Erica Williams

Professor Kardam

December 16, 2002

Social contracts (verbal or written) are a part of every society. They include the rules and obligations to which the people are subjected and the rights they are accorded. In democratic societies social contracts come in the written and legally binding form of a constitution, and are to be reflective of the will of the people, a sign of their civil and political liberties. The state, in its simplest definition, is the body of institutions that ensures consistent methods and procedures of provision for and protection of its citizens. It is also, however, the social location where power relationships within a society are articulated. According to Oliver Costilla, "[the state] is the true locus of political power. It synthesizes all of the social struggles for power that are produced in modern societies, and it unquestionably expresses a relation of domination between classes (a relation of capital)". The government and presiding administrations are put in place to utilize the state in accordance with the public will. The people are to hold the government and presiding administrations accountable for their decisions and actions through the checks and balances provided by the state (as an institution), as well as through political and civil rights to assembly, association, expression and the vote. Thus, the relationship between the people, the government and the state is a delicate one that requires constant monitoring and evaluation to avoid imbalances.

Of course this definition of the democratic social contract is western in its perspective. It does not take into account the complexities of a developing country that has a colonial legacy. It is an ideal type that implies a particular road to democracy or process of democratization. That is, it theorizes an eventual coming to power of the many. Of course this was not an automatic transfer of power, and it might be argued that to this day in Western democracies only a portion of elite power has been transferred to the many. Still, for many countries democracy is new and fragile and has not yet brought about a great enough transfer of power to allow the many what is laid out for them in their constitutions. Thus, if we recognize that democracy in the developing world is still controlled by the elite then we can better understand the obstacles to a more equitable and just society that such countries face.

This paper will examine development and democracy in Brazil, taking into account its particular experiences but not ignoring universal concepts and ideas about the democratic social contract and its worth. It is composed of three sections. The first will briefly review Brazil’s historical development as a nation-state and its economic development under the dictatorship and the new democratic period that followed. The second section will look at the extent of democratic governance in Brazil today, also taking into account Brazil’s history. The final section will look at specific components of governance, specifically transparency and accountability, and the conclusion will assess Brazil’s potential for further development, democratization and democratic governance.

As a Latin American colony, Brazil proved somewhat unique. At the time of its "discovery" in 1500 Portugal, was not nearly as powerful a player as Spain and France, and because of this, the actual settlement of Brazil came later than it did in other parts of southern and Latin America. That is, while Portugal claimed Brazil as its own, it was not until the 1530s that Portuguese settlers went in significant numbers to pioneer the new land. This new momentum was due to French threats to take over what it considered unoccupied territory. Brazil, although at this time "under-exploited", was to feed into the development and industrialization of Portugal by providing raw materials for production in Portugal at no cost. By 1822, however, Brazil became its own autonomous empire with the prince regent of Portugal as its king. Thus, while Brazil gained independence at a relatively early stage, much like its Spanish colonized neighbors, it had not yet become a nation-state. It maintained a monarchical, though highly regionalized, and feudal system with an economy still based on the export of primary goods to Portugal.

In 1889 the monarchy met its demise, in part due to the first initial stages of industrialization, which allowed for the creation of a new mercantilist elite. The empire also met its demise because of a disillusioned military, which toppled the monarchy. The result of this was the Republic, which promised to bring order and progress to Brazil. Brazil’s first forty years of nation building, however, were characterized by civil war centered on a struggle between industrialists and landowners, with the military as the deciding faction. By 1930, Brazil reverted to an authoritarian leader, Getulio Vargas, whose rule "marked the breakdown of the political hegemony of the regional oligarchies, thus opening up a space for the entry of new actors into the limited cast of the ruling elites of the country". While Vargas was an authoritarian ruler, brought to power by the military, his role was to stabilize and maintain the nation-state through the centralization of power. Both military and civilian government bureaucrats were now able to address long term problems with the country’s economy, which was complicated by regional politics, and their solution was the industrialization that would take place during the 1950s. Vargas remained in power for 15 years, until forced to give up his reign to an elected civilian government. The late forties until the mid-60s were really the beginning stages of the federative republic and democracy in Brazil. President Kubitschek (1955-1959) was responsible for taking on the project of modernization in Brazil and consolidating the developmentalist project. He built up infrastructure facilitating increased state-led industrialization, further altering power relationships, and creating an environment in which opposition groups could be formed. This period of rapid political and economic modernization was followed by a military coup and dictatorship of 21 years.

While the coup of 1964 clearly debilitated Brazil’s young democratic political institutions, the structural transformations of its economy that began during the 1950s were to continue on throughout the dictatorship. These transformations came under the auspices of modernization, with the goal of economic growth, built up infrastructure and a more "civilized" Brazilian population. Prior to this time period Brazil was both in the process of modernizing and in the practice of import substitution industrialization (ISI) to try to break from dependency upon center country goods, although it welcomed foreign investment. The military regime did not stray too far from this model of economic development. In fact, the most important difference between the prior regime and the military regime was ideology. The military did not fall in line with dependency theorists. It was not looking for growth with equity, but rather growth with order. Thus its economic strategy was state-led industrialization that allowed it control over resources and wealth creation, enhanced political authority and thus the power to engage in a national program for macroeconomic and political stability. Within this strategy the regime had a particular focus on trade and exports, and a lesser focus on import substitution and production for internal markets. With the initial support of local and export capitalists, as well as its long standing relationship with landowning elite, the military regime’s political strategy of periodic repression went unchallenged, allowing them to maintain order.

In 1955 only 41% of Brazil’s population was living in urban areas, by 1975 the urban population jumped to 62%. Similarly, in 1955 56% of workers were in the agricultural and mining sectors and by 1975 this number had decreased to 37%. The percentage of workers in the service sector from 1955 to 1975 went from 29% to 42%. This transition from an agricultural based economy to an industrial one was deliberate and not only transformed the economic structure of the country but also transformed power relations in a country where the landowning elite had a longstanding stronghold on politics. With an economic shift toward industrialization, the new capitalists, either those producing for the local market or for export, saw an increase in their political influence, one that would be maintained in the following democratic period. The military regime relied heavily on the support of these capitalists, particularly those in export production, in addition to force and violence, to gain and maintain power. Thus, it "pursued economic growth through capital-goods industrialization and exports of manufactured goods, which required that [it] take an active role in the economy, coordinating and complementing transnational and local capital". Those capitalists producing for the domestic market, however, were less content with the military regime’s economic strategy, as part of the plan was to suppress worker’s wages and domestic consumption in order to bolster saving and investment, thus shrinking their market. Still, the military regime continued with the industrial oriented economic strategy that was initiated in the 1950s and that permanently altered the demographic and political landscape of the country.

Economic growth rates under the military dictatorship (1964-85) were the highest Brazil had ever experienced, reaching up to 11%. This growth, however, was not accompanied with equitable income distribution. In fact, "between 1960 and 1972, the income share of the poorest 50% of Brazilians fell from 17.4% to 11.3%, while the richest 10% saw their share of income grow from 39.6% to 52.6%". This demonstrates how a shift from a feudal and agricultural based society to a capitalist and industrial society does not guarantee a more equitable society. The state-led development of the military government "at best, did not counteract structural forces making for greater inequality; at worst [it] aggravated [the] effect" of those already existent structural forces.

Other indicators, however, do show that there were some quality of life improvements. For example, in 1955 life expectancy at birth in Brazil was 50 years, but between 1970 and 1975 it was 59.5 years. Literacy rates, for age 5 and over, also improved from 48% in 1955 to 63% by 1975. Though these indicators demonstrate improvement, they also demonstrate that the long lasting feudal-like system in combination with authoritarian rule in Brazil caused late human development.

It should be noted that at the outset the military government did not intend to reign over Brazil for two decades, and "[in] fact the majority group within the military leadership had as their stated objective simply ‘putting the house in order’ and returning power to civilians". This meant stifling the communist threat, curbing inflation, which had gotten out of control under previous administrations, and fiscal reforms. Its economic agenda, as mentioned above, was largely based on a strong alliance between local capital, international capital and export capital. In order to carry out the necessary policies for the economic structural transformations they desired, political rights and civil liberties had to be severely suppressed at the outset. Disappearances, executions, torture, the dismantling of unions and associations, and the dismissal of congress people not in line with the military regime were some of the initial actions taken. Surprisingly, "the regime did not eliminate all direct elections. Citizens continued to vote for mayor and city council-members (in almost all municipalities), for state and federal deputy, and for senator, despite frequent changes in electoral laws and limits on competition". However, in 1967, three years after the coup, all political parties were banned and the military regime created two parties to take their place, one conservative and one liberal. It also began to replace traditional political candidates for governorships with bureaucrats under its authority. This action came after the regime’s realization that regional autonomy, specifically the autonomous power of governors, undermined its centralizing efforts and its ability to manipulate the electoral process with at least the appearance of legitimacy. Ironically, this strategy of replacing traditional elites with bureaucrats backfired due to the deeply rooted clientelistic politics with which the latter were not familiar or adept at utilizing.

Despite political repression and manipulation the Freedom House country rating system, which assesses political rights and civil liberties, rated Brazil a "partly-free" country from 1972 until 1985. This may in part be due to the increasing urbanization that was taking place before and during the rule of the military. Not only were Brazilians moving to some of the biggest cities like Sao Paulo, but they were also creating new urban areas. For example, "from 1950 to 1980 the number of cities over 20,000 in population skyrocketed from 96 to 482". This allowed for and "was positively associated with resistance to the military government". The military recognized this fact and prohibited the direct election of mayors within the state capitals and in a number of other important cities in order to curb resistance by the people. Still, by the end of the 1970s Brazilians were taking to the streets, protesting and rallying. By the early 1980s the military government was falling apart.

The end of military rule in 1985 was brought about in large part by the world recession of the 1980s, which stifled export growth and subsequently broke down the government’s strong alliance with export capitalists. Local capitalists were already disillusioned with the regime because of tax incentives for foreign investment, wage controls which suppressed domestic consumption and regulatory controls. Their discontent, however, was not enough to undermine military control. However, when the market for exports fell apart and there was no domestic demand due to wage controls the military government found itself without allies. Furthermore, interest rates skyrocketed and payments took up a larger share of GDP. The only type of legitimacy the military regime would have left was its might, which was increasingly being challenged by the public.

This period marked the beginning of a transition back to a democratic political system. The political ideology of the New Republic shifted from a focus on modernization to one on eradicating corruption and rent-seeking. Now the strong links between the government and industry, particularly in the export market, were pinpointed as obstructions to further economic and political development, not to mention equitable distribution. Beginning in the late 1980s, but specifically during the 1990s there were moves to transform the structure of the economy, to free the market of state intervention or guidance. The dismantling of the state-led development model gave way to privatization of major state owned enterprises in the "iron and steel, petrochemicals and fertilizers sectors", trade liberalization through serious reductions in tariffs and deregulation that allowed for re-opening to foreign capital. Exports remained crucial to the economy and at the end of the recession, and military reign, the renewed expansion of exports allowed for further growth. Brazil’s GDP grew from US$263.6 billion in 1981 to US$407.7 billion in 1991 to US$593.8 billion in 2000. Agricultural goods continued to drop in percentage of GDP from 10.7% in 1981 to 7.4% in 2000. The share of the service sector as a percentage of GDP rose from 45.5% in 1981 to 65.3% in 2000. The share of manufactured goods as a percentage of GDP, however, dropped from 32.9% to 17.4%, possibly due to the rise in the service sector’s share of GDP.

Equitable distribution of economic growth still has not occurred in Brazil, although in recent times, specifically from 1994 on, greater efforts have been made to invest in education and health, particularly at the state and municipal levels. The adult literacy rate has gone from 78.4% in 1985 (at the end of the dictatorship) to 85.2%, and the youth literacy rate (age 15-24) has risen from 88.8% to 92.5%. In fact, Brazil’s spending on public education since 1985, as a percentage of GDP, has been comparable to that of some "developed" countries at around 5%. Life expectancy rose to 67.7 years by the year 2000. This has been accompanied by a significant decline in the infant mortality rate which, in 1970 was 95 deaths per 1,000 births but in the year 2000 was down to 32 deaths per 1,000 births. The improvements in some of these key indicators, however, do not change the fact that since 1983 and at least until 2000 26.5% of Brazil’s population has lived on less than US$2 per day and that 17.4% of the population lives below Brazil’s national poverty line. Considering the high rates of growth Brazil has experienced (averaging 2.9% between 1981 and 2001) and the wealth of the country, the socioeconomic disparities are startling. By 1998 the poorest 10% of Brazil received 0.7% of national income whereas the richest 10% received 48% and the richest 20% received 64.1%. The massive urbanization of Brazil at the end of the 1950s on through the dictatorship accompanied by worsening disparities allowed for the "favelization" of Brazil’s urban areas. That is, the concentration of poverty and marginalization in urban areas led to the creation of make-shift or unplanned communities (favelas) lacking basic infrastructure. Likewise poverty in rural areas persists, as do the patron-client relations inhibiting Brazilians in these areas to pursue greater equity. Governance during the post-dictatorship period has improved as political rights and civil liberties were reinstated. Furthermore, additional positive changes were made such as suffrage for illiterate citizens and for 16 and 17 year olds, as well as those over 70 years of age in 1985. This expanded the electorate and potentially gave more power to the Brazilian populace. The distribution of congressional power, however, remained quite uneven. While the urban areas of the country (namely the South and Southeast) have an advantage in presidential elections simply because they hold a larger majority of the entire population, they are at a disadvantage when it comes to state representation as a result of "a constitutional cap on the number of elected deputies per state...as well as the gross overrepresentation of small states in Congress".

In comparing Brazil’s development process under the dictatorship and that during the New Republic, it is clear that economic and political transformations took place as the country moved from a semi-closed and state-led economy to a free market economy as well as from a military to civilian, democratic regime. The benefits of moving to a free market economy have been the further break-down of clientelism in Brazil as well as the dismantling of bureaucratic authoritarianism that reigned under the dictatorship. The major benefit resulting from the move to a democratic political system is that Brazilians are now free to mobilize against the socioeconomic inequities that seem to persist in Brazil regardless of the structure of the economy. This begs the question of whether the economic system is what enables a country to achieve broad based sustainable development or whether the political system has this power? If it is the political system, will a top-down imposition of democracy triggered by new elite interests, as was the case in Brazil, allow for a more equitable distribution? If Brazil is any indication of this, then the answer to the second question is no.

At its most basic level democracy can be defined as a state in which "[individuals] should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others". This definition, suggested by David Held, embraces the principle of "democratic autonomy, which requires both a high degree of accountability of the state and a democratic reordering of civil society". In order to achieve this kind of democracy, which ensures the consistency of the state as a bureaucratic apparatus and the equality of interests within civil society, Sorenson argues that a certain atmosphere must be attained. This atmosphere is created by meeting particular structural preconditions that allow for actors or agents to act according to the above principle of democracy. The structural preconditions necessary to facilitate democracy as defined above include sufficient economic growth and development, the existence of a political culture conducive to participation, a social structure made up of classes that tend toward a democratic system, and amenable external factors. Once the structural preconditions have been met, there is still the issue of agency. That is, major actors must be willing to accept a move toward democratic governance and to strengthen the democratic system. The important factors falling under agency, then, are international recognition and benefits, the fragmentation of authoritarian coalitions, the perceptions of domestic and international elite and popular mobilization. Thus the first section of this paper will examine the extent to which Brazil has engaged in democratic governance and the preconditions that have or have not been met as well as how agents/actors have responded. The second section will look more closely at the particular governance issues that have been addressed by the Brazilian government in cooperation with the UNDP, as it is a major multilateral donor and a norm creator in the realm of governance.

Brazil’s economic development over the past half century has brought about great economic growth, industrialization and urbanization. It has often been thought that wealth creation "will always be accompanied by a number of factors conducive to democracy," yet although it is a medium-income country, and by far the wealthiest in its region, Brazil is notorious for its inequitable distribution of resources. In the year 2000 the country’s GDP reached almost US$600 billion, yet the poorest 20% only received 2.2% of that income. The richest 20%, on the contrary, received over 64.1% of national income. Other indicators have in fact improved, however. Primary education enrollment has increased and illiteracy and infant mortality rates have decreased. These improvements are most likely attributable to the industrialization that the military regime supported, which brought about high economic growth rates, and the subsequent urbanization of the Brazilian population. In this sense it is arguable that economic development was a necessary, though not sufficient factor in facilitating democratization in that it spurred rapid urbanization, allowing for the concentration of people who would later mobilize.

Brazil’s political culture is another important structural pre-condition for democratic governance. Political culture refers to "the system of values and beliefs that defines the context and meaning of political action". This means that the existence and form of political action will depend upon a society’s historical, social and political experience and its interpretation of that experience. Because democracy obliges its citizens to participate and because it calls for freedom of association and expression, there is good reason to believe that political culture within a democracy should include an active civil society and associational life. Brazil historically did not have a strong associational life in which independent and voluntary community groups and organizations were created to address common issues and were based on "inter-personal trust and enabling cooperation among people and their keeping track of government" until the final years of the military dictatorship of 1964-1985. Ironically a political culture conducive to democratic governance developed under authoritarian rule, during the years when certain military elite were leaning toward a restricted democracy as opposed to a permanent authoritarian regime. While the transition that transpired was really a negotiation between political and military elite, important occurrences were taking place among the poor, the industrial working class and middle class sympathizers. According to Leonardo Avritzer, the intervention of the military regime in the everyday life of the poor in Brazil caused the emergence of two new discourses: "the discourse of citizenship and the discourse of societal autonomy in relation to the state". For example, the military regime’s economic policies caused massive urbanization without meeting its accompanied health, education and infrastructural needs. As Sonia Alvarez discusses, the urban poor, "[faced] with a regime and development model premised upon the political and economic exclusion of the working classes,…organized at the community level, outside regime-sanctioned political parties and corporatist institutions, to resolve their immediate survival needs". Poor, urban women in particular spearheaded this mobilization as they found themselves unable to fulfill their basic familial and gender roles. From these efforts came the eventual public critique of the regime’s politics and the rebirth of labor unions, political parties, including the Workers’ Party, and the emergence of other voluntary community associations and organizations. By 1995, only ten years after the return to democracy, 32% of Brazil’s non-agricultural workforce belonged to trade unions and by the year 2000 the total number of non-governmental organizations in Brazil reached 1,830 (see Figure 1).

A third structural precondition for democratic governance is the existence of a social structure in which there are classes that tend to be consistently ideologically in line with a democratic political system. Brazil has met this precondition. That is, since the demise of the military regime, the lower classes have engaged in the associational life and civic community building, as was discussed above. Under military rule "residents of the urban periphery demanded basic services that the unbridled pace of urbanization and persistent government indifference had denied them" and this led to a politicized culture within the lower ranks of society that would last through the transition into the new democratic period. In doing so, they have allowed for a broader political space that fosters greater political participation and increased competition for official positions, at least in the South and Southeast. This is especially true with regard to the presidency. In fact, the first democratically elected president, Tancredo Neves, was an extremely popular opposition candidate and in the year 2000 Brazil received a polity score of 8 (from -10 to 10), with polity being defined as competition for the presidency. While it is the lower classes that have really mobilized to bring about greater political openness and rights (in 2000 receiving a score of 3 out of 7 or partly free), it is also the lower classes that historically have not held much political power. Historically Brazilian politics have been plagued by the tensions between regional oligarchies vying for power through the state and federal governments. Also, though Brazil’s small middle-class currently promotes democracy, it failed to do so at the time of the military coup, choosing instead to protect the status it had gained with such difficulty. There is no assurance that the middle class would choose to support democracy if sometime in the future its socioeconomic interests and status were threatened. Thus, it is only the working class, and to a greater extent the urban underclass that is supportive of continued democracy in Brazil; and the strength of the underclass is in its numbers with 26.5% of the people living on under US$2 per day.

Finally, external factors amenable to democracy make up another structural precondition to be met in order to facilitate or enhance democratic governance. In Brazil’s case, the most influential external factor over domestic governance is the global economic and financial system. Brazil does in fact enjoy some influence within the global economy as it is the eighth largest economy in the world, and is a major powerbroker in Latin America and within the regional trading bloc Mercosur. It also has been able to secure the largest "bailout" loan ever given by the IMF due to the sheer size of its market and its importance on the international economic scene. At the same time, like most developing nations, Brazil is also vulnerable to the structure of the global economy. This structure tends to keep developing nations at the margins through debt service, dependence upon further loans, investment and capital flows. In fact, new president Luiz "Lula" Inácio da Silva had to agree to compromises such as maintaining tight fiscal policies if elected president, in order to continue working within the global economic and financial structure. Still, Brazil’s size and importance open up space for it to improve and continue with its democratic governance as it is not completely subservient to the global economic and financial system.

The structural conditions in Brazil, then, are in such a state that further consolidation of democracy is possible. Whether or not this occurs will be determined by the cooperation—or lack thereof—of the country’s major players. As mentioned above, Brazil receives financial benefits from the international community due to the recognition of its world importance. For example, Brazil enjoys a significant degree of trade negotiating power, which makes it less dependent upon center countries, giving it a degree of autonomy to pursue economic programs based on its internal needs. At the same time it also suffers from the ups and downs of investor confidence, currency speculation by the financial community and the threat of US intervention, military or economic, to influence its political affairs.

Domestically, agency has also been an important factor in paving the way for democratic governance. For example, authoritarian coalitions, while still existent were broken up to some extent with the demise of military regime. Fragmentation within the coalition occurred due to different opinions about what system of governance should be in place. Some believed the military should maintain authoritarian control whereas others pushed for a restricted democracy, in which there would be "limits on competition, participation, and liberties" as well as the preservation of elite interests. This break down in military elite consensus allowed for the building up of associational life and civic community, as mentioned earlier. According to the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report Brazil’s political stability, including the likelihood of another military coup d’etat, scored a 0.47 in a range from -2.5 to 2.5. This demonstrates that the military is still a major player in Brazilian politics but is not thought by experts to likely engage in another military takeover.

Probably more important than the status of the military is the maintenance of power over decision-making by non-military elites. For example, according to Elias de Castro, "the conservative Northeastern regional elites have bargained successfully for redistributionist concessions from the national government (and therefore the South and Southeast) while avoiding authentic regional reforms that would benefit the poor, restructure power, and therefore threaten their own privileged status". These same competing interests between elites of the North, Northeast and Center-West (primarily rural and agricultural regions) and the South and Southeast (primarily urban and industrial regions) has led to a standstill at various times throughout history on key reforms, such as those of the taxation and social insurance systems in Brazil. Likewise it has allowed for continued corruption, among public officials, the banking sector and judiciary officials, causing Brazil to score a -0.02 for corruption and a -0.26 for rule of law (on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5).

While agency does present obstacles to further democratic governance, as elites attempt to maintain their power and privilege, agency at the local level is at the same time improving democratic governance. According to Wayne Selcher, the municipal level governments and leaders are bringing about "the drive for experimentation, greater popular participation, and accountability at the local level" and are doing so in conjunction with "the activity of proliferating nongovernmental organizations to produce some of the most creative and exciting experiments in democracy and empowerment in the country today". An example of such creativity is a new strategy employed by nonprofits and Worker’s Party politicians alike—participatory budgeting. The Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis, or IBASE, is working in the state of Rio de Janeiro to bring the state and municipal budgets to the people. This entails providing access to the information as well as educating citizens about how to read those budgets so that they might better hold their public officials accountable for decision-making. In Porto Alegre, the Worker’s Party has taken this program a step further, actually organizing neighborhood associations to really participate in the decision-making process of prioritizing budget allocations. Furthermore, the election of Luiz "Lula" Inácio da Silva of the Workers’ Party as the new president of Brazil brings hope that his agency and that of his party will enable broader coalition building at the federal level, allowing for the passing and implementation of important distributive reforms. The broad based support for Lula, who received approximately 63% of votes, and for the Workers’ Party, which represents workers as well as the urban and rural poor, along with continued support from multilateral donor agencies like the UNDP, should allow for further consolidation of democracy in Brazil.

The UNDP has long been promoting its principles of good governance in Brazil, and working with the Brazilian government to make the transition and return to a democratic political system. The principles of good governance as set out by the UNDP, with the assumption of a democratic system, include participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, responsiveness, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, consensus orientation, and strategic vision. Together, these principles represent an ideal form of management of a country’s affairs that enable it to move toward sustainable human development and, particularly in the case of developing countries, poverty reduction.

The UNDP, in conjunction with the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, has designed the second country cooperation framework for Brazil to be carried out during the period 2002-2006. The good governance principles targeted by this framework are participation, equity, responsiveness, and efficiency and effectiveness. Participation is being addressed through "the provision of high-quality education as a critical challenge to the full exercise of citizenship". The Brazilian government and the UNDP have "launched a massive reform of elementary, high school and vocational education, focusing among other things, on upgrading the quality of teachers and school management". This part of the program hopes to ensure the capacity of current and future generations to participate meaningfully in the political process.

Equity and responsiveness are being promoted through a sustainable human development and poverty eradication approach. This includes the continued use of the human development indices, based on UNDP’s index, at the regional level in Brazil as a tool for federal budget allocations, as well as the future application of this distributional tool at the local level. The use of these indices entails allocating greater resources to Brazil’s most disadvantaged states and municipalities. Finally, efficiency and effectiveness, under this country cooperation framework, are sought through "public administration that is results-oriented, cost-effective, and citizen responsive" in terms of the quality and availability of public services. Furthermore, the UNDP is supporting "interventions for continued macroeconomic stability, such as the Reform of the Social Security System (the major source of public deficit) and Reform of Fiscal Administration, to achieve a sustainable fiscal balance, based on an efficient and transparent management of revenues and expenditures".

The role of the UNDP in expanding good, democratic governance in Brazil has been one of capacity building and support. The most innovative idea put into place was that of using human development indices at the federal level to aid with budgetary allocations. It was not mentioned, however, whether ways of tracking the use of those allocations have also been created to ensure that those with power in particularly poor regions are not taking advantage of extra funds as has occurred throughout Brazil’s history. The educational component of this country cooperation framework has also been important, and demonstrates strategic vision on the part of the Brazilian government, as well as a commitment to enabling political participation. Through this framework the UNDP has been able to target 30,000 under-qualified teachers in the North, Northeast and Center-west regions of Brazil, providing them with a distance training program. Thus, the UNDP has aided Brazil’s improvement of democratic governance through support and capacity building and addressing key issues like resource distribution. The obstacles to Brazil’s expansion of democratic governance, however, will depend much more on whether other agents in Brazil are able to capitalize on the currently amenable structural conditions to create the kind of social, political and economic changes necessary to ensure and strengthen democracy within the country.

According to the UNDP, accountability means that "decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organisations are [responsible] to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organisation and whether the decision is internal or external to an organization". Institutionalizing accountability is crucial to democratization, particularly in newer democracies where there is a disconnect between public policy and societal demands. "Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them". Transparency is important because it not only allows for meaningful participation by the people, if they so choose, but also because it creates an enabling environment for holding political actors accountable to their constituents.

Thus, two critical components for a balanced relationship between the people, the government and the state, or a democratic social contract are transparency and accountability. In Brazil transparency and accountability are weak, namely at the state and federal levels of government. With the fall of the military regime and consequent reopening of the Brazilian political and social systems came a redistribution of national resources. As noted by David Samuels and Fernando Luis Abrucio, "[what] marked the Brazilian transition was the ‘traditional’, conservative political elite’s ability to maintain power". He also notes that the newer, capitalist elite followed the lead of their traditional counterparts and both were able to "project state-government interests into national politics" through the building of the 1988 Constitution. The new constitution brought a great decentralization of "tax bases, revenues and block transfers", but as discussed by Wayne Selcher, "no concomitant strategy was followed to develop and coordinate either the responsibilities or capabilities to meet them". Political elites in Brazil enlarged their wealth and power through the democratic transition without having to take on extra responsibility, and thus were less accountable for the decisions that were made with the extra funds they received. The federal government has given itself little recourse for holding the state governments accountable for their spending and public administration. The North and Northeast, for example, "receive productive resources…reaching two-thirds of the net Federal transfers" yet have not engaged in reforms that would benefit their regions economically and socially. In fact, some have scholars have noted that transfers to these regions from the federal government later leave these regions as "capital flight". Furthermore, in the North, Northeast and Center West regions high percentages of public sector employment, combined with a high concentration of land ownership by elites, the lack of a job-providing private sector, and a weaker civic culture as compared to the South and the Southeast, have created an environment amenable to patron-client relations. That is, power relations, extremely in favor of traditional landowning elite, as they are the main providers of employment, give that elite political leverage that allows them to maintain their privileged status. Continued systems of patronage and elite capture of national resources should be major concerns for the UNDP, for example, which is pushing for the use of human development indices to aid the federal government in redistributing resources to the poorer regions of the country. The problems of poverty and poor quality public services may not be the result of insufficient funds, but rather the ability of the people and the federal government to hold the state governments accountable. Since the fiscal problems of the late 1990s, however, the federal government did take steps to institutionalize accountability of state governments through the necessary renegotiations of state debts, including those of the South and Southeast. The need of state governments to renegotiate these debts gave the federal government sufficient leverage to bind them to "stringency programs of reduced expenditures," particularly with regard to public payroll spending. These measures, however, did not require that resources be diverted to programs and projects that would improve social indicators nor did they require a more transparent use of funds.

Also impeding accountability and transparency is Brazil’s weak national party system. According to David Samuels:

The weakness of political parties denies the people the creation of national public programs that they may or may not uphold as legitimate programs addressing their concerns. Instead, they are caught in a system that perpetuates patron-client relations based upon the benefits an individual promises to bring to their municipality or state as opposed to an individual following a specified party line with goals for the nation as a whole. The weak party system also requires that politicians, especially governors and presidential candidates, raise large sums of money for their campaigns. These funds are generated in large part from corporations, which undoubtedly has an effect on policy decisions. But according to Samuels "Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva [has] garnered relatively many votes…despite access to relatively little cash, because his Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party), in contrast to Brazil's other major parties, possesses a cohesive national reputation and organization" based on a specific platform as opposed to a mere persona. In addition, the successes of its programs, such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, have gained recognition throughout the country, perhaps creating an impetus for change. Still, most political elites do not run closely with a party and thus are not subject to disciplinary measures by their parties. That is, they are not held accountable by their parties for not following the set ideology or strategy, for example, with the threat of not being nominated or supported as a candidate.

These issues of transparency and accountability have serious ramifications for development, democratization and democratic governance in Brazil. As Kurt Weyland notes "[the] quality of a new democracy, in turn, depends partly on how politics was organized under authoritarian rule. For instance, where clientelism was rampant and "rent-seeking" interest groups had great influence, these corrosive forces are likely to persist and further to diminish the strength of the state under democracy". In the case of Brazil, clientelism was rampant before and during authoritarian rule. It has hindered the ability of the State to bring about the kinds of socioeconomic reforms that would address Brazil’s notorious economic inequality and bring about broad-based sustainable development. For this reason transparency and accountability are probably the most pressing issues facing new president Luiz Inácio da Silva and his administration. He will no doubt face serious opposition to such reforms. However, dealing with transparency and accountability as opposed to trying to implement tax, social insurance and land reforms may be a "round about" way of tackling the country’s serious distributive problems. That is, institutionalizing transparency and accountability through policies that require a demonstration of use of federal transfers and a demonstration of positive social and economic results may very well be less threatening than direct reforms like those mentioned above. Such policies would also be well received by international financial institutions concerned with Brazil’s financial and fiscal viability, due to high indebtedness at both the state and federal levels. Brazil today has a greater opportunity than it ever has to improve its resource and income distribution. Specifically, President da Silva has broad public support, particularly of a mobilized working and underclass, to institute reforms. Longstanding power relations in favor of the elite will of course be the greatest obstacle to such reforms. Still, the opportunity to create change is present. The structural preconditions laid out by Sorenson as necessary for the consolidation of democracy, such as economic growth and development, a political culture conducive to democracy, and a large working and underclass tending toward democracy, have been met. Now it is up to agency. If Lula is able to bring the creativity of the Worker’s Party to the national government and institutionalize transparency and accountability, without alienating the international financial community and without directly threatening the elite by capitalizing on a gradual process of change, then he will have irreversibly opened the doors for change.

Above information collected from the UNDP Human Development Report 2002

N/R = not reported

*Scale of -10 to 10 with -10 signifying less democratic and 10 signifying more democratic

**Scale of 1-7 with 1 signifying free and 7 signifying not free

***Scale of 0 to 100 with 0 to 30 signifying free, 31 to 60 partly free, 61 to 100 not free

****Scale of -2.5 to 2.5 where 2.5 is best

*****Scale of 0 to 6 where 6 is best

******Scale of 0 to 10 where 10 is best

"Brazil at a Glance." The World Bank Group. www.worldbank.com

IMF SURVEY. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2002/091602.pdf

Black, Jan K. "Democracy and Development in Brazil: Cardoso’s Catch 22."

Human Development Report 2002. Oxford University Press: New York, 2002.

Tornquist, Olle. Politics and Development. London: Sage Publications, 1999.