference of 1995, "National Women’s Machineries" (NWM) were created in countries signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). NWMs are networks of government offices and civil society organizations that share similar mandates for women’s advancement. These networks work to ensure implementation of the Beijing Platform of Action, by mainstreaming a gender-equality perspective into all policy areas. The ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is the equal consideration of male and female interests in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies. The second responsibility of the women’s machineries is to track national progress in promoting the tenets of CEDAW. NWMs are accountable to the international CEDAW Committee, to which they must submit comprehensive reports every four years.

In addition to CEDAW, international conventions ratified by Jordan include the Convention Regarding Political Rights for Women, the Convention Regarding the Minimum Marriage Age and Registering Marriage Contracts, and the Convention Regarding the Nationality of Married Women. All three were drafted in 1957, and signed by Jordan in 1992. The country has also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The Jordanian women’s machinery is officially headed by the semi-governmental commission known as the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW). Located initially within the Ministry of Labor, the directorate has since been moved to the Ministry of Social Development. The JNCW is the primary body responsible for executing the country strategy to institutionalize gender equality, entitled the Model for the Advancement of Women. Designed within the framework of the Beijing Platform in 1993, the strategy’s guidelines are based on the Jordanian Constitution and National Charter. Both official and private entities with various specializations assume oversight for the design and execution of programs. Whereas the JNCW leads efforts to design and implement programs, the National Committee for Women’s Affairs functions as a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for these programs.

The JNCW is composed of high-ranking civil society representatives and government officials, and is headed by Princess Basma Bint Talal. While this demonstrates top-level political commitment to the process of gender mainstreaming, it raises questions about the degree of grassroots’ voice in policy-making decisions, and the amount of communication between the two sectors. A Coordinating Committee of Women’s Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has been established; however, its objectives and procedures are formulated under JNCW regulations. NGOs must defer to the JNCW, (designated the "authority on women’s issues" by the Council of Ministers), prior to implementing any action plan or decision. The fact that it is socially unacceptable to directly criticize the Princess further complicates the issue of voice for the NGO constituency (JNCW 2002, Chronology). However, quiet criticism is emerging from the more politically liberal NGOs, concerning the mission statement of the JNCW. They claim that the institution has strayed from its mandate as government and civil society coordinator, and instead is superimposing a blanket representation of all women’s interests from the top that marginalizes some groups.

One aspect of the Jordanian system that bears mentioning is its emphasis on expert representation in all ministries and state bodies. This "Network of Focal Points in Government Institutions" consists of male and female policy makers who are in direct contact with the General Secretaries and Ministers of their respective departments. The network reports back to the JNCW with information on women’s status in the public sector, for both employees and recipients of services. The representatives then work with the JNCW to identify challenges and create solutions, including policy and legislative

changes, and to assist in the formulation of reports for the CEDAW Committee. The JNCW submitted its first report to the CEDAW Committee in 1997, and its second in 2000.

The initial report asserts that Jordan’s large body of laws provides equal rights and responsibilities for men and women. It identifies an increase in women’s economic participation as the country strategy’s primary goal. Labor discrimination is ascribed to the insufficient recognition of women’s dual role within society, and a lack of mechanisms that allow women to maintain both private and public roles. Nevertheless, the report is unambiguous about the need for women to fulfill their primary role before seeking outside employment:

"With respect to a profession or occupation, Islam permits women to pursue any respectable profession, provided her husband agrees, and that it does not interfere with the performance of her duties as a mother and mistress of the home" (CEDAW Country Report 1997-2000, 27).

Women’s full participation in economic life is hampered because few policies enable women to both pursue formal sector employment and fulfill these informal responsibilities, which are seen as inherently female and indivisible. Concessions such as paid maternity leave are found in the private sector, but rarely in the public sector.

In general, the country evaluation team that drafted the country report did not question the framework of within which it was working. Gender roles, though different because of men and women’s inherent differences, are not considered unequal. Change is sought within this context. New policies are designed to allow women more participation in formal development. The report sums this up well:

"… There are no existing practices based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes. Instead, Jordan continues to be governed by customs and traditions where the man is the head of the family and where men have one role and women another, particularly in matters relating to the family and the upbringing of children. Moreover, there are certain acts which, being within the domain of men, are unacceptable for women to carry out, not because the State has laid down laws in that respect, but because we remain a society governed by customs and traditions which cause this situation to prevail" (CEDAW Country Report 1997-2000, 6).

The UN Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee, which reviewed Jordan’s Country Report to CEDAW, also expressed concern about the institutional unwillingness to support women seeking legal redress in cases of rape and domestic violence. The committee noted that while radio and television programs focus on ending stereotypes of femininity, the majority of programming effectively enforces the idea of women’s subservience; thereby upholding the notion that violence against women is on some level acceptable (UN News Center 2000).

Committees established or supported by the JNCW include the Legal Committee, which sifts through the entire body of Jordan’s laws for gender discrimination, and proposes amendments to the JNCW (who in turn reports to the Council of Ministers). The Professional Women’s Committee mobilizes professional women from diverse fields to improve women’s status and rights on the job, as well as to mentor incoming female professionals. Women’s rural development committees have been ongoing since the 1980s at the village and governorate level, and membership is close to 70,000. Women’s committees within municipal councils are conceived as pressure groups to help lobby for gender-equality issues. The Princess Basma Women’s Resource Center (PBWRC) was established as another source of implementing mechanisms for the Beijing Platform. The organization conducts seminars and workshops to raise public awareness of gender issues, and serves as a central resource center.

At the time of the JNCW’s formation, it was agreed that issue areas requiring the most urgent attention were women’s economic empowerment, legislation, public participation, and "human security and social protection." The organization defines its broader mandate as a narrowing of the gap between legislation and actual societal attitudes. It has made the most inroads in amending legislation to ensure gender equality in judicial procedures. In 1984, the University Women Graduates Club formulated a petition to reform personal status laws to comply with the constitution. At the time, there was no response from Parliament. Today, however, professional women’s law unions and others continue to comb through provisions and acts of legislature, suggesting and advocating for revisions. Their first major victory came with the insertion of the phrase (here in italics), "Jordanians, men and women, are equal before the law," into the National Charter.

Implicit in much of the country’s legal codes is the assumption that women are to be legally regarded as minors. Thus, while the wording of laws appears to "protect" women, it has the opposite effect of dispossessing them of their rights as full citizens. Problematic codes include the Civil Status Law, Personal Status Law, and the Social Security Law.

As announced on 3 November 2002, successful new amendments have been passed for three of these laws. The Personal Status Law continues to allow Polygamy and arbitrary divorce, but has been amended to allow women married to foreigners to pass Jordanian citizenship to their children. This right was formerly reserved for

Jordanian men, even those married to non-national women. The Social Security Law now allows working widows to collect both their deceased husbands’ pensions and their own, whereas before they had to choose between the two. Perhaps the most remarkable change has occurred with the Civil Status Law, which required that a woman be removed from her father’s "family book," or group passport, and added to her husband’s upon marriage. The recent amendment allows women to henceforth apply for their own, single passports, without their husbands’ or fathers’ permission (Dawn 2002, International). These changes came about due to a concerted collaboration between NGOs and the JNCW.

Organizational reconfiguration is evident in the opening of the first women’s shelter for victims of violence by the Family Protection Unit of the Amman Police. The result of concerted efforts by local NGOs, the UNDP and UNIFEM, the shelter was a badly needed alternative for potential victims of honor crimes under state custody. With no separate, safe place to house them, an estimated 40 women at a time had been staying in jail for indefinite periods, sometimes up to 11 years. The state is unable to release them due to the probability of murder by family members. The existence of an alternative shelter may have the effect of dissipating the powerful message that women themselves are to blame for "provoking" dangerous situations.

According to CEDAW, it is the responsibility of NWMs to institute mechanisms for gender accountability. This requires the difficult analysis of whether (and how) government actions result in real changes for women. In the Jordanian NWM, each of the civil society and government member bodies is required to submit periodic progress reports assessing tangible change and obstacles to this. The Jordanian National

Committee for Women’s Affairs conducts a regular organizational evaluation. Data submitted by departments and ministries is then used to conduct studies in the field. The Committee also functions as a conduit for communication and expertise between international Arab and Islamic organizations adopting women’s issues.

The Jordanian NWM is characterized by a coordination of objectives among stakeholders. This appears to detract from government accountability by preventing the creation of alternative methods of gender mainstreaming by NGOs and associations. As stated previously, the JNCW functions as a coordinating mechanism for the network of organizations promoting gender-equality. Its mission is to create fluidity and efficiency among the efforts of individual groups in the interest of overall progress. However, the JNCW must approve all proposed NGO actions and objectives according to a standard set of guidelines formulated by the JNCW itself, which casts serious doubt on organizational freedom in agenda setting and speech. The reliance on umbrella regulations appears to be a feature of monarchal systems, which generally strive to project an image of organizational coherence and ideological unity.

Donors play a critical role in any machinery, by exerting influence on the direction and objectives of programs. Because organizations must expend a great deal of energy on the race for funding, discrepancies between organizational and donor objectives may be understated or overlooked. If the funding is mostly external, this can cause the internal demand for gender equality to atrophy.

The majority of the JNCW’s funding has come from foreign aid, of which Jordan is a large recipient. Because so much of this aid is external, it puts a constraint on the level of internal acceptance of gender mainstreaming. USAID sponsored the drafting of the National Strategy for Women under its Democratic Institutions Initiative. Because of its integral role in both funding and guiding the JNCW, USAID has had a deep impact on the formulation of objectives. A USAID Women in Development (WID) team was invited to the country to assist in developing a mission statement for the JNCW. It was suggested by the WID team that the JNCW function primarily as a coordinator between the private and public sectors, by mediating and evaluating the work of women’s groups. The goal of the organization was to act as a policy forum, in the interest of cooperatively placing gender concerns on the political agenda. Documents do show a noteworthy effort by USAID to leave the bulk of decision-making in Jordanian hands. Still, the sudden shift of government attention on gender equality could easily be construed as a formality in the interest of appeasing donor interests. (Brand 1998, Jordan)

Another significant donor in Jordan is Amideast. It is a foreign non-profit and the official source of American education, scholarships and university exchanges in the country. As a part of its Democratic Development project, it provides local NGOs with funding to educate women about their legal and participatory rights, and to promote their active involvement in the political process. It has funded workshops to strengthen the networks between local NGOs. In general, this donor appears more committed to the efficient functioning of the Jordanian NWM as a whole, rather than focused primarily on the royal and bureaucratic JNCW, as with USAID. Amideast has even funded "peripheral" NGOs with relatively radical political ideologies, to conduct, for example, close evaluations of the Personal Status Law. In looking at the donor situation as a whole, it is evident that an increase in local, internal funding is badly needed to balance the "foreign imports" of donor objectives, however well intended. The extent to which foreign donors are able to deepen gender accountability in a country is questionable, although it must be acknowledged that funding has thus far brought about a significant transformation. In the case of Jordan, gender sensitivity is an established requirement of many NGO projects. The long-term status of these conditions, when the donors have eventually left, is still uncertain.

The extent of government responsiveness to gender can be partially explained by funding sources, and Jordan’s overall foreign policy strategy. Beginning with King Hussein in the 1950s, the monarchy has wooed the US and UK by projecting an image of a socially progressive society. Because the country is sensitive to maintaining its modern image, it is eager to participate in the formulation and adoption of international conventions. However, Jordan holds reservations on CEDAW that make it readily compatible with the country’s existing constitution and charter, eliminating the need for particularly challenging areas of gender mainstreaming. The country does not consider itself bound by the following CEDAW provisions:
1. Article 9, paragraph 2, which states that women shall have equal rights with men in determining the nationality of their children;
2. Article 15, paragraph 4, which states that men and women shall have "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." (Jordan’s submitted response to this is that "a wife's residence is with her husband.")
3. Article 16, paragraph (1) (c), relating to the rights arising upon the dissolution of marriage with regard to maintenance and compensation;
4. Article 16, paragraph (1) (d) and (g), which state that women and men shall have the "same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children;" and "the same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation.

Maintaining Sharaf (honor) is of utmost importance to women’s precarious status in Jordanian society. As a social norm, group honor is defined in terms of women’s modesty, and is preserved through female segregation, punishment and control. Several social rules are strictly adhered to: 1) Women must be virgins when they marry (in some villages, the custom of displaying the stained nuptial bed sheet is still practiced). 2) Women, whether single, married, widowed or divorced, must not participate in any extramarital affairs.

While the responsibility for the family’s honor rests with women and girls, it is the male relatives who must restore this honor in cases of suspected impropriety. In essence, male honor resides in the ability of men to control the sexual behavior of women relatives. The restoration of breached honor is attainable through the death of the guilty woman. Suspected impropriety can include anything from dating a man to being raped. In general, the male members of an extended family, or of de facto legal bodies within the community, will hold a meeting to discuss their course of action in such a situation. Responsibility for the woman’s murder is usually passed to the youngest male, who, in the event of prosecution, will receive the shortest jail sentence.

Complex socio-cultural and psychological factors make honor crimes possible, and determine the social processing of their aftermath. Honor crimes, which are a social, rather than religious phenomenon, occur at all strata of society, and among both Christians and Muslims, though neither religion sanctions them. The local community may outwardly treat the murderer as a hero; indeed, official reports sometimes indicate the arrival of police during crowded, post-mortem celebrations. However, the act of murder itself lives on in the collective consciousness, and on some level, the family is tarnished more by this incident than by the victim’s suspected indecency.

In order for an honor crime to be prosecuted, the family of the victim itself must issue a formal complaint. Because the perpetrator is generally a member of the family, there is a natural incentive to refrain from doing so. Therefore, it is difficult to know exactly how many of these murders occur each year. On average, from 22 to 35 reports are issued annually, but many guess the actual number to be double this, considering suicides and runaways ending in death. In 2001, 95% of these murders were carried out on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion (e.g. unverified rumors or malicious gossip). In September 2002 alone, 3 women were killed within 5 days, with murder weapons ranging from axes to phone cords.

Prosecution is skewed because the family’s testimony is not questioned, and if it is corroborated by the murderer’s story, no state investigation occurs. Nor does investigation proceed when the victim is discovered to have been "innocent." It is suspected that several cases each year are actually attempts to cover up incidents of incest ending in pregnancy. Often, it is openly stated by the family that a raped girl had "seduced" her brother, and was killed in return by a different brother. It is also suspected that restoration of family honor may be the stated but improbable motive in situations

involving disputed inheritance.
Prior to 2001, a problematic article in the Penal Code (340, paragraph 1) exempted from penalty those who murdered a female family member while finding her in an adulterous situation. Article 340 included two clauses, one of which stated that, "he who discovers his wife or one of his female relatives committing adultery (with a man) and kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, is exempted from any penalty." The other stipulates that in the same situation, a man may also benefit from a reduction in penalty. The article allowed only men to benefit from exemptions or reduced penalties; it was not applicable to women committing murder under the same circumstances.

Though the NWM in Jordan seeks to advance gender equality in all policy areas, political discussion of honor crimes was strictly taboo and not broached by the JNCW at the time of its establishment. The creation of a space for protesting honor crimes can be traced instead to civil leadership, international scrutiny from the global gender equality regime, and key allies within government.

Leadership in bringing this issue to the table can clearly be traced to one courageous woman, Rana Husseini, a US-university educated Jordanian and staff journalist for the English-language daily, Jordan Times. She has been a recipient of both the Reebok Human Rights Award (1998) and the Human Rights Watch Award (2000) for her activism and reporting of violence against women. Ms Husseini began her campaign out of abhorrence over a case she was reporting, involving a 16 year-old murder victim, who had been raped by her younger brother. The girl became pregnant and was forced to tell her parents, which led to a knife attack by her brother. She survived the attack, had

an abortion and was married off to a man 50 years her senior. When the man divorced her 6 months later, a different brother brought her back to his parents' home, bought her candy and reassured her of her safety. When they arrived at their parents’ home, he tied her to a chair, gave her a glass of water, and made her recite verses of the Koran before slitting her throat. He then ran outside and began yelling that he had cleansed his family name. His jail sentence was halved under Article 340.

In 1999, Ms Husseini assisted other activists with the launching of the National Campaign to Eliminate Crimes of Honor, an independent initiative composed of concerned citizens. The campaign collected over 15,000 signatures in support of abolishing article 340, among other gender-discriminatory laws. Yet in 2000, the Lower House of the Jordanian Parliament twice failed to eliminate the article, drawing public criticism from the UN CEDAW Committee. Human Rights Watch and the UN Commission on Human Rights also voiced concern that the government was giving insufficient attention to providing refuge for potential victims.
As a direct result of Ms Husseini’s campaign, which has involved outspoken criticism of legal regulations, tenacious reporting of the previously taboo subject, and frequent personal threats to her life, honor crimes have been incontrovertibly placed on the national agenda. Many worry, however, about the ultimate chance for real change from within Jordan’s overwhelmingly male, conservative political establishment. Despite parliamentary resistance due to the fear of losing votes or appearing anti-Islamic, there does exist strong political support for halting honor crimes among key personalities at top levels. Queen Noor, widow of the late King Hussein, appeared on CNN in January of 1999 and stated that, "this type of violence against women is not consistent with Islam or with [the Jordanian] Constitution" (Jordan Times 1999). Also interviewed were members of the Police Department's newly created Family Protection Unit, and Head of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine Mo'men Hadidi. All of these people are outspoken and widely heard advocates. Speaking at the opening of the 13^th Parliament in November of 1998, the late King Hussein made a passionate speech imploring the Ministry of Justice and others in the government to help deter violence against women by promoting their legal human rights. Taking an even stronger stand, Hussein’s son, King Abdullah, later vowed to actively promote the repeal of all laws discriminating against women. Encouraged by this, the Justice Ministry drafted a bill to repeal article 340. Royal family members, such as Prince Ali El-Hussein, King Abdullah's half brother, and his cousin, Prince Ghazi Bin Mohammed were active in large public demonstrations calling for legislative reform. Legal committees within the Council of Ministers were eventually successful at carrying the legislation through Parliament.

These efforts, in combination with a vast mobilization of women’s rights groups, led to the amendment of the article in 2001. The amendment nullifies the provision for lighter sentencing, and requires honor crimes to be tried as other murders. The revision also expands the investigative power of the attorney general and prosecutors in such cases.

The progress has been hailed as a symbolic but insufficient victory. The Royal Commission on Human Rights (RCHR), chaired by Queen Rania, had also pushed for amendments to articles 97 and 98, which were left untouched. Article 98 states: "He who commits a crime in a fit of fury caused by an unlawful and dangerous act on the part of

the victim benefits from a reduction in penalty." While Rana Husseini applauds the signature drive as consciousness-raising, she notes that the cancellation of only one article is indeed a hollow victory; Article 340 has only been applied a handful of times in 40 years. Men are still receiving 3 to 6 month sentences under Article 98. Police officials, on the other hand, report a decrease in killings since the amendment, which, at least initially, appears to be functioning as a deterrent.

A key element in understanding honor crimes, I believe, is in looking at the constraints on women’s free movement within a society. Freedom of movement is a universal human right, but one that is, in practice, directly tied to women’s status within marriage and the home. The historic impetus to sequester women in the private sphere, where they are put "in charge" of things, derives from the collective consideration of women as minors. As stated earlier, much of Jordanian law has been written with an implicit understanding of women as legally lesser citizens, who require male guardianship. This, in turn, implies and perpetuates a visceral understanding of women’s mental, psychological and decision-making capacity as qualitatively reduced. Sha‘ria scholar, Muhammad 'Abduh, breaks male guardianship into four elements: protection, surveillance, custody, and maintenance. Another scholar, 'Abd al-'Ati, considers the role of obedience above and beyond these elements:

"A husband has the legal right to restrict his wife's freedom of movement. He may prevent her from leaving her home without his permission unless there is a necessity or legitimate reason for her to do otherwise." (Doi, The Family, 1)

The Jordanian constitution guarantees that people of either sex are equal before the law. Yet Jordan maintains a reservation on Article 15, Paragraph 4 of CEDAW, which states that men and women shall have "the same rights with regard to…the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." Jordan’s explanation for this reservation is that "a wife's residence is with her husband," who ultimately decides where the couple’s residence will be. This reasoning is further explained in the 1997 Jordan Country Report to the CEDAW committee:

"Article 16, paragraph 1(h), [of CEDAW] conflicts with religious directives, which

provide that men are the guardians of women. A wife does not therefore have the

right to behave exactly as she wishes. For example, she may leave or allow

anyone else to enter the house only with her husband's permission" (Jordan Country Report 1997-2000, 27).

I would argue that in light of such explicit qualifications, women and men do not have the same right to freedom of movement, as claimed in the constitution.

The reasons given for restrictions on freedom in Sha‘ria have their root in Islamic teachings on sexuality. Sexuality is at the center of creation, for it symbolizes the perpetual attraction, opposition and dualism of life (Dahl 1997, 95). Sexual joy and pleasure is praised throughout the Koran, and desire is thought to be equally present in both women and men. According to the eleventh century Islamic sexologist, Imam Ghazali, sexuality "assures energy in the construction of the social order, and threatens the same order with chaos" (Dahl 1997, 101). This powerful energy can therefore be channeled in both creative and destructive ways; the dilemma lies in using it wisely. Women’s sexuality, as a distraction from religious duty, is thought to pose a special threat to men’s righteousness. In this regard, women’s sexuality (fitna) is seen as more dangerous than men’s. Fitna holds two meanings – femme fatale, and chaos. It is men’s duty to satisfy women’s sexual urge, by caring for and controlling it -- and by extension, them.

Societies have formed around the notion of psychological, physical, social and economic segregation, in part as a means of successfully suppressing the destructive potential of fitna. It is taken for granted that this control is a male responsibility. Though women in most Arab countries have legal rights allowing them free movement in society, men possess the right to hinder women’s access to public spaces. These restrictions combine with social mores and attitudes to discourage women from moving freely. A quotation by an Egyptian jurist of the 14^th century Maliki School, Ibn al-Hajj, is still cited in reference to this:

"A woman should leave her house on three occasions only: when she is conducted to the house of her bridegroom, on the deaths of her parents, and when she goes to her own grave" (Hourani 1992, 120).

In the cognitive context, the ideology of women’s seclusion continues to inform the core identities of both men and women in Islamic societies. Perhaps as a result of deeply ingrained segregation and privacy, "freedom of movement" in itself is rarely brought to the table as a separate political agenda. It appears to be addressed only in the context of other human rights; if these are attained, women will naturally transition to a more prominent role in public life. Arab women authors have discussed at length the contradictory way in which Universal Human Rights are applied to each sex. Women’s full exercise of their right of movement, for example, could potentially constitute a breach of domestic law.

The role of veiling in Arab society has been written about extensively, and the many viewpoints about its role are not within the scope of this paper. As it relates to women’s mobility, however, some have described the veil as a symbol of spatial separation and comportment (PBS 2002, Women and Islam, 1). In this context, it identifies one who has left her private sphere, and yet remains on the periphery of an environment into which she cannot be fully integrated.

Sexuality in Jordanian society is not only an aspect of oneself, but a thing also separate from a woman and belonging to the whole. Not surprisingly, then, sex is very openly discussed, celebrated, laughed and complained about among Jordanian women in groups. Because it is such an open topic, I believe it holds potential as a subject that will someday mobilize women to change the conditions of their mobility.

There has already been one very famous incident involving a female candidate for parliament in 1989, around whom there was remarkably swift and strong organization of independent citizens, women’s interest groups, NGOs and professional organizations. Toujan Al-Faisal was a television personality on a talk show called "Women’s Issues." The Islamic Brotherhood had a strong presence in the elections that year, under the political party, the Islamic Action Front. Faisal wrote an opinion piece criticizing the party’s stance on women, and the fact that all other political parties had been made illegal. The piece ran in a widely-circulated newspaper. Two days later, Faisal decided to run in the parliamentary elections. It was then she was taken to court by two Islamists on charges of apostasy, though Jordan has no apostasy law. The two plaintiffs were an assistant mufti and a private in Jordan’s armed forces, a man close to the king. The plaintiffs’ statement complained that Faisal had

"mocked the obligation of a woman to be obedient to her husband, to live with him, and not to leave the house without his permission…. She criticized the hadith that stated that woman by nature is deficient in intellect and religion, and she opposed the requirement that a woman have a guardian and that her duty is to cook, clean, and serve the members of her family with maintenance as compensation" (Afkhami 1995, 218).

The case shows the risk involved in addressing freedom of mobility. Yet it received international attention, and a number of groups promoting women’s political interests rallied around Faisal, including the Legal Committee for the Arab Organization for Human Rights, Jordan’s Amnesty International, other candidates and countless independent citizens. There appeared to be no governmental involvement from the top-level NWM. This may have been due to the embarrassment brought to the king by the actions of his close associate. The fact that mobilization centered on NGO and grassroots voices was significant, and effective. Though none of the 12 female candidates were elected to office that year, the court decided that it was incompetent to review the case.

Women from upper and middle classes have strategically organized themselves during upheavals such as the Six Day War and periods of Palestinian unrest, breaking social barriers and temporarily filling political vacuums. However, the results of these efforts tend to confine themselves to the social class and urban areas where they occur. Mobilization across classes has proved somewhat difficult. The national women’s machinery in Jordan has made a sincere effort to create gender-equality mechanisms within the government that closely consider the goals of CEDAW. However, this top-down method of needs assessment and agenda-setting has suppressed not only grassroots voice, but the transmission of human rights knowledge to the local level. NGOs, increasingly cognizant of this, have initiated some noteworthy projects to directly address the dismantling of rural/urban and class borders. The NGO Sisterhood is Global is exemplary in its simultaneous technical training and consciousness-raising efforts, for women in isolated areas. Local volunteers from several villages within a region meet to design their own human rights training programs, which they then take back and conduct at the community level. More developments of this nature will likely begin to ease the tension between government and local level resources in Jordan’s gender-mainstreaming effort.

Jordan is making a genuine effort at mainstreaming gender into its overall development strategy, within its organizationally challenging framework. Though far from equitable, the top-down organization of the NWM lends certain credibility to gender mainstreaming, since much in Jordanian culture is accomplished through political connections. At the same time, the society’s deeply rooted trust in authority hinders change, by making the consent and leadership of the government a key ingredient in projects, and disallowing creativity in the design of alternative methodologies. This is compounded by the government’s leeriness of anything ostensibly opposing its authority.

Within this context, the legal reforms thus far accomplished are nothing short of remarkable. Though demands to sufficiently prosecute honor crimes have resulted only in partial change, the fact of the issue’s placement on the political agenda, and the resulting mobilization around it are absolutely essential to securing future transformation. The recent amendments to the Personal and Civil Codes, which now recognize women as legal entities separate from their husbands, are even more groundbreaking.

Gender equity will not be a fact of life, of course, until it is a reality for the fundamental unit of society, the family. This is true not for Jordan alone, but globally. I would argue that the cognitive context is therefore the most important area of gender mainstreaming. The country has put strong effort into educational materials for the media, which work to counteract sexual stereotypes, but more comprehensive programs are needed.

Jordan is correct in bemoaning the inequities that force women to continually pursue their informal responsibilities to the exclusion of their formal participation. However, the assumption that the informal labor force must be singularly female is misguided. Women’s inability to share their domestic labor with the other half of the population forces them to assume the work of two people should they require remuneration through outside employment. This is detrimental not only to their health, but to the rate of society’s development as a whole. If men and women’s roles are indeed necessarily different and inflexible, as stated in the CEDAW country report for Jordan, then means of compensating women monetarily for the economic contribution of housework may need to be considered.

As this is, of course, a fantasy, the relationship between traditional gender roles, the public/private sphere division, and the incentive to undertake honor crimes should be more closely examined in the effort to mainstream gender. While it is claimed that women wear the pants in the private sphere, and men in the public sphere, a brief look at women’s restricted movement from the house proves their authority within the house illusory. The division of labor by sex may be functional for certain activities of a society, but the fact that neither women nor men are entirely free to choose the spheres of their participation automatically negates their equality. Crimes against women in the name of honor are possible precisely because women are made to bear so many burdens, and to symbolize so many things, at the same time that their personhood is considered less worthy of justice.

Cognitively, the revision of customary and court laws to reflect constitutional gender equality is an uphill battle. Hesitancy to automatically incorporate gender equality into society is understandable, in light of the natural avoidance of Western, cultural imperialism, of which feminism is deemed to be a part. Therefore, gender equality must first be accepted or rejected as a universal truth. Changes in gender relations in Jordan will occur from the inside out, and will ultimately be most effective if begun along conventional channels. I believe that more frank and open discussion of gender roles will eventually make honor crimes a thing of the past in Jordan, but this path is a long one that will require a gradual lifting of government restrictions on civil society and NGOs.

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